{
  "id": 1878674,
  "name": "Mary Ellen JACKSON, Jerry D. JEWELL and Ometa M. JEWELL v. FARM AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jackson v. Farm & Commercial Properties",
  "decision_date": "1984-12-03",
  "docket_number": "84-186",
  "first_page": "130",
  "last_page": "133",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "284 Ark. 130"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "680 S.W.2d 105"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "281 Ark. 84",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1742334
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/281/0084-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "280 Ark. 275",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1744749
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/280/0275-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "265 Ark. 668",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1665002
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/265/0668-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "278 Ark. 475",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1748053
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/278/0475-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 316,
    "char_count": 4964,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.837,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.5041076769248298e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6662108485861531
    },
    "sha256": "3f024e0f51b1c035f0f9f7f09ba6acb7932d9fe5fe4a0074b93c76a5c9295a61",
    "simhash": "1:446bc0ef709e5dff",
    "word_count": 826
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:32.164820+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Hays, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Mary Ellen JACKSON, Jerry D. JEWELL and Ometa M. JEWELL v. FARM AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Webb Hubbell, Chief Justice.\nThis is an appeal from a decree of the Pulaski County Chancery Court ordering appellants, Mary Ellen Jackson, Jerry Jewell, and Ometa Jewell to specifically perform a contract to sell real property. Jerry Jewell borrowed money from Barney Mays and deeded property to Dorothy Mays as security for the loan. Dr. Jewell and Barney Mays had an understanding that the property would be reconveyed upon repayment of the loan. Barney Mays, who was president of Mays Realty, listed the property for sale. One of his agents found a buyer, appellee, who made an offer to purchase the property on January 9, 1979. During that same month, Dr. Jewell repaid the loan, and at Dr. Jewell\u2019s request, Mrs. Mays deeded the property to Dr. Jewell\u2019s secretary, Mary Ellen Jackson. Appellee made another offer; the offer and acceptance was signed; and $200.00 earnest money was accepted by the agent of Mays Realty. On April 23, 1981, appellee sued for specific performance of this land sale contract. The chancellor ruled that the contract was valid and that appellee was entitled toa decree of specific performance. Appellants urge error in the chancellor\u2019s finding that Mary Ellen Jackson had authority to sign the land sale contract and error in actions by the chancellor at trial. We affirm.\nThe chancellor made the following findings of fact: 1) Mary Ellen Jackson held record title to the real property; 2) Mary Ellen Jackson entered into the written land sale contract with appellee as buyer; 3) Mary Ellen Jackson signed the contract at the direction of Jerry Jewell and as agent of Jerry Jewell and Ometa Jewell, and her signature on the contract is not a forgery. Findings of fact by the chancellor shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. ARCP Rule 52. Ivey v. Bray, 278 Ark. 475, 647 S.W.2d 430 (1983). Since the question of preponderance turns heavily on the credibility of the witnesses, we defer to the superior position of the chancellor in this regard. Hackworth v. First National Bank of Crossett, 265 Ark. 668, 580 S.W.2d 465 (1979). Mary Ellen Jackson held record title to the property. Her signature appeared on a valid contract for the sale of land for which consideration in the amount of $200.00 was paid. One of the partners of Farm and Commercial Property testified that although he had numerous conversations with Dr. Jewell about the price of the property, \u201cthere was never anything said that it [the signature] was a forgery or even anything improper about it.\u201d An agent for Mays Realty testified that Dr. Jewell set up an appointment with him to meet with Mary Ellen Jackson for her to sign the offer and acceptance. He further testified that he took the offer to her apartment where, stating she was authorized to sign by Dr. Jewell, she signed it in his presence. We conclude the chancellor did not err in finding that Mary Ellen Jackson, as Dr. Jewell\u2019s agent, had authority to sign the offer and acceptance nor in awarding appellee specific performance of the land sale contract.\nAppellants also contend the chancellor erred in prematurely ruling that Mary Ellen Jackson\u2019s signature was not a forgery and in calling a witness to the stand after he had been excused. In the direct examination of Jerry Jewell concerning Mary Ellen Jackson\u2019s signature, he stated \u201cI think it\u2019s a forgery.\u201d The chancellor then stated \u201cThe Court made a Ruling on that, or if it didn\u2019t, the Court is going to make a Ruling after taking extensive evidence that that is not a forgery. That that is Ms. Jackson\u2019s signature, and let\u2019s move on from that question.\u201d Although the trial court may have erred in refusing to accept appellants\u2019 evidence that the signature on the offer and acceptance was a forgery, appellants\u2019 counsel did not attempt to proffer any evidence. An exclusion of evidence cannot be reviewed in the absence of a proffer showing what the evidence would have been. Malcolm v. Thompson, 280 Ark. 275, 658 S.W.2d 357 (1983).\nAt the beginning of the proceedings, appellants\u2019 counsel had requested \u201cthe rule\u201d to be invoked, and the chancellor so ordered. During the questioning of appellee\u2019s second witness, the first witness, who had been excused, re-entered the courtroom. The chancellor recognized his presence, asked him a question, and allowed appellant\u2019s counsel to question him. Although the chancellor\u2019s action may have constituted error, counsel for appellee failed to object. The absence of a timely objection precludes a consideration of the matter on appeal. Hopper v. Denham, 281 Ark. 84, 661 S.W.2d 379 (1983).\nAffirmed.\nHays, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Webb Hubbell, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Acchione & King, by: Harold King; and Lazar M. Palnick, for appellant.",
      "Plegge &r Church, by: Beresford L. Church, Jr., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Mary Ellen JACKSON, Jerry D. JEWELL and Ometa M. JEWELL v. FARM AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES\n84-186\n680 S.W.2d 105\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 3, 1984\nAcchione & King, by: Harold King; and Lazar M. Palnick, for appellant.\nPlegge &r Church, by: Beresford L. Church, Jr., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0130-01",
  "first_page_order": 158,
  "last_page_order": 161
}