{ "id": 1878659, "name": "Thomas Jeffrey TACKETT v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Tackett v. State", "decision_date": "1984-12-10", "docket_number": "CR 84-179", "first_page": "211", "last_page": "214", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "284 Ark. 211" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "680 S.W.2d 696" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "280 Ark. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744801 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.W.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1753697, 1753605 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0489-01", "/ark/275/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753605 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.W. 2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744865 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 2052", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ark. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137235 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/12/0057-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 380, "char_count": 5013, "ocr_confidence": 0.826, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.001631534143703e-07, "percentile": 0.9058201848833658 }, "sha256": "b01e66bf0368b2c5c8c05070329be03fc48e2bb81e81c9ef1014d54ef6da7c66", "simhash": "1:76d319150630b5d2", "word_count": 820 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:32.164820+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Thomas Jeffrey TACKETT v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per Curiam.\nPetitioner Thomas Jeffrey Tackett was found guil ty by a jury of manslaughter and leaving the scene of a personal injury accident. He was sentenced to a term of eight years imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. He appealed the manslaughter conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Tackett v. State, 12 Ark. App. 57, 670 S.W.2d 824 (1984). Petitioner now seeks permission to proceed in circuit court for postconviction relief pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.\nPetitioner first alleges that counsel did not adequately investigate the circumstances of the automobile accident which led to his conviction for manslaughter. The record indicates that counsel called the petitioner and four other witnesses in an attempt to establish that petitioner was not at faul t in the accident. Counsel also cross-examined the State\u2019s witnesses at length on the State\u2019s version of how the accident occurred. Although petitioner contends that counsel should have investigated the crime scene, he does not explain what helpful information such an investigation would have revealed. Counsel has \u201ca duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.\u201d Strickland v. Washington, -U.S--, 104 S. Ct. 2052, (1984). Even if counsel did not visit the scene of the accident, his decision not to do so must be assessed for reasonableness based on all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure a deference to counsel\u2019s judgments. Strickland v. Washington. Since petitioner has not demonstrated that counsel failed to develop any specific element of the defense, we find no basis for a finding of incompetence.\nPetitioner next contends that several witnesses could have been called to testify that the victims whose car went off the road had been to a beer party and were using drugs before on the day of the accident. He also contends that there were two witnesses who could have testified that one of the victims caused the accident by j umping from the back seat to the front seat of the car.\nIt is well settled that the decision to call certain witnesses and reject other potential witnesses is largely a matter of trial strategy. Counsel must use his own best judgment to determine which witnesses will be beneficial to his client. See Hayes v. State, 280 Ark. 509, 660 S.W. 2d 648 (1983). It is possible that another attorney might have attempted, and perhaps succeeded, in having the testimony of the witnesses admitted into evidence, but petitioner has not established that counsel\u2019s decision prejudiced him or amounted to more than a tactical decision.\nPetitioner\u2019s final allegation concerns a statement made by venireman Owens during voir dire. The following exchange occurred between counsel and Mr. Owens:\nState: Mr. Owens, have you heard the questions I have asked these other jurors?\nJuror: Yeah.\nState: Would your answer be similar to theirs?\nJuror: No.\nState: Okay. Thank you, sir. Pass.\nCounsel for Petitioner: Pass him back.\nState: One moment, Your Honor. Good, Your Honor.\nCounsel for Petitioner: He\u2019s good.\nThe Court: Take a seat in the jury box.\nPetitioner argues that the juror\u2019s answers indicated that he was not willing to abide by the Court\u2019s instructions, but the record is silent as to what Mr. Owens was referring when he said, \u201cNo.\u201d A reading of the complete voir dire reveals that the routine questions of the prosecutor were sometimes framed, \u201cwould your answers be the same\u201d and at other times, \u201cwould your answers be different.\u201d After listening to a number of other people answer, it is not unlikely that Mr. Owens simply misunderstood the question. In any event, petitioner has failed to show that he suffered any actual prejudice from Owens\u2019 presence on the jury. To prevail on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to jury selection a petitioner first has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption that jurors are unbiased. Urquhart v. State, 275 Ark. 486, 631 S.W.2d 304 (1982) . To accomplish this, a petition must demonstrate actual bias. Jeffers v. State, 280 Ark. 458, 658 S.W.2d 869 (1983) . Moreover, the actual bias must have been sufficient to prejudice the petitioner to the degree that he was denied a fair trial. Although the record would be clearer with regard to Mr. Owens\u2019 position if counsel had questioned him further, counsel was in a position to assess the juror\u2019s demeanor and weigh his suitability as a juror. As petitioner has not shown that he was actually prejudiced by counsel\u2019s conduct to the point that he was denied a fair adjudication of his guilt, we cannot say that counsel was ineffective. See Strickland v. Washington, - U.S--- 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) .\nPetition denied.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per Curiam." } ], "attorneys": [ "Appellant, pro se.", "Steve Clark, Att'y Gen., by: Jack Gillean, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Thomas Jeffrey TACKETT v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 84-179\n680 S.W.2d 696\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 10, 1984\nAppellant, pro se.\nSteve Clark, Att'y Gen., by: Jack Gillean, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee" }, "file_name": "0211-01", "first_page_order": 239, "last_page_order": 242 }