{ "id": 1878686, "name": "Gregory C. SPARROW v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Sparrow v. State", "decision_date": "1985-01-21", "docket_number": "CR 84-160", "first_page": "396", "last_page": "398", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "284 Ark. 396" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "683 S.W.2d 218" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "257 Ark. 1057", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/1057-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878678 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878690 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ark. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1879959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/283/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ark. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1751553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/276/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045986 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ark. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1597687 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/248/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/255/0225-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 373, "char_count": 4330, "ocr_confidence": 0.84, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.768149542874144e-07, "percentile": 0.9507604497405061 }, "sha256": "7c4aa9a61285cbb3fd470e3c8d07bd525b73c8c22c83e88e337ac3e2b0f301a0", "simhash": "1:59cf1943780a7a11", "word_count": 740 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:32.164820+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Gregory C. SPARROW v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Darrell hickman, Justice.\nThis is another in a series of cases challenging the Omnibus DWI Act. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 75-1031.1, 75-1045, 75-2501 \u2014 75-2514 (Supp. 1983). Gregory C. Sparrow, the appellant, was found guilty of speeding and driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 0.10%. According to the chemical test, he had a blood alcohol content of 0.17%, and he admitted to having at least three drinks prior to driving. He appealed his conviction to the Washington County Circuit Court and waived a j ury. He was found guilty, fined $300, plus costs, sentenced to 24 hours continuous incarceration in the city jail and his license was suspended for 90 days.\nOn appeal he raises questions which, with minor exceptions, have been answered in previous cases. He argues that the DWI law violates the separation of powers provision in the Arkansas and United States Constitutions in that it takes away from the prosecuting attorney and the court the right to reduce a charge and accept plea bargains and places that power within the hands of the policeman, who files the charge. Appellant cites no authority for these propositions. This part of the law is not unconstitutional. It is well settled that it is for the legislative branch of a state or federal government to determine the kind of conduct that constitutes a crime and the nature and extent of the punishment which may be imposed. Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973); Thom v. State, 248 Ark. 180, 450 S.W.2d 550 (1970); C. E. Torcia, Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law \u00a7 10 (1978). See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law \u00a7 589 (1981). In fact, there is no authority for Sparrow\u2019s contentions that penalties and their imposition are for the courts to decide.\nSparrow cites no authority for his argument that he is deprived of the right to plea bargain, nor does he even maintain that it is his right. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the United States Supreme Court said: \u201cThe States in their wisdom . . . may prohibit the practice of accepting pleas to lesser included offenses under any circumstances.\u201d Plea bargaining is merely a tool to aid in the administration of justice. Furthermore, statutes are valid which provide that an accused may not plead guilty. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law 422 (1).\nSparrow also argues that he should have been taken before a judicial officer for a probable cause determination since he was arrested without a warrant. ARCP Rule 8.1 requires that one arrested shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. Here, Sparrow was detained approximately six and one-half hours. We find no violation of Rule 8.1. See Brown v. State, 276 Ark. 20, 631 S.W.2d 829 (1982).\nThe other arguments that Sparrow raises on appeal have been answered in other cases. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-2503 (b) (Supp. 1983) is not void for vagueness. Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 425, 678 S.W.2d 318 (1984); Long v. State, 284 Ark. 21, 680 S.W.2d 686 (1984). Sparrow argues that the statute requires that he be informed that he may take another breath chemical test in addition to the one he was given. The written warning that Sparrow signed stated that he had the right to request a test of a different type. However, it also stated \u201cI will assist you in obtaining another test of your choice . . .\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-1045 (c) (3) only requires that an individual be advised that he can have tests \u201cin addition to any test administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer.\u201d The facts in this case are virtually identical to those in Spicer v. City of Fayetteville, 284 Ark. 315, 681 S.W.2d 369 (1984), and, again, we find no error.\nSparrow also contends that he was not observed for 20 minutes by the operator of the machine as required by the department of health standards. Substantial compliance with health department regulations is all that is required. Munn v. State, 257 Ark. 1057, 521 S.W.2d 535 (1975). As in Spicer v. State, supra, the appellant was collectively observed by officers for 30 minutes prior to the administering of the test.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Darrell hickman, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Darrell E. Baker, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Gregory C. SPARROW v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 84-160\n683 S.W.2d 218\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 21, 1985\nDarrell E. Baker, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0396-01", "first_page_order": 426, "last_page_order": 428 }