{
  "id": 1878568,
  "name": "Coy W. PRUITT v. CARGILL, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pruitt v. Cargill, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1985-02-04",
  "docket_number": "84-197",
  "first_page": "474",
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      "cite": "683 S.W.2d 906"
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      "cite": "54 Or. App. 886",
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      "reporter": "Or. App.",
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        2086629
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:32.164820+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Coy W. PRUITT v. CARGILL, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThe question before the court concerns the granting of a motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court.\nThe appellant, Coy W. Pruitt, and the appellee, Cargill, Inc., entered into a Feeder Pig Production and Hog Feeding Agreement. During the course of the agreement, Pruitt purchased a used water tank. The tank was delivered to the appellant by an employee of Cargill. Subsequently, Cargill filed suit against Pruitt seeking the balance due on a loan. Pruitt filed a counterclaim in which he alleged that Cargill had supplied him with the water tank and that it was defective. Cargill denied that it had supplied the water tank and filed a motion for summary judgment as to the counterclaim. The motion was granted by the trial court. This case is before us under Sup. Ct. R. 29(1 )(m) as it presents a question in the law of products liability.\nIn support of his claim that Cargill supplied the water tank, Pruitt offered two affidavits. The first, an affidavit by Pruitt, states that an employee of Cargill told him that he needed the water tank and that subsequently, the same employee delivered the water tank to the Pruit farm in a Cargill truck. Pruitt said, \u201cI thought that I was buying the tank from Cargill.\u201d The second affidavit is by an employee of Pruitt\u2019s who stated that he was present when the water tanks were delivered and, he too thought that Pruitt bought the tanks from Cargill.\nThe appellee supplied nine affidavits of employees and business associates all of which state that Cargill has never engaged in the business of selling or distributing used water tanks. Furthermore, the Cargill employee who delivered the tank stated that he did so as a favor and at Pruitt\u2019s request. The employee stated that he picked the used tank up for Pruitt from a Russellville company.\nThe trial judge held that,\n[T]he basic issue before the Court is whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Cargill, Inc., \u201csupplied\u201d the used tank in the instant case and is, therefore, subject to liability under Ark. Stat. 85-2-318.2____\nIt appears to the Court that defendant\u2019s argument does not raise a genuine issue of fact. The question is not whether plaintiff appeared to be a \u201csupplier\u201d but whether plaintiff was, in fact, a supplier. There is nothing shown by the pleadings and exhibits that creates an issue of fact on this point, and, therefore, the Court does grant plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent part:\nA supplier of a product is subject to liability in damages for harm to a person or to property if:\n(a) the supplier is engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing or otherwise distributing such product;\nHere, there was no proof that Cargill, Inc., was engaged in the business of supplying water tanks. See Lancaster v. Hartzell & Assoc., 54 Or. App. 886, 637 P.2d 150 (1981); Tauber-Arons, Etc. v. Superior Court, Etc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980); McKenna v. Art Pearl Works, Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 362, 310 A.2d 677 (1973); Pridgett v. Jackson Iron and Metal Co., 253 So. 2d.837 (1971, Miss.).\nSummary judgment is proper when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d AR Civ. P Rule 56(c).\nAlthough affidavits for summary judgment are construed against the moving party, once the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement the respondent must meet proof with proof by showing a genuine issue as to a material fact. Hughes Western World, Inc. v. Westmoor Mfg. Co., 269 Ark. 300, 601 S.W.2d 826 (1980). In Hughes this court found that the respondent\u2019s burden of going forward was not met when the affidavits did not assert the required personal knowledge of facts alleged. The qualification, \u201cas Affiant understands it,\u201d was not found to be a positive statement made on personal knowledge as required by AR Civ. P Rule 56. The same is true here. Cargill\u2019s proof that it is not a supplier of water tanks is prima facie evidence of entitlement to summary judgment. The mere assertion in Pruitt\u2019s affidavit that he \u201cthought\u201d he was buying the tank from Cargill is not a sufficient statement of fact, based on Pruitt\u2019s personal knowledge, that Cargill was a supplier of the product in question. Accordingly, summary judgment is proper.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Witt Law Firm, by: Ernie Witt, and R. Kevin Barham, for appellant.",
      "Mobley ir Smith, by: William F. Smith, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Coy W. PRUITT v. CARGILL, INC.\n84-197\n683 S.W.2d 906\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 4, 1985\nWitt Law Firm, by: Ernie Witt, and R. Kevin Barham, for appellant.\nMobley ir Smith, by: William F. Smith, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0474-01",
  "first_page_order": 512,
  "last_page_order": 515
}