{ "id": 1877706, "name": "Lonnie DUDLEY v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Dudley v. State", "decision_date": "1985-03-04", "docket_number": "CR 85-13", "first_page": "160", "last_page": "163", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "285 Ark. 160" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "685 S.W.2d 170" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 S. Ct. 3308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6199647 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182629 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11643095 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 2052", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ark. 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1624208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/254/0961-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 365, "char_count": 5114, "ocr_confidence": 0.825, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.295494978499395e-08, "percentile": 0.5123563188432994 }, "sha256": "98c96f9856a070a93ddbc48a396ecaee6ee5f6cf036892154c3f18e436e957ac", "simhash": "1:5b14558e7c0c7716", "word_count": 832 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:39.025760+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Lonnie DUDLEY v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per Curiam.\nPetitioner Lonnie W. Dudley stabbed a fellow inmate at Cummins Prison and was subsequently convicted by a jury of first degree battery, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1601 (1977). He was sentenced as an habitual offender with five prior felony convictions to a term of thirty years imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Dudley v. State, CA CR 83-21 (September 21, 1983). Petitioner seeks permission to proceed in circuit court for postconviction relief pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and the failure of the trial court to raise sua sponte the issue of his sanity.\nPetitioner was examined before trial by the Southeast Mental Health Center and found competent. He contends now that he was not competent to stand trial and was mentally ill before, during and after the stabbing. He alleges that if counsel had investigated, he would have found evidence of his long history of mental illness and proof that he was under the influence of a drug when he stabbed the inmate. Petitioner argues that counsel should have put the evidence of his insanity before the jury even though he was found legally competent when examined at the mental health center.\nPetitioner called several witnesses at trial to testify that he was watching television when the crime occurred. The main point of this petition appears to be that counsel should have employed an insanity defense instead of the alibi strategy which proved unsuccessful. If the question is one of mere trial strategy, then petitioner has stated no ground for granting postconviction relief. Questions of trial strategy are matters of professional judgment about which experienced advocates could engage in endless debate. As a result, such questions are not cognizable under Rule 37. Leasure v State, 254 Ark. 961, 497 S.W.2d 1 (1973).\nPetitioner suggests, however, that counsel\u2019s conduct was unreasonable and therefore should be considered fundamentally unsound representation. Petitioner lists witnesses who could have testified to his history of mental illness, drug use at the time of the offense and his general incompetence to stand trial, implying that an insanity defense was the only real choice open to counsel.\nThe United States Supreme Court has provided guidelines for assessing attorney performance in the area of investigation of a defense. These guidelines are applicable to petitioner\u2019s case.\n[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. Strickland v. Washington,_U.S._, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).\nIn light of the psychiatric report finding petitioner legally competent, petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel\u2019s decision to employ an alibi amounted to other than a reasonable professional judgment. The mere fact that an accused might have raised the question of mental competence at trial does not entitle him to a new trial or a hearing pursuant to Rule 37.\nThe allegation that the trial court should have injected the question of petitioner\u2019s sanity into the proceedings and given an instruction on insanity as a defense is without merit. While a trial court should be alert to circumstances suggesting that an accused is not competent to stand trial, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), there is nothing in the petition before us to show that the court had any reason to question the petitioner\u2019s competence.\nAfter trial, counsel filed a motion to be relieved and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there was no merit to the appeal of the judgment. Petitioner\u2019s final assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is that filing a \u201cno merit\u201d brief is tantamount to ineffective assistance. He contends that counsel should have raised on appeal the issues presented in this petition.\nThe decision to file an Anders brief is a matter of professional judgment. Counsel, not the appellant, must decide whether the issues raised at trial are meritorious. See Jones v. Barnes, _ U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983). Moreover, the sanity issue was not raised at trial and could not have been reviewed on appeal. If there were other issues which appellant wished to raise on appeal, he had the opportunity to raise them himself since he was informed of his right to file a brief in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 11 (h) but did not do so.\nPetition denied.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per Curiam." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pro Se Petition to Proceed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37; denied.", "Appellant, pro se.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Michael E. Wheeler, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Lonnie DUDLEY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 85-13\n685 S.W.2d 170\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 4, 1985\nPro Se Petition to Proceed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37; denied.\nAppellant, pro se.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Michael E. Wheeler, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0160-01", "first_page_order": 184, "last_page_order": 187 }