{
  "id": 1876559,
  "name": "John C. PULLAN, d/b/a SHEAR PLEASURE FAMILY HAIR CARE v. Julia P. FULBRIGHT, d/b/a JULIA'S SHEAR PLEASURE BEAUTY SALON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pullan v. Fulbright",
  "decision_date": "1985-09-23",
  "docket_number": "85-79",
  "first_page": "21",
  "last_page": "25",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "287 Ark. 21"
    },
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      "cite": "695 S.W.2d 830"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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      "cite": "230 Ark. 319",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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      "year": 1959,
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    {
      "cite": "185 F. Supp. 895",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F. Supp.",
      "case_ids": [
        1443215
      ],
      "year": 1960,
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          "page": "903"
        }
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      "case_paths": [
        "/f-supp/185/0895-01"
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    {
      "cite": "207 F. Supp. 718",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F. Supp.",
      "case_ids": [
        1461019
      ],
      "year": 1962,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "732-735"
        }
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f-supp/207/0718-01"
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 360,
    "char_count": 5148,
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    "word_count": 864
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:17:15.669869+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Purtle, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "John C. PULLAN, d/b/a SHEAR PLEASURE FAMILY HAIR CARE v. Julia P. FULBRIGHT, d/b/a JULIA\u2019S SHEAR PLEASURE BEAUTY SALON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nSince October 1980, appellee, Julia P. Fulbright, has operated a beauty salon in Fort Smith under the name of Julia\u2019s Shear Pleasure Beauty Salon. Since March 1983, appellant, John C. Pul\u00edan, has operated a barber shop in Van Bur\u00e9n under the name of Shear Pleasure Family Hair Care. In August 1983, five months after appellant opened his barber shop, appellee registered the trademark \u201cshear pleasure\u201d with cutting shears above the word \u201cshear\u201d and surrounded by a border. Appellee then brought an action to enjoin appellant from alleged unfair competition through the use of her trade name. The trial court entered a decree enjoining appellant from using the trade name \u201cshear pleasure.\u201d We reverse and dismiss.\nTrade names are afforded protection under the law of unfair competition. They are protected by a registration statute and by the common law. See Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 70-539(e), \u00a7 70-550, and \u00a7 70-552 (Repl. 1979). Appellee does not contend that the trade name registration statute, \u00a7 70-540(e), affords her any protection, perhaps because she did not register her trademark until after appellant began using his trade name. However, she does contend that the common law, coupled with \u00a7 70-550 may afford her protection. The pertinent part of \u00a7 70-550 provides:\nLikelihood of injury to. . .a trade name valid at common law, shall be grounds for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of . . . services.\nAppellant does not contend that the names themselves are sufficiently distinguishable so as to avoid confusion. See Shoppers Fair of Ark., Inc. v. Sanders Co., 207 F. Supp. 718, at 732-735 (W.D. Ark. 1962). Rather, he contends that the words \u201cshear pleasure\u201d are descriptive words which have not acquired a \u201csecondary meaning\u201d or a new significance by which the public recognizes appellee\u2019s trade name in appellant\u2019s business area. We agree.\nDescriptive words may not be afforded the status of a trade name unless they have acquired a \u201csecondary meaning.\u201d The concept of \u201csecondary meaning\u201d has been explained as follows:\nThere are certain names, marks, and symbols which in their primary sense are merely generic or descriptive and do not ordinarily indicate the origin of goods or services. Such names, marks, or symbols, when used in their primary sense, cannot form the subject matter of a trade or service mark. However, a name, mark, or symbol by long and exclusive use and advertising by one person in the sale of his goods and services may become so associated in the public mind with such goods or services that it serves to identify them and distinguish them from the goods or services of others. When such an association exists, the name, mark, or symbol is said to have acquired a \u2018secondary meaning\u2019 in which the original user has a property right which equity will protect against unfair appropriation by a competitor.\nLiberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co. of Tex., 185 F. Supp. 895, 903 (E.D. Ark. 1960).\nAppellant testified that he decided to use the words \u201cshear pleasure\u201d in his trade name when he saw a coffee mug inscribed: \u201cA hairdresser is shear pleasure.\u201d He also testified that barbershops in Ozark and Clarksville, as well as Muskogee, Oklahoma, use the words \u201cshear pleasure\u201d in their names. Appellee testified that she got the idea for her trade name from a barbershop in Little Rock.\nIn Sav-A-Stop, Inc. v. Sav-A-Stop, Inc., 230 Ark. 319, 322 S.W.2d 454 (1959) we stated:\nWe agree that at common law the case at bar, due to the similarity of the names, borders on the class of cases wherein injunction would lie, but further search convinces us that in the use of words descriptive of a service, where the person using them has not used them over a long period of time substantially to the exclusion of all others who perform the same or similar services, such descriptive words will not be protected by injunctive relief, because one man cannot appropriate as his mark the usual words in the common language which would be used to describe the service rendered. In this case neither party contends that their names are a result of their own wit, but instead both admit that they got the idea from others in the same business who use the same name. The name is certainly not unique enough to either litigant from the facts presented to enable one to have its use to the exclusion of the other.\nHere, as in Sav-A-Stop, both got the idea for their names from others. The name is descriptive, not distinctive, and strong evidence is required to show that appellee\u2019s name has acquired a secondary meaning before it is entitled to common law protection. Not one single person testified that when they thought of \u201cshear pleasure\u201d they thought of appellee\u2019s beauty shop.\nReversed and dismissed.\nPurtle, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Floyd G. Rogers, for appellant.",
      "Eddie H. Walker, Jr., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John C. PULLAN, d/b/a SHEAR PLEASURE FAMILY HAIR CARE v. Julia P. FULBRIGHT, d/b/a JULIA\u2019S SHEAR PLEASURE BEAUTY SALON\n85-79\n695 S.W.2d 830\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 23, 1985\nFloyd G. Rogers, for appellant.\nEddie H. Walker, Jr., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0021-01",
  "first_page_order": 47,
  "last_page_order": 51
}