{ "id": 1876590, "name": "Stephen Craig DOLLAR v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Dollar v. State", "decision_date": "1985-10-14", "docket_number": "CR 85-168", "first_page": "153", "last_page": "155", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "287 Ark. 153" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "697 S.W.2d 93" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ohio Misc. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio Misc.", "case_ids": [ 6699289 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-misc/63/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.Y.S.2d 962", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Misc.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 810234 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/118/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 A.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11727098 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/307/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 Ark. 886", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1709168 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/270/0886-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 301, "char_count": 3250, "ocr_confidence": 0.898, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.759469888050475e-08, "percentile": 0.49512249555862137 }, "sha256": "a658b1a695543e37895a463cae4bb19dc386c9719dfeee35974948891345d886", "simhash": "1:872af5cff91c37bb", "word_count": 538 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:17:15.669869+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Purtle, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Stephen Craig DOLLAR v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nIn appealing from a DWI conviction Dollar argues that a prospective juror should have been excused for cause and that a blood alcohol test by means of a device called an Intoxilyzer does not satisfy the statutory requirement of being a \u201cchemical analysis.\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a775-1031.1 (Supp. 1985). It is the latter contention that brings the case to us under Rule 29(l)(c). Neither point has merit.\nThe juror in question was peremptorily challenged by the accused after the trial judge had refused a challenge for cause. In the selection of the jury the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges, but the record does not show that Dollar was forced to accept any juror against his wishes. In that situation there was no reversible error. Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980).\nThe Intoxilyzer showed Dollar\u2019s blood alcohol level to be .17%. Although the use of an Intoxilyzer had been approved by the State Board of Health and this particular device and its operator were properly certified, it is argued that the process was not a chemical analysis, which the statute contemplates. In making this argument the appellant relies upon the description of an Intoxilyzer as set forth in a widely used treatise, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, \u00a7 24A.01 (3d ed. 1985). There the authors explain that alcohol absorbs infrared energy. The Intoxilyzer passes an infrared light beam through the sample of accused\u2019s breath that he has blown into the device. The Intoxilyzer measures the amount of infrared energy that is absorbed by the alcohol vapor and converts that figure into a blood alcohol reading.\nWhether an Intoxilyzer makes a chemical analysis appears to have been decided in only three reported cases, all in trial courts. Every one of the cases upheld the test as being a chemical analysis. State v. Moore, 307 A.2d 548 (Del. Super. 1973); People v. Jones, 118 Misc.2d 687, 461 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Co. Ct. 1983); City of Dayton v. Schenck, 63 Ohio Misc. 14, 409 N.E.2d 284 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1980). We agree with their reasoning. Chemistry is the science that treats of the composition of substances and of the transformations which they undergo. Webster\u2019s Second New International Dictionary (1939). That accurately describes what the Intoxilyzer does in analyzing a breath sample for its alcoholic content. As the cases observe, the process is not \u201cwet chemistry,\u201d but it is nonetheless chemistry. Defense counsel argues that the legislature could easily have used some other language in the 1983 statute. Perhaps so, but the draftsmen of the statutory language exercised good judgment in leaving exact details to the discretion of the Board of Health. As this case illustrates, the Board has been able to make use of scientific methods of analysis that have been developed since the statutory language was first selected a number of years ago. The draftsmen\u2019s choice of language readily withstands the attack now made upon it.\nAffirmed.\nPurtle, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "John Wesley Hall, Jr., for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Connie Griffin, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Stephen Craig DOLLAR v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 85-168\n697 S.W.2d 93\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 14, 1985\nJohn Wesley Hall, Jr., for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Connie Griffin, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0153-01", "first_page_order": 185, "last_page_order": 187 }