{
  "id": 8719051,
  "name": "Kathy MULLEN v. Homer COUCH",
  "name_abbreviation": "Mullen v. Couch",
  "decision_date": "1986-02-18",
  "docket_number": "85-235",
  "first_page": "231",
  "last_page": "233",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "288 Ark. 231"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "703 S.W.2d 866"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
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    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "284 Ark. 183",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "260 Ark. 893",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1616790
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/260/0893-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:45:27.788923+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Purtle, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Kathy MULLEN v. Homer COUCH"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nThe question presented here is whether there is a limit on the time within which a court may grant a timely motion for a new trial. We hold that the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on the motion ninety days after the judgment is filed with the clerk. Therefore, we reverse the court\u2019s granting of the new trial motion on July 1,1985, with respect to a judgment filed February 4, 1985.\nArk. R. Civ. P. 59 is devoted to the subject of the new trial motion, and it contains short limits on moving for and responding to the motion for a new trial after a judgment. No provision is made in that rule for requiring the court to rule on the motion within a stated time. The appellant relies instead on Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-2106.4 (Repl. 1979). That statute required that the moving party request a hearing on the new trial motion within thirty days from filing the motion. It provided further that unless the motion had been \u201cpresented\u201d and the court had taken it under advisement within the thirty-day period the motion would be deemed to have been disposed of at the end of the thirty days, and the time for filing a notice of appeal would begin then.\nThat statute has obviously been superseded by Ark. R. App. P. 4(c) and its very similar provisions on when time begins to run on filing a notice of appeal after a motion for a new trial has been made or ruled on. However, the statute contained as its last sentence the following not found in the rule:\nThe expiration or lapse of a term of court or commencement of a subsequent term shall not affect the power of the court to take any action herein provided, or the time for filing notice of appeal.\nThe appellee argues that sentence favors his position, as it suggests there are no limits at all on when the court must rule on the new trial motion. We disagree because ruling on the motion is not \u201cany action herein provided\u201d as it is not governed by the statute. Additionally, we held in Jones v. Benton County Circuit Court, 260 Ark. 893, 545 S.W.2d 621 (1977), that the court could not rule on a new trial motion when the term of court in which it was made had ended and there was no evidence that the motion had been \u201cpresented\u201d or \u201ctaken under advisement\u201d within the time prescribed in \u00a7 27-2106.4. See also Smith v. Boone, 284 Ark. 183, 680 S.W.2d 709 (1984).\nWhile we are no longer governed by terms of court in this respect, we do have a rule providing that a court must act within ninety days of the filing of the judgment with the clerk if it is to modify or set aside its judgment, Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(b), unless certain conditions, not relevant here, exist. Ark. R. Civ. P. 60 (c). Although these provisions are not found in Rule 59, they apply to the power of the court to grant a new trial. The granting of a new trial necessarily involves the setting aside of any judgment entered in the case. Rule 60(c) clearly recognizes that fact when it refers to grounds for setting aside a judgment after ninety days from its filing \u201c[b]y granting a new trial\u201d and \u201c[b]y a new trial granted.\u201d See Rule 60(c)(1) and (2).\nReversed.\nPurtle, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "David Newbern, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Laser, Sharp & Mayes, P.A., for appellant.",
      "Harold King, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Kathy MULLEN v. Homer COUCH\n85-235\n703 S.W.2d 866\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 18, 1986\nLaser, Sharp & Mayes, P.A., for appellant.\nHarold King, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0231-01",
  "first_page_order": 259,
  "last_page_order": 261
}