{ "id": 8719289, "name": "Chester and Hilda R. WARREN v. Toney ROBINSON, Shirley ROBINSON, Warren G. SOUTHARD and Yvonne WORKMAN", "name_abbreviation": "Warren v. Robinson", "decision_date": "1986-02-24", "docket_number": "85-65", "first_page": "249", "last_page": "254", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 Ark. 249" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "704 S.W.2d 614" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "253 Ark. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.W.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1740730, 1740780 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0417-01", "/ark/282/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ark. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1740780 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721463 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ark. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1656627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/221/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ark. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1681353 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/236/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ark. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718827 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ark. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1678951 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/261/0690-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 513, "char_count": 9235, "ocr_confidence": 0.927, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1082648544711147e-07, "percentile": 0.8597985828517416 }, "sha256": "2529f5cb6316c90b264bd337e4db9f5de2e192eb7121795d1763787d3e335b19", "simhash": "1:b000c3631d4319fd", "word_count": 1549 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:45:27.788923+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Purtle, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Chester and Hilda R. WARREN v. Toney ROBINSON, Shirley ROBINSON, Warren G. SOUTHARD and Yvonne WORKMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThis is a second appeal arising from a lawsuit over an easement for use of a roadway and contempt proceedings for violation of the trial court\u2019s previous orders. Our jurisdiction is based upon Sup. Ct. R. 29(1)(j).\nIn the previous appeal of this case, Warren v. Cudd, 261 Ark. 690, 550 S.W.2d 773 (1977), we affirmed the findings of the trial court establishing an easement, but we further held that the use of the roadway was restricted by the conditions mutually agreed upon by the parties\u2019 predecessors in title. The conditions were that the gate would be locked, that the public would be kept out, and that only the rebuilt roadway would be used. The Chancery Court decision was entered of record in September of 1976, and was affirmed as modified by this court in May of 1977.\nIn February, 1983, the appellees filed a petition in Chancery Court alleging the appellants had maliciously removed the existing gate and placed a fence across the roadway, thereby totally restricting appellees\u2019 use. This matter apparently was heard by the court on September 6,1983, at which time the trial court found appellants in contempt of court. The court\u2019s order, however, was not filed of record until August 16, 1985.\nOn January 15,1985, after another hearing, the Chancellor found that:\nthe defendants [appellants] are in contempt of this Court\u2019s prior orders and hereby orders that:\n1. The defendants at no time will place any gate across the road in issue different from the type of metal gate used in September of 1976.\n2. The defendants shall not place an obstruction of any kind whatsoever across the road in issue in a position different than that used in September, 1976.\n3. The defendant, Chester Warren, is committed to th$ Yell County Jail until such time as he posts a $2,500.00 cash compliance bond with the Yell Chancery Clerk.\n4. The defendants shall pay a $1,000.00 fine, and said fine is hereby suspended.\n5. The defendants shall pay the plaintiffs attorney a fee of $250.00.\nThe appellants admit that they erected a wire-gap gate on the perimeter of their property, some 200 yards north of the metal gate which was established in 1976. They contend that the purpose of this new gate was to close their property to confine their cattle. Appellants maintain that they were confused regarding the restrictions placed on the roadway by the court in 1983, particularly in light of the fact that the order was not entered of record until after the appeal of the January, 1985 order.\nAppellees testified that the wire-gap gate had been stapled to the post to prevent use, and that such a wire gate was an obstruction placed on the lands by the appellants, contrary to the court\u2019s order of September, 1976.\nAppellants argue (1) The Chancellor\u2019s finding that appellants were in contempt of court was against the preponderance of the evidence; (2) The Chancellor erred in not finding appellees in contempt; (3) The Chancellor erred by not permitting appellants to construct a new gate at a different location on the roadway; and (4) The Chancellor abused his discretion by ruling on issues not properly before the court.\n1. PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE\nAppellants contend that they cannot determine whether the court\u2019s citation was for civil or criminal contempt. The Chancellor\u2019s findings and the punishment meted out indicate that he considered the proceeding as one for both civil and criminal contempt. See Dennison v. Mobley, Chancellor, 257 Ark. 216, 515 S.W.2d 215 (1974).\nIn cases of civil contempt, the objective is the enforcement of the rights of the private parties to litigation. On the other hand, the primary reason for punishment for criminal contempt is the necessity for maintaining the dignity, integrity and authority of, and respect toward, courts, and the deterrent effect on others as just as important as the punishment of the offender. Dennison v. Mobley, Chancellor, supra.\nThe distinctions and reasons therefore have been discussed by us in Songer v. State, 236 Ark. 20, 364 S.W.2d 155 (1963), citing Blackard, et al. v. State, 217 Ark. 661, 232 S.W.2d 977, (1950). In Songer we stated:\nIt is not questioned that punishment for civil contempt will be upheld by this Court unless the order of the trial court is arbitrary or against the weight of the evidence. However, it is not necessary for us to hold the petitioner was found guilty of only civil contempt in order to sustain the trial court. We think the trial court should be sustained even if the petitioner were guilty of criminal contempt.\nEven though civil contempt findings are reviewed to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies, we only examine the record for substantial evidence in criminal contempt cases and affirm a judgment finding criminal contempt unless we find no substantial evidentiary support. Dennison v. Mobley, Chancellor, supra.\nWeighing the testimony in light of these rules, we find the preponderance of the evidence supports the finding of civil contempt and there is substantial evidence to support the order of criminal contempt.\nIn the trial court\u2019s decree of 1976, the Chancellor found that the appellees had a right-of-way across appellants\u2019 property and enjoined the appellants from molesting, interfering, or restricting in any way the appellees\u2019 right of use of the existing roadway. This decree was affirmed by this court, and modified to the extent that it was subject to certain conditions made by mutual agreement, 1.e. the gate should be locked, the public would be kept out, and only the rebuilt road would be used.\nAlthough the appellants claim confusion as to the court\u2019s findings and orders due to the lack of a written order after the 1983 contempt hearing, appellant, Hilda Warren, admitted that the Chancellor ordered them at the 1983 hearing to put the metal gate back where it was in September of 1976.\nThe general rule is that before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, that order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be expressed rather than implied. Wood v. Goodson, Judge, 253 Ark. 196, 485 S.W.2d 213 (1972). The Chancellor\u2019s 1983 order was not filed until five months after the notice of appeal of the 1985 order. Nevertheless, the court\u2019s order of 1976 is clear enough to warrant the finding that the appellants\u2019 conduct amounted to civil contempt of the 1976 order. Likewise, by finding contempt on the part of appellants and ordering appellant, Chester Warren, committed to jail until he posts a compliance bond, it is obvious the court intended punishment for criminal contempt in order to maintain the dignity, integrity and authority of the trial court.\nAs to the suspended $1,000 fine, we have held that a suspension of a punishment for contempt is in effect a complete remission. Stewart, et al. v. State, 221 Ark. 496, 254 S.W.2d 55 (1953).\n2. COURT\u2019S DISCRETION IN CONTEMPT MATTERS\nThe appellants argue that it is the appellees who should have been cited for contempt. Refusal of a trial court to punish an alleged contemnor will be reviewed by an appellate court only to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Pearson Termite & Pest Control, Inc., 266 Ark. 635, 587 S.W.2d 823 (1979). We find this argument without merit.\n3. COURT\u2019S DISCRETION TO MODIFY PREVIOUS ORDERS\nAppellants claim the Chancellor erred in his 1985 order by enjoining them from placing across the road any obstruction of a different type, or in a different position, than the gate utilized in September, 1976. The granting or denying of an injunction is a matter falling within the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Bassett v. City of Fayetteville, 282 Ark. 395, 669 S.W.2d 1 (1984). Appellants argue that the trial court should allow the wire gate on the perimeter of their property to stand, as the construction of some gate was necessary to protect their property. Granted, the owner of a servient estate may erect gates across the way if they are so located, constructed or maintained as not unreasonably to interfere with the right of passage, and when they are necessary for the preservation and proper and efficient use of the servient estate. Jordan v. Guinn & Etheridge, 253 Ark. 315, 485 S.W.2d 715 (1972). However, the testimony is in sharp conflict as to whether the wire gate, particularly, as opposed to the 1976 metal gate, constitutes an obstruction to the roadway. In this regard, we do not find that the Chancellor\u2019s findings were clearly erroneous.\n4. MATTERS NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT\nAs to the final point argued by appellants, we find that the Chancellor did not err by ruling on issues not properly before the court and further, that the relief granted was proper. The trial court\u2019s finding that the appellants were in contempt merely reiterated the prior orders of 1976.\nAffirmed.\nPurtle, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Susanne K. Roberts, for appellant.", "Bill Strait, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Chester and Hilda R. WARREN v. Toney ROBINSON, Shirley ROBINSON, Warren G. SOUTHARD and Yvonne WORKMAN\n85-65\n704 S.W.2d 614\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 24, 1986\nSusanne K. Roberts, for appellant.\nBill Strait, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0249-01", "first_page_order": 277, "last_page_order": 282 }