{
  "id": 1872651,
  "name": "Vera RYKER v. C.G. FISHER, Jr.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ryker v. Fisher",
  "decision_date": "1987-02-02",
  "docket_number": "86-146",
  "first_page": "177",
  "last_page": "179",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "291 Ark. 177"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "722 S.W.2d 864"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "224 Ark. 938",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1955,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "276 Ark. 46",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1751500
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/276/0046-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:26:32.108459+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Vera RYKER v. C.G. FISHER, Jr."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant and appellee have interests in adjoining tracts of land and share a common fence. Appellee was growing watermelons on his leased land, while appellant was raising cattle on her tract. In July 1984, cattle entered appellee\u2019s land, and destroyed his existing crop of watermelons. Appellee brought suit, alleging the appellant was negligent in \u201cfailing to keep up\u201d her cattle. The jury found in appellee\u2019s favor and awarded him $7,000.00. For reversal of that verdict, appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) admitting photographs into evidence that were not properly authenticated, and (2) excluding evidence of subsequent harvests from the same crop which had been destroyed. We find no merit in appellant\u2019s contentions, and therefore, affirm.\nRegarding appellant\u2019s first point, the appellee was requested to identify certain pictures. He responded they were photographs he asked his son to take of appellant\u2019s fences, but he was unsure if they depicted the south or west fence. Appellee further testified he was present when the photographs were taken, and only appellant\u2019s \u2014 and not his other neighbor\u2019s \u2014 fences were shown. We have held that the validity of photographs introduced into evidence was not objectionable merely because the witness did not take the pictures. Hay v. Scott, 276 Ark. 46, 631 S.W.2d 841 (1982). The test, we said, of whether photographs are admissible into evidence depends on the fairness and correctness of the portrayal of the subject and their admissibility addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Hay at p. 50. As already noted, appellee identified the photographs as depicting appellant\u2019s fences at the time the cattle destroyed the crop. His only uncertainty was in distinguishing the photographs as they depicted either the west or south fences. Appellee\u2019s uncertainty did not render the exhibits inadmissible; instead, such uncertainty merely addressed itself to the discretion of the trial judge who determined whether the photographs were sufficiently accurate to be of value to the jury. Southern National Ins. Co. v. Williams, 224 Ark. 938, 277 S.W.2d 487 (1955). Considering the other evidence given in this case, we believe the trial judge was especially justified in admitting the photographs. Both appellant and appellee \u2014 aside from the photographs \u2014 presented extensive testimony concerning the state of appellee\u2019s watermelon crop and appellant\u2019s fences when the cattle destroyed the crop. Appellant has failed to show that the photographs in any way misled or prejudiced the jury. Therefore, we cannot agree the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting them.\nNor can we agree the trial judge erred in excluding evidence regarding appellee\u2019s subsequent harvests to the one destroyed by the cattle. This error, appellant argues, caused the jury to miscalculate the proper measure of damages. Nothing in the record substantiates appellant\u2019s argument on this point. In fact, the record shows appellant received all she requested of the court, and instead, the appellee was the one denied the opportunity to develop the costs he incurred in planting and cultivating his crop.\nOn cross-examination, appellee stated that he had sold some watermelons in the fall after the cattle had damaged his crop. Appellee\u2019s attorney, in a side-bar conference, stated that if the appellant planned to elicit testimony about melons appellee sold, appellee wanted to introduce testimony about the cost of putting the crop in. After a discussion of the issue, the judge stated that he thought appellee should be able to show the cost he incurred in making the sales. Appellant\u2019s attorney replied \u201c[t] hat\u2019s fair enough . . . [y]es, sir. I\u2019ve got no problem with that.\u201d Appellant then proceeded to ask appellee about the number of \u201cpullings\u201d [harvests] he got from the crop. Appellee replied that he made three \u201cpullings\u201d in the fall and conceded that the cattle\u2019s destruction of his first crop did not prevent subsequent harvests. The issue was not raised again until re-direct examination, when appellee\u2019s attorney asked if appellee had sold enough melons to pay his expenses. Appellant objected, and the court, reversing its earlier position, sustained the objection, stating that appellant\u2019s attorney, on cross examination of appellee, had not gone into actual values received from appellee\u2019s later production. Throughout appellant\u2019s discussion of this issue with the trial court, appellant specifically stated that she wanted only tp show how many loads of melons appellee had harvested \u2014 not what money he got.\nIn sum, the trial court agreed with appellant and appellant was allowed to thoroughly examine appellee concerning his destroyed first crop, as well as his subsequent harvests. She simply is in no position to complain regarding this issue on appeal.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Witt Law Firm, P.C., by: Ernie Witt, for appellant.",
      "Turner & Mainard, by: Lonnie C. Turner, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Vera RYKER v. C.G. FISHER, Jr.\n86-146\n722 S.W.2d 864\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 2, 1987\nWitt Law Firm, P.C., by: Ernie Witt, for appellant.\nTurner & Mainard, by: Lonnie C. Turner, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0177-01",
  "first_page_order": 201,
  "last_page_order": 203
}