{ "id": 1872615, "name": "Jeff BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. State", "decision_date": "1987-03-09", "docket_number": "CR 86-29", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "291 Ark. 393" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "725 S.W.2d 544" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "466 U.S. 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "598 S.W.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664827 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ark. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1174853 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/272/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ark. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0266-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 9624, "ocr_confidence": 0.914, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.339053206711533e-08, "percentile": 0.5136519542259027 }, "sha256": "554b92373f2d6657310d31a1f77b05773511f9cc059bf93bd9174ec3c6508034", "simhash": "1:bf7dd267f17a1764", "word_count": 1667 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:26:32.108459+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hickman, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Jeff BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nAppellant Jeffery A. Brown has appealed from the denial of a Rule 37 petition.\nBrown and Mark Henderson were charged with the capital felony murders of Steve and Diane Francis committed in connection with a robbery. Their bodies were found in the front seat of their car in Arkadelphia on the morning of January 31, 1982. Each had been shot in the back of the head. A few days later Brown and Henderson were arrested in North Little Rock on other charges. Attorneys Herman Hankins and John Thomas were appointed to represent Brown.\nOn April 1 Brown withdrew his plea of not guilty pursuant to a plea agreement by which Brown agreed to testify against Mark Henderson and the charges against Brown were reduced to murder in the first degree. The trial judge approved the agreement and accepted Brown\u2019s plea of guilty. Brown was sentenced to life imprisonment.\nIn February of 1986 Brown filed a petition under A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37. He contends his plea of guilty was not voluntarily entered and that he did not receive competent representation. Following a hearing the trial court denied the petition and Brown has appealed. We affirm the trial court.\nBrown\u2019s first argument is that the trial court failed to make written findings and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 37.3(a). However, after appellant\u2019s brief was filed, the record was remanded to the trial court on the joint petition of the parties and written findings and conclusions were entered by the trial court on June 30, 1986, rendering that issue moot.\nAnother point of contention is that appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel in that Brown\u2019s attorneys did not competently explain parole eligibility and therefore the plea was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. No authority is cited for the assertion that counsel must be able to explain parole eligibility and procedures, and we are aware of no such requirement. Too many variables exist, including the conduct of the defendant during incarceration.\nIn Haywood v. State, 288 Ark. 266, 704 S.W.2d 168 (1986) we held that a petitioner under Rule 37 may not collaterally attack the voluntary character of a guilty plea merely by demonstrating that some advice as to parole eligibility is erroneous. We said the issue was whether counsel\u2019s advice was competent, taking into account the inherent uncertainty in advising a defendant about pleading guilty.\nHankins testified he was not well versed in parole procedures and made no assurances to Brown about parole, only that it would depend on his own actions while he was in the penitentiary. Thomas said Brown was told that prospects for parole would depend on policies of the Department of Correction and on his own behavior \u2014 that he possibly could be eligible anywhere from nine to fifteen years into his sentence. The trial court found that Brown\u2019s plea of guilty was made knowingly and intelligently after being fully advised of his rights, and appellant has not shown that finding to be against the preponderance of the evidence. Williams v. State, 272 Ark. 98, 612 S.W.2d 115 (1981).\nAppellant also maintains that his plea was coerced, that he was told by his counsel that since the victims were white and he was black he would be sentenced to the electric chair by an all white jury. We find no support for this argument anywhere in Brown\u2019s testimony at the hearing on his petition, other than a statement that Hankins advised him to take life, or \u201cthey\u2019re going to give you the electric chair.\u201d But Hankins testified Brown was never told he was going to the electric chair and we cannot say the trial court\u2019s finding was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.\nWe do find testimony by Brown that when he entered his guilty plea and was asked by the circuit judge if he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason, he said he was entering the plea not because he was guilty, but because he \u201cwas involved in that situation\u201d:\nQ: (By the prosecutor): You told Judge Lookadoo all that?\nA: Yes, I said it because my lawyer stopped me and said, \u2018He just means yes, Your honor.\u2019 Because he asked me, are you pleaing guilty because you are guilty. I said, I\u2019m pleaing guilty because the Court will find me guilty an accessory and not because I committed a charge. And, when I was in the process of saying this, my attorney, Mr. Hankins stopped me and said yes, he means yes, Your Honor. Now, you can draw your tapes out and replay them and I know I said this and I know he said that.\nOn finding that allegation in the proceedings on the Rule 37 petition, we ordered, pursuant to ARAP Rule 6(e), a transcript of the proceedings on the guilty plea. That material was promptly supplied and has been examined. We find nothing in those proceedings consistent with the allegation:\nBY THE COURT:\nGentlemen, I understand from the prosecuting attorney\u2019s office that Mr. Brown desires to change his plea.\nBY MR. HANKINS:\nThat is correct, Your Honor.\nBY THE COURT:\nI\u2019m assuming that you desire to withdraw his motion for transfer and change of venue.\nBY MR. THOMAS:\nThat\u2019s right.\nBY MR. HANKINS:\nThat\u2019s right, Your Honor, we will withdraw those at this time.\nBY THE COURT:\nMr. Brown, do you understand what we\u2019re saying about withdrawing your motions?\nBY MR. BROWN:\nYes, sir.\nBY THE COURT:\nHave any threats or any promises been made to you to induce a plea?\nBY MR. BROWN:\nNo, sir.\nBY THE COURT:\nI\u2019m assuming that any plea made by you would be as a result of an agreed recommendation, is that correct?\nBY MR. HANKINS:\nYes, sir, that\u2019s correct.\nBY MR. THOMAS:\n(Nods his head yes)\nBY MR. BROWN:\nYes.\nBY THE COURT:\nAs a recommendation, Mr. Brown, I am not bound by it. As a plea bargain, I am bound by it, dependent upon presentence investigation and so forth. Has that been explained to you?\nBY MR. BROWN:\nYes, sir.\nBY THE COURT:\nDid you prepare a statement in advance of a plea? BY MR. HANKINS:\nNo.\nBY MR. THOMAS:\nNo.\nBY THE COURT:\nI believe, Mr. Arnold, the plea is to be taken on first degree?\nBY MR. ARNOLD:\nYes, sir. It would be the recommendation of the State anticipating a plea that we would reduce to first degree murder.\nBY THE COURT:\nIs that the understanding?\nBY MR. BROWN:\nYes.\nBY MR. HANKINS:\nThat\u2019s our understanding.\nBY THE COURT:\nAll right, Mr. Brown, as to the charge, how do you plead?\nBY MR. BROWN:\nGuilty.\nBY THE COURT:\nAre you pleading guilty because you are guilty.\nBY MR. BROWN:\nWell, yes.\nBY THE COURT:\nNo, don\u2019t say well, yes. Either you\u2019re guilty or you\u2019re not guilty.\nBY MR. BROWN:\nYes.\nBY THE COURT:\nAre you pleading guilty because you are guilty? \u2022\nBY MR. BROWN:\nYes, sir.\nBY THE COURT:\nIs there any doubt in your mind?\nBY MR. BROWN:\nNo, sir.\nBY THE COURT:\nGentlemen, do you all concur in his plea?\nBY MR. THOMAS:\nYes, we do, Your Honor.\nBY MR. HANKINS:\nWe do.\nAppellant\u2019s final point concerns a statement given by Brown shortly after his arrest in North Little Rock. The statement denied any involvement by Brown in the murder of Steve and Diane Francis except being present in the car when Henderson shot them both. The incriminating part of the statement was that Brown acknowledged that before he and Henderson got into the car Henderson had told him he planned to kill Steve Francis to get his marijuana. Brown maintains he did not take the remark seriously.\nThe contention now made is that Brown\u2019s counsel should have moved to suppress the statement because it was induced by threats and intimidation. However, the officers denied any coercion or threats and the trial court\u2019s factual findings rejected that contention. Core v. State, 265 Ark. 409, 598 S.W.2d 581 (1979). Hankins testified that Brown was talking to anybody who would listen and it appeared there was \u201cabsolutely no grounds\u201d for suppression of Brown\u2019s statement.\nThe burden Brown assumes in alleging ineffective assistance is that counsel\u2019s conduct so undermined the adversarial process that it cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). Under the law we are constrained to indulge a strong presumption that the conduct of Hankins and Thomas in Brown\u2019s defense came within a wide range of reasonable professional competence. Strickland v. Washington, supra. Brown\u2019s bare allegation that they should have moved to suppress his statement is not sufficient to defeat that presumption. In this connection we note that Brown\u2019s counsel filed a number of motions in his behalf: a motion for severance, a motion for discovery, a motion to transfer to juvenile court, a motion for a change of venue with affidavits and exhibits, and a motion for a psychiatric examination. There is no reason to assume counsel would not have filed a motion to suppress if they believe that grounds existed.\nBrown insists he was free of any culpable intent in this unusual case. But it is clear the state expected to make a case of capital felony murder against him by showing that he knew ahead of time that Henderson intended to kill Steve Francis, was present when the murders were committed, and that he and Henderson left the community together promptly after the crimes were committed. We cannot say that Brown was ill-advised to choose a life sentence in preference to the alternatives.\nAffirmed.\nHickman, J., not participating.\nHenderson was later tried, convicted and sentenced to life without parole.", "type": "majority", "author": "Steele Hays, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hurst Law Office, by: Q. Byrum Hurst, Jr., for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: William F. Knight, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jeff BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 86-29\n725 S.W.2d 544\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 9, 1987\nHurst Law Office, by: Q. Byrum Hurst, Jr., for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: William F. Knight, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 421, "last_page_order": 429 }