{
  "id": 1872717,
  "name": "Terrance PROCTOR v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Proctor v. State",
  "decision_date": "1987-03-16",
  "docket_number": "CR 86-133",
  "first_page": "459",
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      "cite": "725 S.W.2d 827"
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    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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      "year": 1984,
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:26:32.108459+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Terrance PROCTOR v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nTerrance Proctor, appellant, pled guilty to one count of robbery and ten counts of aggravated robbery, and received ten sentences of twenty years imprisonment and one life sentence, each term to run consecutively. Proctor filed an A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 petition alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel, his guilty pleas were not voluntary, and that the trial court did not follow correct procedure in accepting the pleas. The petition was denied by the trial court without a hearing and we affirm.\nProctor contends an evidentiary hearing should have been granted on these issues. Rule 37.3(a) allows the trial court to dispose of a post-conviction petition, without a hearing, if \u201cthe motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. . . .\u201d See Simmons v. State, 265 Ark. 48, 578 S.W.2d 12 (1979).\nAs ineffective assistance of counsel, Proctor alleges his attorney failed to interview certain witnesses who could have provided him with an alibi. Proctor does not state who these witnesses were, what their testimony would have been, or for which of the convictions they would have provided an alibi. Proctor told the trial judge at the plea proceedings that there were no witnesses he could subpoena, that he had discussed defenses with his attorney and knew of nothing that could change the outcome of the case, and that he was satisfied with his attorney\u2019s performance.\n\u201cWhen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel\u2019s assistance, the defendant must show that the counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness\u201d and \u201cthat there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.\u201d Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This test was applied to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel in Hill v. Lockhart, _ U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985), where the Supreme Court said:\n[I]n order to satisfy the \u201cprejudice\u201d requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.\nWt\u00ed \u00bfaid in Crockett v. State, 282 Ark. 582, 669 S.W.2d 896 (1984) that a \u201cdefendant whose conviction is based upon a plea of guilty will have difficulty proving any prejudice since his plea rests upon his admission in open court that he did the act with which he is charged.\u201d\nProctor\u2019s unsupported allegations, which are inconsistent with his statements at the plea proceedings and which in no manner disprove his guilt, do not justify a hearing on his petition.\nProctor next alleges that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given because he was told by his attorney that a deal had been reached with the prosecutor\u2019s office that concurrent thirty year terms would be recommended to the court. The trial court at the plea proceedings, however, addressed the defendant as follows:\nTHE COURT: And you want to enter a plea of guilty to all of these?\nPROCTOR: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Now, do you understand \u2014 This is not a negotiated plea?\nMR. KING (prosecutor): No, sir.\nMR. HELLER (defense counsel): No, it\u2019s a plea to the court.\nTHE COURT.: Okay. There are potentially ten life sentences here.\nPROCTOR: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: In other words \u2014 I don\u2019t think there\u2019s much doubt about it, Mr. Proctor, you\u2019re going to spend the rest of your life in the Department of Correction. Do you understand that?\nPROCTOR: Yes, sir.\n* * *\nTHE COURT: And you understand that in all likelihood you\u2019re going to spend the rest of your life in the Department of Correction?\nPROCTOR: Yes, sir.\nIf there is any truth to Proctor\u2019s allegations that he was led to believe a deal had been reached, that possibility was negated when the court pointedly explained that there was no such agreement before taking the guilty pleas, and Proctor cannot now claim to have been misled.\nFinally, Proctor contends that the trial court did not follow the proper procedure in taking his pleas. Proctor\u2019s petition does not specifically state the procedural errors he relies on, but his brief indicates a belief that the court failed to establish a factual basis for the pleas in compliance with A.R.Cr.P. Rule 24.6. Following is a representative colloquy between the court, the prosecutor and Proctor on one of the counts:\nMR. KING: On the same day, October 31st, 1982, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Mr. Terrance Proctor entered the Noble Texaco Station at 3715 South University, where he asked Mr. Charles Diifee about some repair work and using a pay phone. He left the station. He returned shortly and asked Mr. Diifee for some change. And, as soon as the customers left, he pulled a pistol and demanded all the money. He then took Mr. Diffee\u2019s wallet and money from the cash register and ran out of the station. Apparently there was a lady who was driving into the station and saw him leaving the area. Apparently he had somebody else out in the car with him.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Proctor, did you rob Mr. Diifee on the day in question?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: And you had a weapon?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: And you displayed the weapon?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: And you took some property from Mr. Diffee?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nSimilar exchanges between the trial court and the defendant took place before each plea was accepted. This process not only meets the requirement of substantial compliance with the rules, it serves as a good model for other trial courts to follow whenever establishing a factual basis for a guilty plea.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joel O. Huggins, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Terrance PROCTOR v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 86-133\n725 S.W.2d 827\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 16, 1987\nJoel O. Huggins, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0459-01",
  "first_page_order": 491,
  "last_page_order": 495
}