{
  "id": 1872690,
  "name": "William Edward EAVES, II v. Edith Kay DOVER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Eaves v. Dover",
  "decision_date": "1987-03-23",
  "docket_number": "86-220",
  "first_page": "545",
  "last_page": "548",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "291 Ark. 545"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "726 S.W.2d 276"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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  "cites_to": [
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "year": 1910,
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/265/0681-01"
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    {
      "cite": "440 U.S. 268",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6181890
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      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/440/0268-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:26:32.108459+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "William Edward EAVES, II v. Edith Kay DOVER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant, the father, filed a paternity petition, seeking a paternity determination of his son. Appellee, the mother, answered, admitting appellant was the father of the child but seeking a denial of his visitation rights and recovery of her lying-in expenses, child support and attorney\u2019s fees. An order was issued by the juvenile referee, determining appellant to be the natural father, and ordering him to pay lying-in expenses of $3,113.65 and attorney\u2019s fees of $500.00. The circuit court affirmed the referee\u2019s order and awarded an additional attorney\u2019s fee of $350.00. Appellant appeals, contending that Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 34-706 (Supp. 1985) is a gender-based statute that violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He further argues that, because the statute is unconstitutional, the award of lying-in expenses and attorney\u2019s fees should be reversed. We hold \u00a7 34-706 is constitutional, and, therefore, affirm the trial court.\nSection 34-706 provides in relevant part:\nIf it is found by the court that the accused is the father of the child, the court shall render judgment against him for the lying-in expenses in favor of the mother, or person who incurred the same, if required or claimed, for a sum not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00), and if the same shall not be paid upon the rendition of such judgment, together with all costs which may be adjudged against him in said case, then the court shall have the power to commit the accused person to jail until the same shall be paid, with all costs;\n* * *\nProvided, however, that the court may at any time, enlarge, diminish, or vacate any order or judgment in the proceedings under this Act [\u00a7\u00a7 34-701 \u2014 34-714] as justice may require and on such notice to the defendant as the court may prescribe.\nAppellant argues \u00a7 34-706 denies him equal protection and, in effect, is a civil punishment in that all costs fall squarely on him. Appellant relies upon Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) wherein the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Alabama alimony statutes which provided that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce. To this same effect, see Hatcher v. Hatcher, 265 Ark. 681, 580 S.W.2d 475 (1979). The Orr Court determined that the statutory scheme in question created a constitutionally-suspect classification wherein the distinctions made were gender-based without serving important governmental objectives. That Court\u2019s holding and its underlying rationale in no way apply here.\nWe first are obliged to point out that appellant reads \u00a7 34-706 too narrowly when arguing that statute affords the trial court no discretion and requires it to impose all lying-in expenses upon the father. As early as 1910, this court, in construing \u00a7 34-706, held that the award of lying-in expenses must be confided largely to the discretion of the trial court. Belford v. State, 96 Ark. 274, 131 S.W. 953 (1910). In 1979, the General Assembly amended \u00a7 34-706, empowering the trial court with the discretion at any time to enlarge, diminish or vacate any order or judgment in these filiation proceedings as justice may require. See Act 718 of 1979. Thus, if any doubt existed that a trial court possessed discretion in the award of lying-in expenses, attorney\u2019s fees or support prior to 1979, clearly that doubt was eliminated by the General Assembly\u2019s passage of Act 718.\nThe major purpose of Arkansas\u2019s filiation laws is to provide a process by which the putative father can be identified so that he may assume his equitable share of the responsibility to his child. However, the court, in awarding lying-in expenses or attorney\u2019s fees under \u00a7 34-706, may exercise its discretion in determining the amount that father should bear, and, in doing so, it may even consider the mother\u2019s financial means when making an award.\nThe trial court, under our reading and interpretation of \u00a7 34-706, has discretion in assessing the amount of any awards made under the provisions of that statute. Thus, we conclude that \u00a7 34-706 does not discriminate on the basis of sex and, contrary to appellant\u2019s contention, does not violate the equal protection clause.\nWe affirm.\nAppellant challenges only the constitutionality of \u00a7 34-706 and not its application.\nThe trial court ordered appellant to pay all lying-in expenses in this cause, but appellant limited his argument below and on appeal to the constitutionality of \u00a7 34-706 and not to the reasonableness of the award made pursuant to that law.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gregory E. Bryant, for appellant.",
      "T.B. Patterson, Jr., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "William Edward EAVES, II v. Edith Kay DOVER\n86-220\n726 S.W.2d 276\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 23, 1987\nGregory E. Bryant, for appellant.\nT.B. Patterson, Jr., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0545-01",
  "first_page_order": 577,
  "last_page_order": 580
}