{
  "id": 1871177,
  "name": "Wanda J. BALLHEIMER v. SERVICE FINANCE CORPORATION",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ballheimer v. Service Finance Corp.",
  "decision_date": "1987-04-27",
  "docket_number": "86-223",
  "first_page": "92",
  "last_page": "96",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "292 Ark. 92"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "728 S.W.2d 178"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "248 Ark. 1172",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1597630
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1970,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/248/1172-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "260 Ark. 21",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1616699
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/260/0021-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "283 Ark. 425",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1879959
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/283/0425-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "284 Ark. 551",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1878604
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/284/0551-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "225 Ark. 302",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1642517
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1955,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/225/0302-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 436,
    "char_count": 7046,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.93,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.441253914337608e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8030831141120582
    },
    "sha256": "e6403a4511bf766c9042917e0cf8243881cbbe701923e5216a903b84a8439c85",
    "simhash": "1:374a137f283d4c99",
    "word_count": 1137
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:01.167469+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Hickman, J., dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Wanda J. BALLHEIMER v. SERVICE FINANCE CORPORATION"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThis case involves an action on a debt owed for medical services incurred by appellant on June 22,1983, at the Baptist Medical Center in Little Rock. Appellant admits owing the debt, but argues the appellee, assignee of the Baptist Medical Center, is barred from bringing the suit since it delayed in doing so for thirty-three months from the date appellant incurred the debt. Appellant\u2019s argument is based upon Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 37-245 (Supp. 1985), which provides that \u201c[n]o action shall be brought to recover charges for medical services performed or provided prior to April 1,1985, by a physician or other medical service provider after the expiration of eighteen (18) months after the date such services were performed or provided.\u201d The trial court rejected appellant\u2019s argument, holding \u00a7 37-245 did not apply, but instead applied Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 37-209 (Repl. 1962). Section 37-209 provides that actions on promissory notes or other instruments in writing must be commenced within five years after the cause of action accrues.\nOn appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in applying \u00a7 37-209. Appellee responds the court was correct, but, in addition, it asserts \u00a7 37-245 was inapplicable because the medical center was not a provider of medical services under the terms of that statute. Appellee also asserts \u00a7 37-245 violates the equal protection clause because it singles out medical service providers by treating them differently from other creditors. We hold that \u00a7 37-245 is applicable to this cause of action and is not a denial of equal protection of the law.\nWhen appellant entered the Baptist Medical Center, she signed a financial agreement, promising to pay the hospital for services and supplies rendered during her stay. She was discharged two days later, owing the hospital $1,028.75. Much of the parties\u2019 argument concerns the validity or enforceability of the agreement signed by appellant and whether it was an instrument in writing that effectuated the longer five-year statute of limitations (\u00a7 37-209) thereby avoiding the shorter one (\u00a7 37-245) dealing specifically with the recovery of charges for medical services.\nIn support of appellee\u2019s position that \u00a7 37-209 applies, it cites Jefferson v. Nero, 225 Ark. 302, 280 S.W.2d 884 (1955), which relates the rule that if there is doubt as to which of two or more statutes of limitation applies to a particular action or proceeding, and it is necessary to resolve the doubt, it will generally be resolved in favor of the application of the statute containing the longest limitation. That rule is certainly a valid and settled one, but it is not applicable here where no doubt exists concerning what the General Assembly intended when it enacted the later but shorter limitation statute of \u00a7 37-245.\nAs we have said before, where a special act applies to a particular case, it excludes the operation of a general act upon the same subject. Williams v. City of Pine Bluff, 284 Ark. 551, 683 S.W.2d 923 (1985), and Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 425, 678 S.W.2d 318 (1984). Prior to \u00a7 37-245, actions brought to recover medical services were subject to the general limitation provisions governing (1) contracts not in writing (and open accounts) under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 37-206 (Repl. 1962) and (2) promissory notes and instruments (contracts) in writing under \u00a7 37-209. Under appellee\u2019s theory, \u00a7 37-209 applies instead of \u00a7 37-245 because appellant signed a written agreement to pay for the medical services rendered. It does so, appellee argues, because both \u00a7 37-209 and \u00a7 37-245 arguably apply under these circumstances, so the court must resolve the conflict by employing the statute with the longest limitation. Using this same logic, \u00a7 37-206, Arkansas\u2019s three-year general limitation statute, would apply in actions for medical service charges when no written contract (or open account) was involved \u2014 again because it has the longer period of limitation. Obviously, to accept such a construction of these two statutes would render the General Assembly\u2019s special enactment of \u00a7 37-245 meaningless since \u00a7 37-245 could never apply. Thus, to give \u00a7 37-245 the effect intended by the General Assembly, we reach the plain and simple conclusion that it intended \u00a7 37-245 to cover all actions brought to recover charges for medical services.\nAppellee further contends that \u00a7 37-245 is inapplicable since it applies to a medical service provider and the Baptist Medical Center \u201cdoes not provide medical services as such.\u201d Appellee offers no proof that the Baptist Medical Center is not a medical services provider, and, in fact, what evidence appellee did present runs counter to its contention. Appellee sued appellant on her debt which admittedly resulted from \u201cservices rendered by the hospital.\u201d Appellee attached to its complaint an itemized account that listed each service rendered and the charge for that service. Those services included neurological exams, x-rays, laboratory tests and medication. Under the circumstances presented here, we are unaware of any reason why the Baptist Medical Center should not be designated a medical service provider under the terms of \u00a7 37-245. Appellee fails to argue any legal authority to show the Baptist Medical Center is not a medical service provider, and because the record clearly demonstrates otherwise, we conclude it is. We believe \u00a7 37-245 clearly is applicable to the situation before us.\nLastly, we consider appellee\u2019s argument that \u00a7 37-245 violates the equal protection clause because it treats physicians and other medical service providers differently than other creditors who enjoy a longer statute of limitations. Such legislative action creating different statutory periods within which actions must be commenced has been upheld as constitutional by this court. See Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970). In Owen, we said the vital question is one of reasonableness, and the courts may not strike down a statute of limitations unless the period before the bar becomes effective is so short that it amounts to a virtual denial of the right itself or it can be said that the legislature has committed palpable error. Adhering to this test, we hold the limitation period in \u00a7 37-245 is both reasonable and constitutional.\nBecause we conclude the trial court should have applied \u00a7 37-245 as a bar to appellee\u2019s action against appellant, we reverse and dismiss.\nHickman, J., dissents.\nAct 638 of 1984, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 37-245, enacted on March 22, 1983, provided for an eighteen-month statute of limitations. Act 894 of 1985 amended \u00a7 37-245, and provided a two-year statute of limitations to recover charges for medical services performed or provided after March 31, 1985.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Phil Stratton and Casey Jones, Ltd., by: Phil Stratton, for appellant.",
      "Julius C. Acchione, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Wanda J. BALLHEIMER v. SERVICE FINANCE CORPORATION\n86-223\n728 S.W.2d 178\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 27, 1987\nPhil Stratton and Casey Jones, Ltd., by: Phil Stratton, for appellant.\nJulius C. Acchione, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0092-01",
  "first_page_order": 118,
  "last_page_order": 122
}