{ "id": 1869806, "name": "Jay D. URICH v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Urich v. State", "decision_date": "1987-10-05", "docket_number": "CR 87-50", "first_page": "246", "last_page": "249", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ark. 246" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "737 S.W.2d 155" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "205 Ark. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ark. 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1616782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ark. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1668846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ark. 975", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725607 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/228/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ark. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719023 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/242/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619067 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0190-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 357, "char_count": 5435, "ocr_confidence": 0.894, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5458610458026758e-07, "percentile": 0.6737856145281057 }, "sha256": "6775faba21d3199b9d77bb753a19c452fc7f7724412e2bd68f7addf661d37c6f", "simhash": "1:32ae43554181035c", "word_count": 918 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:33:58.592079+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jay D. URICH v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nAppellant Jay Urich was convicted in the Municipal Court of Ft. Smith of driving while intoxicated in violation of the Omnibus DWI Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-2501 et seq. Appellant was fined $500 and his driver\u2019s license was suspended for ninety days pursuant to \u00a7 7 5-2511. Two weeks later he was arrested in Benton County for driving with a suspended driver\u2019s license. He was convicted by the Benton Circuit Court and sentenced to ten days in jail.\nOn appeal, Urich challenges his conviction in Benton Circuit Court on the grounds that the suspension of his license by the Ft. Smith Municipal Court was of no effect and therefore he could not be convicted of driving with a suspended license. Urich argues that he was prosecuted by the City of Ft. Smith in violation of Rule 1.5 of the A.R.Cr.P., which provides:\nAll prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of this state shall be in the name of the State of Arkansas, provided that this rule shall in no way affect the distribution, as provided by law, of moneys collected by municipal courts.\nThe only evidence in the record of the Ft. Smith proceedings is an abbreviated \u201cTranscript of Judgment,\u201d which has two blanks, one by City of Ft. Smith and one by State of Arkansas. The blank indicating the City of Ft. Smith is checked. Urich argues that because Rule 1.5 was not followed, the Ft. Smith conviction was of no effect. He cites nothing other than the rule itself, but the implication of his contention is that the city had no authority to prosecute him. The argument constitutes a collateral attack on the Ft. Smith conviction, which could have been raised by appeal. However, since lack of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack, [Ark. State Hwy. Comm. v. Rice, 259 Ark. 190, 532 S.W.2d 727 (1976); Catlett v. Republican Party of Arkansas, 242 Ark. 283, 413 S.W.2d 651 (1967)] we will treat appellant\u2019s argument as being that the Ft. Smith Municipal Court had no jurisdiction to convict him of a violation of state law.\nThat municipal courts may exercise jurisdiction over state misdemeanor violations is settled law. Article 7, \u00a7 1 of the Arkansas Constitution provides:\nThe judicial power of the State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in circuit courts, in county and probate courts, and in justices of the peace. The General Assembly may also vest such jurisdiction as may be deemed necessary in municipal corporation courts ....\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 22-702 establishes municipal courts and \u00a7 22-709 grants jurisdiction to municipal courts over misdemeanors.\nThe same issue was raised in Ex Parte Hornsby, 228 Ark. 975, 311 S.W.2d 529 (1958), where the petitioner was convicted in municipal court of violating a state DWI statute. We found the argument without merit, citing Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 22-709.\nUrich also submits that under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a775-1511, the municipal judge of Ft. Smith had no authority to suspend his driver\u2019s license. The statute provides:\nAt the time of arrest for violating \u00a7 75-2503 [driving while intoxicated] the arresting officer shall seize the motor vehicle operator\u2019s license of the person arrested and issue to such person a temporary driving permit to expire on the date of arraignment. The arresting officer shall remit the seized operator\u2019s license to the court. Upon arraignment, the judge shall issue such person a temporary permit to expire on the date of the trial. If the person is convicted of violating \u00a7 75-2511, the court shall transmit the operator\u2019s license to the Office of Driver Services and shall instruct the Office of Driver Services to suspend or revoke such person\u2019s motor vehicle operator\u2019s license as follows: (Our emphasis).\nUrich contends that the statute should be construed as reading that only the Office of Driver Services is authorized to suspend licenses, and not the sentencing judge. He then asserts that inasmuch as the municipal judge directed an unauthorized suspension, it is of no effect, and that in any case, the court never transmitted the license to the ODS as directed by the statute, which is essential in order to support a valid suspension.\nAppellant\u2019s brief suggests these points involve matters of jurisdiction which, as we have noted, could be addressed in a collateral attack. However, we decline to consider the argument within the context of this case because the record contains only this: \u201cDisposition: Fined 500.00/90 days D.L. susp.\u201d There is no evidence that the statute was not fully complied with. All we have is appellant\u2019s bare claim on appeal that such was the case. Nothing in the statute requires that this information be part of, or noted on, a judgment.\nThere is a similar flaw in appellant\u2019s argument that the judge was not authorized to suspend the license. The above notation on the judgment tells us nothing as to who or what was involved in authorizing the suspension. We do not reverse unless the record demonstrates error. Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978). It is appellant\u2019s burden to demonstrate error, and he has failed to do so. Hazen v. City of Booneville, 260 Ark. 871, 545 S.W.2d 614 (1977); Clemenson v. Rebsamen, 205 Ark. 123, 168 S.W.2d 195 (1943).\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Steele Hays, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff Duty, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: William F. Knight, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jay D. URICH v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 87-50\n737 S.W.2d 155\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 5, 1987\nJeff Duty, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: William F. Knight, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0246-01", "first_page_order": 282, "last_page_order": 285 }