{
  "id": 1895827,
  "name": "James Hamilton PARKMAN v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Parkman v. State",
  "decision_date": "1988-01-25",
  "docket_number": "CR 87-137",
  "first_page": "339",
  "last_page": "342",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "294 Ark. 339"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "742 S.W.2d 927"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "291 Ark. 212",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "293 Ark. 438",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1869742
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/293/0438-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "293 Ark. 243",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1869780
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/293/0243-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-13-201",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:05.889486+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Purtle, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "James Hamilton PARKMAN v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nJames Hamilton Parkman was convicted of battery in the first degree [Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-13-201 (1987)] and sentenced to forty years imprisonment as an habitual offender. He argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and that the trial court erred in admitting privileged communications into evidence. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nParkman, an ex-convict, first contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict since the principal testimony at trial was that of two ex-convicts, Mike Walker and Robert Nease. Walker testified that while Parkman was standing outside of a vehicle in which Walker and Nease, the driver, were sitting, Parkman pulled a gun from behind his back, pointed it at Walker\u2019s head, and fired it just as Walker was putting his right hand up to cover his face. The bullet struck and passed through his hand. At trial, Nease identified Parkman as the person who was standing outside of the vehicle. He also testified that when he started to drive away, he heard a gun shot and then Walker remark, \u201cI\u2019ve been shot. I\u2019m bleeding like a stuck pig.\u201d In a tape recording admitted into evidence, Parkman stated to Mike Willingham, a private investigator, that he had hit Walker with a \u201c38.\u201d\nWe affirm if there is any substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. Robinson v. State, 293 Ark. 243, 737 S.W.2d 153 (1987). Substantial evidence is evidence of such sufficient force and character that it will compel a conclusion one way or the other. Holloway v. State, 293 Ark. 438, 738 S.W.2d 796 (1987). Although the key testimony at trial was given by two ex-convicts, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of these witnesses. Robinson v. State, 291 Ark. 212, 723 S.W.2d 818 (1987). We find the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on the charge of battery in the first degree.\nParkman also argues that a taped conversation should have been excluded under the attorney-client privilege. Mike Willing-ham, a private investigator who had been employed by Parkman\u2019s step-mother to assist in investigation and trial preparation for a murder case against Parkman, recorded a conversation between himself and Parkman in which Parkman stated he had hit Walker with a \u201c38.\u201d The evidence reveals that Parkman\u2019s lawyers did not employ Willingham, but they met with him and used his work product in defending Parkman in the murder case, which resulted in acquittal. In denying Parkman\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court found the attorney-client privilege did not apply because Willingham was not a representative of Parkman\u2019s lawyers and because the communications involved matters other than the rendition of legal services. We agree.\nArk. R. Evid. 502(b) provides:\nGeneral Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communcations [communications] made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer\u2019s representative, (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer\u2019s representative, (3) by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein, (4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.\nArk. R. Evid. 502(a)(4) defines \u201crepresentative of the lawyer\u201d as \u201cone employed by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services.\u201d\nThe communications between Parkman and Willing-ham were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Willing-ham was not a representative of Parkman\u2019s lawyers under Ark. R. Evid. 502(a)(4) since they did not employ him to assist in the rendition of professional legal services. In addition, the communications were not made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services, which is a prerequisite under Ark. R. Evid. 502(b) to invoking the attorney-client privilege. The telephone conversation between Parkman and Willingham concerned the acquisition and sale of illegal weapons and drugs and the fact that Parkman had shot Walker in the hand. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting a portion of the taped conversation into evidence.\nAffirmed.\nPurtle, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William L. Wharton, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Joseph V. Svoboda, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "James Hamilton PARKMAN v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 87-137\n742 S.W.2d 927\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 25, 1988\nWilliam L. Wharton, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Joseph V. Svoboda, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0339-01",
  "first_page_order": 379,
  "last_page_order": 382
}