{ "id": 1895822, "name": "David INGLE v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Ingle v. State", "decision_date": "1988-01-25", "docket_number": "CR 87-164", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "357", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "294 Ark. 353" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "742 S.W.2d 939" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "716 S.W.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1873744 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0043-02" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873744, 1873694 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0043-02", "/ark/290/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 P.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10407396, 10407223 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/701/0017-02", "/p2d/701/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182598 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348, 350", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980) (footnote omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 3114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 28169 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 374640 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "Frankfurter,.!., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/315/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2258 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" }, { "page": "482-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0475-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 7812, "ocr_confidence": 0.919, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0560825371126397e-07, "percentile": 0.5553632663525943 }, "sha256": "66bcf63115da521d75c269739b9a029829eee588752f0fec36dca4e4dee1a779", "simhash": "1:d0efb305ce4af090", "word_count": 1259 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:05.889486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "David INGLE v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nAppellant entered guilty pleas to three felonies, was sentenced in each case, and began serving the sentences. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 alleging constitutionally inadequate representation because of his attorney\u2019s conflict of interest in representing codefendants. The trial court denied post-conviction relief. We reverse and remand.\nIt is settled that \u201c[requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.\u201d Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978). Inmany cases, \u201c\u2018[a] common defense. . . gives strength against a common attack.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 482-83 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter,.!., dissenting)). However, appointing or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants does create a possible conflict of interest that could prejudice either or both clients. See Burger v. Kemp,_U.S__, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3120 (1987). The possibility of prejudice does not justify \u201can inflexible rule that would presume prejudice in all cases.\u201d Id. Instead, prejudice is presumed \u201c \u2018only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u201cactively represented conflicting interests\u201d and \u201can actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980) (footnote omitted))). Thus, the inquiry in the case at bar is whether counsel actively represented conflicting interests and, if so, did that conflict adversely affect the lawyer\u2019s performance.\nThe facts are as follows. On November 21,1985, the police searched a house in Star City occupied by appellant and codefendant Audrey Courtney, and also searched Mrs. Courtney\u2019s car, located at the residence. The police seized fifteen pounds of marijuana from the house and car. Four days later, on November 25, appellant and codefendant Courtney were jointly charged with possession of a controlled substance. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 82-2617 (Supp. 1985). Because of the amount of marijuana seized, the information was amended to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. On December 20, appellant and codefendant Courtney employed Robert Remet as their attorney. Remet filed various defense motions and prepared for trial. The deputy prosecuting attorney offered to recommend a term of nine years each for the appellant and codefendant if they would plead guilty. Their attorney wrote back, \u201cWould you consider reducing the state\u2019s offer to 6 years for each defendant?\u201d Appellant and the codefendant subsequently rejected the State\u2019s offer.\nOn June 8, 1986, the police searched appellant\u2019s pickup truck and seized another three and one-half pounds of marijuana and, in addition, seized the truck for forfeiture. The next day, June 9, appellant was charged with two additional felonies, one for the manufacture and possession of a controlled substance and the other for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.\nThree days later his attorney wrote the deputy prosecutor about the second set of charges against appellant, and also inquired about the first charge against appellant and his co-defendant:\nNeedless to say, my client\u2019s subsequent, alleged drug related offense has nonplussed his poor lawyer. . .\nTalk about out of the frying pan and into the fire!\nThe previous case, LCR 85-94-2 (State v. David Ingle and Audrey Courtney) is set for trial on September 23, 1986.\nPlease think about a new plea offer for Mr. Ingle, present developments duly considered. And, while you\u2019re at it, may I, once again, ask for some clemency for Mrs. Courtney \u2014 who, if hindsight be any guide, was probably not in pari delicto in the earlier case (CR85-94-2)?\nThe state\u2019s statutory entitlement to retribution, insofar as Mrs. Courtney be concerned, will not suffer if she is placed on 5-years\u2019 supervised probation, and required to pay an appropriate fine. In fact, in view of the latter case against Mr. Ingle, such an arrangement would not be unreasonable.\nOn June 20, in the codefendant\u2019s case, the State offered to recommend five years on probation and a fine of $3,000.00. The codefendant accepted the plea on June 24. On the same day, June 24, the deputy prosecutor mailed a plea offer for appellant. The offer was for five years on the first charge and ten years on each of the second charges filed June 9, the latter two sentences to be concurrent to one another but consecutive to the five year sentence. In addition, the bargain called for forfeiture of the truck. The appellant accepted the plea offer on June 25 and was sentenced on July 1. On that same day, July 1, appellant\u2019s attorney wrote the deputy prosecutor:\nThat 1985 Ford Ranger pick-up, formerly the property of David Ingle, is subject to a lien of about $3000 or so with Ford Motor Credit Co., as well as to an indirect lien of over $3500, running in favor of Audrey Courtney.\nSince (1) the confiscation is subordinate to secured liens; and (2) Mrs. Courtney did in fact put up the cash for the downpayment ($3500), as well as make the monthly payments; and (3) Mrs. Courtney was not involved in 86-34-2, which is the case at issue (the confiscation), what are your thoughts about titling the truck in her, and having her go ahead and continue the payments?\nIf, for one moment, I believed Courtney to be in pari delicto with Ingle, period, I would not ask for you to consider ceding the truck to her.\nPunishment and retribution have now been exacted: he gets the pen, she gets a healthy fine and probation. Plus, he has lost his truck. Fair is fair, wouldn\u2019t you say. . .?\nThe foregoing facts show that at first, when appellant and the codefendant had equal charges pending, their attorney devoted his full loyalty to both clients and sought a six year sentence for each of them. However, when the second set of charges was filed against appellant, a disparity of charges between the clients came into existence. When a substantial disparity of evidence or of charges exists, it is unusual if an actual conflict does not also exist. Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17, 22 (Colo. 1985); see also Boyette v. State, 290 Ark. 43, 716 S.W.2d 749 (1986). The attorney reacted to the disparity of charges by changing his plea bargaining from a position of complete loyalty to both clients to one of comparing his clients\u2019 culpability, even on the first charge: \u201cCourtney ... if hindsight be any guide, was probably not in pari delicto in the earlier case. . . .\u2019\u2019At this time the attorney was in the middle of conflicting interests. The conflict is even more clear in his subsequent letter: \u201cPunishment and retribution have now been exacted: he gets the pen, she gets a healthy fine and probation. Plus, he has lost his truck. Fair is fair, wouldn\u2019t you say. . .?\u201d\nThe facts conclusively establish that the attorney was playing one client against the other, which constitutes a clear conflict of interest. The facts also conclusively establish that, after getting in the middle of the conflicting interests, the attorney\u2019s performance was adversely affected because he no longer had complete loyalty to appellant. He virtually abandoned appellant in order to get a better offer for the codefendant. Accordingly, we hold that appellant had constitutionally inadequate representation at the time he pleaded guilty.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gibson & Deen, by: Thomas D. Deen, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: C. Kent Jolliff, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "David INGLE v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 87-164\n742 S.W.2d 939\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 25, 1988\nGibson & Deen, by: Thomas D. Deen, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: C. Kent Jolliff, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 397 }