{ "id": 1895789, "name": "William D. YOUNTS v. CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK", "name_abbreviation": "Younts v. City of North Little Rock", "decision_date": "1988-02-16", "docket_number": "87-351", "first_page": "501", "last_page": "504", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "294 Ark. 501" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "744 S.W.2d 715" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-52-205", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 S.W.2d 1022", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ark. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1432141 ], "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/187/0405-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 376, "char_count": 5865, "ocr_confidence": 0.92, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.2977880177570198 }, "sha256": "ea020d5d2a66b0d1af93c06e32f9f407089d77401d22559f5a3903022280850a", "simhash": "1:df77f70e50aa1c28", "word_count": 959 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:05.889486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Purtle, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "William D. YOUNTS v. CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nIn 1983 the Mayor and City Council of North Little Rock were having numerous differences with William Younts, the Chief of Police. The City Council wanted to replace Younts, the appellant, and, in an effort to do so, passed Ordinance 5554 on July 26, 1983. The ordinance was an offer of settlement in which the City, the appellee, agreed to pay appellant \u201call the normal retirement benefits that any employee of the City of North Little Rock would expect to receive upon his retirement which include accumulated vacation pay, accumulated sick pay and discretionary days.\u201d The only mention in the ordinance of compensatory time, or accumulated overtime pay, was as follows: \u201cThe City Council agrees not to interfere with any right William D. Younts may have to immediate pension benefits based on parity pay and compensatory time\u201d (Emphasis added.) The ordinance provided that the offer would be withdrawn if not accepted by 3:00 p.m. the next day. On the next day, July 27, the appellant submitted his resignation in an attempt to accept the offer. However, his acceptance included a provision that called for payment to him of accumulated compensatory time. The appellee found the provision unacceptable and, in the exchange of letters which followed, made it clear that it had no intention of paying compensatory time. The parties continued to negotiate the terms for the resignation and finally, on August 2,1983, entered into a settlement agreement. The written settlement agreement expressly left the determination of entitlement to compensatory pay open to resolution by the courts.\nThe appellant filed suit, claiming entitlement to 872 hours of compensatory time. The lower court looked to Ordinance 5172, a 1980 ordinance, which in part provides, \u201cCompensatory time may be accumulated not to exceed ten (10) days but must be used within twelve months.\u201d The court held that under this ordinance the appellant could not accumulate overtime in excess of eighty hours, or ten days at eight hours per day. The appellant brings this appeal, asserting that for several reasons the trial court erred in imposing the ten day limitation. We find the appellant\u2019s arguments are without merit.\nThe appellant first argues that he is entitled to 872 hours because of assurances given him by various \u201cagents\u201d of the appellee City prior to his attempted resignation of July 27,1983. The lower court rejected his argument, stating in its Order that \u201cthese discussions were merely part of the negotiations to the settlement and did not establish an entitlement.\u201d We agree. Even if the alleged assurances induced the appellant to submit the July 27 resignation, that resignation altered the terms of the offer. Therefore, the resignation was not an acceptance which created a binding contract; it was instead a counter-offer which operated as a rejection of the offer. See Smith v. School District No. 89, 187 Ark. 405, 59 S.W.2d 1022 (1933). A binding contract did not arise until the August 2 settlement, and, prior to that time, the appellee had clearly repudiated any assurances given.\nThe appellant next argues that Ordinance 5172 was repealed by the following language in the original offer: \u201cAll ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of the conflict.\u201d The argument fails for two reasons. First, there is no conflict between Ordinances 5554, the original offer, and 5172, the ten day limitation, since the offer did not include a provision for the payment of compensatory time. Second, Ordinance 5554 on which the appellant seeks to rely never took effect since it was withdrawn by its own terms when it was not properly accepted by the deadline.\nThe appellant\u2019s final argument is that he is entitled to all compensatory time claimed under the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1712 (Repl. 1980). This statute, which now appears with slightly amended language at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-52-205 (Supp. 1987), provides in part that police officers are entitled to overtime pay for all hours over forty worked in a given week. We find the appellant\u2019s argument unconvincing for a number of reasons, none of which is more striking than the fact that this case involves the chief of police, and, thus, the statute is simply inapplicable. The statute is directed toward \u201cpolice officers\u201d and itself makes a distinction between \u201cpolice officers\u201d and the \u201cchief of police.\u201d\nThe trial court ruling that the appellant was limited to the accumulation of ten days of compensatory time was correct, and, therefore, is affirmed.\nPurtle, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice." }, { "text": "John I. Purtle, Justice,\ndissenting. Chief Younts made it clear from the commencement of negotiations that he expected to be paid for accumulated compensatory overtime. The City Council agreed and inserted a provision in the ordinance agreeing not to interfere with either his right to \u201cpension benefits\u201d or \u201ccompensatory time.\u201d He made diligent inquiry at the city hall about his compensatory time and specifically made his acceptance conditioned upon payment to him of his \u201ccompensatory time.\u201d The city did not reject his conditioned acceptance until long after the deal was struck. Although the city may not have intended to pay compensatory time, such intention was not manifested until much later when it decided not to pay the chiefs compensatory overtime in full.\nI believe Chief Younts is entitled to payment for compensatory overtime to the extent revealed by the records at city hall where he was required to daily submit a record of the hours he worked. A citizen ought to be able to deal in trust and confidence with his government.", "type": "dissent", "author": "John I. Purtle, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "L. Gene Worsham, for appellant.", "Philip E. Kaplan, and Joann C, Maxey, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "William D. YOUNTS v. CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK\n87-351\n744 S.W.2d 715\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 16, 1988\nL. Gene Worsham, for appellant.\nPhilip E. Kaplan, and Joann C, Maxey, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0501-01", "first_page_order": 541, "last_page_order": 544 }