{ "id": 1892761, "name": "LITTLE ROCK PORT AUTHORITY v. W. Ross McCAIN", "name_abbreviation": "Little Rock Port Authority v. McCain", "decision_date": "1988-06-27", "docket_number": "88-95", "first_page": "130", "last_page": "132", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "296 Ark. 130" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "752 S.W.2d 44" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1 Ark. L. Rev. 215", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ark. L. Rev.", "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ark. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1705476 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/227/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-79-210", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-902", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 21-9-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 277, "char_count": 3821, "ocr_confidence": 0.856, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06928106619343444 }, "sha256": "75f2ebbb665072d5540478d593785b159d1418c4883ede6d554e04ec05438c8d", "simhash": "1:ea1b84b6b0ee3ae0", "word_count": 607 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:25:51.901471+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LITTLE ROCK PORT AUTHORITY v. W. Ross McCAIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant acquired a railroad liability insurance policy covering tort liability that might arise from the operation of its locomotive. Appellee, a taxpayer, filed a declaratory action against appellant, contending that the appellant\u2019s expenditure for the premium payment of such insurance was an illegal exaction and an abuse of appellant\u2019s discretion because appellant was entitled to governmental tort immunity pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 21-9-301 (1987). Appellant responded that the insurance is necessary because it has exposure to tort suits under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-902 (1987), which provides that all railroads built and operated in the state shall be responsible for the damages they cause persons and property. At trial, both parties stipulated that the appellant\u2019s insurance premiums would be reduced if a finding was made that appellant was immune, by state law, from tort liability. The appellee moved for judgment on the pleadings and stipulation, and consistent with that motion, the trial court held that appellant\u2019s locomotive operation was immune from tort liability and entered a judgment in appellee\u2019s favor. On appeal, appellant maintains the court was wrong in its construction of \u00a7 21-9-301 and that \u00a7 23-12-902 remains a potential source of tort liability for the appellant so long as it operates its locomotive.\nWe first note that while appellee alleged in his complaint that the appellant\u2019s premium payment was an illegal exaction under article 13, section 16 of the Arkansas Constitution, the trial court never held the payment was illegal, nor do we think it should have. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-79-210 (1987), appellant is authorized to purchase liability insurance even in instances where it is not subject to tort liability. See Kirksey v. City of Ft. Smith, 227 Ark. 630, 638, 300 S.W.2d 257, 261 (1957). That statutory provision provides in relevant part that when liability insurance is carried by any municipality (or its agency or subdivision), not subject to suit for tort, and a person suffers personal or property damage on account of the municipality\u2019s negligence, the injured person has a direct cause of action against the insurer to the extent of the policy limits. In sum, while \u00a7 23-79-210 does not require a municipality, which is not subject to suit for tort, to carry liability insurance, the statute does authorize and provide for a direct action against the insurer by the injured person in the event the municipality carries such insurance. Id.; \u00a7 23-79-210(c)(l); see also Leflar, Acts of 1947 General Assembly: Acts 46 and 362, Torts and Liability Insurance of Tort-Exempt Agencies, 1 Ark. L. Rev. 215 (1947), (a discussion of Act 46 of 1947, the predecessor and essentially identical law which was reenacted and compiled in \u00a7 23-79-210).\nBecause the appellant is authorized by law to purchase liability insurance under \u00a7 23-79-210, appellee\u2019s assertion that an illegal exaction would result from paying the insurance premium is erroneous. Appellee\u2019s only manifest interest in this cause is one of disagreement with appellant\u2019s discretionary, but legitimate, decision to purchase liability insurance. Accordingly, we need not reach the issue as to whether the appellant was subject to tort immunity in the operation of its locomotive, and we hold that the trial court was wrong in reaching and deciding that issue. We reverse and remand this case with directions to enter an order vacating the judgment and dismissing the appellant\u2019s action.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Robert S. Shafer, for appellant.", "Owens, McHaney & Calhoun, by: James M. McHaney, Jr., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LITTLE ROCK PORT AUTHORITY v. W. Ross McCAIN\n88-95\n752 S.W.2d 44\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 27, 1988\n[Rehearing denied September 12, 1988.]\nFriday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Robert S. Shafer, for appellant.\nOwens, McHaney & Calhoun, by: James M. McHaney, Jr., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0130-01", "first_page_order": 152, "last_page_order": 154 }