{
  "id": 1889898,
  "name": "Mary Louise FILK v. Elizabeth F. BEATTY, By Her Attorney in Fact, Lloyd David Beatty",
  "name_abbreviation": "Filk v. Beatty",
  "decision_date": "1989-02-20",
  "docket_number": "89-35",
  "first_page": "40",
  "last_page": "43",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "298 Ark. 40"
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    {
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      "cite": "764 S.W.2d 454"
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  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
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  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "150 S.W. 135",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "year": 1912,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "105 Ark. 5",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1346991
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      "year": 1912,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "24 S.W.2d 865",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1930,
      "opinion_index": 0
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      "cite": "181 Ark. 27",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        8718288
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      "year": 1930,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "243 Ark. 465",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8721357
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      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-68-304",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-68-201",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-68-301",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
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        }
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 274,
    "char_count": 3886,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.889,
    "pagerank": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:53.094543+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Mary Louise FILK v. Elizabeth F. BEATTY, By Her Attorney in Fact, Lloyd David Beatty"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nIn 1984, Elizabeth F. Beatty executed a durable power of attorney pursuant to the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 58-501 etseq. (Repl. 1971) (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-68-301 et seq. (1987)) and Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 58-701 et seq. (Supp. 1985) (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-68-201 etseq. (1987)) for the purpose for having her son, Lloyd David Beatty, appointed to provide for her needs in the event she became incompetent. The power of attorney was presented to the probate judge pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 58-501 (Repl. 1971) (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-68-304 (1987)) and was signed by him under the word \u201capproved.\u201d The approval contained no other words of rendition of judgment.\nLloyd Beatty, acting under the power, brought this action in chancery court in the name of his principal against the appellant, to collect amounts past due on a promissory note. In the chancery court action, the appellant questioned the standing of the attorney-in-fact to maintain the action on the ground that the principal was incompetent at the time the probate court approved the power of attorney and at the time the suit was filed; hence, the action could not be maintained either in the principal\u2019s name or in the attorney-in-fact\u2019s name. The appellant further questioned the attorney-in-fact\u2019s standing because of an alleged excessive value in the principal\u2019s estate. The chancellor excluded all evidence of the principal\u2019s competency and of the value of the principal\u2019s estate on the ground that such evidence would only serve to collaterally attack the action of the probate court in approving the power. We affirm that ruling.\nBefore discussing the points of appeal raised by the appellant, we issue a caveat by noting that a judgment consisting solely of the word \u201capproved\u201d does not clearly specify the relief granted by the trial court, as is required for a valid judgment. See Thomas v. McElroy, 243 Ark. 465, 420 S.W.2d 530 (1967). However, the form of the probate court judgment has never been questioned.\nIn her two points of appeal the appellant argues that the chancellor erred in refusing to allow her to prove (1) the competency of the principal and (2) the value of the ward\u2019s estate.\nThe probate court has constitutional and statutory subject matter jurisdiction of persons of unsound mind and their estates. Article 7, Section 34, as amended by Amendment 24, Section 1, of the Constitution of Arkansas, and Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 62-2004 (Repl. 1971) (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-l-104(a)(4) (1987)). In addition, the probate court is specifically given subject matter jurisdiction over this kind of power of attorney. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 58-501 (Repl. 1971) (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-68-304 (1987)). Thus, the probate court was clearly acting within its jurisdiction when it approved the power of attorney in this case. When a probate court has acted within its jurisdiction, its judgments are not open to collateral attack. Sullivan v. Times Publishing Co., 181 Ark. 27, 24 S.W.2d 865 (1930). When a probate court acts without its jurisdiction, however, its judgments are void, and subject to collateral attack. McDonald v. Fort Smith & Western Ry. Co., 105 Ark. 5, 150 S.W. 135 (1912).\nHere, the appellant\u2019s argument is that the probate court\u2019s granting of the power was erroneous because the principal (a) was incompetent and (b) had too large an estate. An erroneous judgment is not void, but only voidable, and may not be collaterally attacked. McDonald, supra. Thus, the chancellor correctly ruled that the probate court judgment could not be collaterally attacked in chancery court.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kelley and Lujfman, by: Eugene T. Kelley, for appellant.",
      "Scott, Lashlee & Watkins, P.A., by: John R. Scott, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Mary Louise FILK v. Elizabeth F. BEATTY, By Her Attorney in Fact, Lloyd David Beatty\n89-35\n764 S.W.2d 454\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 20, 1989\nKelley and Lujfman, by: Eugene T. Kelley, for appellant.\nScott, Lashlee & Watkins, P.A., by: John R. Scott, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0040-01",
  "first_page_order": 64,
  "last_page_order": 67
}