{
  "id": 1889837,
  "name": "Daniel R. BRUNDAGE v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Brundage v. State",
  "decision_date": "1989-05-15",
  "docket_number": "CR 88-216",
  "first_page": "606",
  "last_page": "607",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "298 Ark. 606"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "770 S.W.2d 122"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "395 U.S. 238",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        1771759
      ],
      "year": 1969,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/395/0238-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 177,
    "char_count": 2036,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.845,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.06922855347937273
    },
    "sha256": "62b3dbf5a0531a744fb941945c5c127901a227da0fb3a22c50318e10e3facb5a",
    "simhash": "1:62ac9725ad010b30",
    "word_count": 341
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:53.094543+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Daniel R. BRUNDAGE v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice.\nThe appellant\u2019s motion to set aside his plea of nolo contendere was denied by the trial court. We reverse and remand.\nThe motion was filed after a commitment order was entered, making it untimely under A.R.Cr.P. Rule 26. But the trial judge addressed the merits of the motion, so we will consider this an appeal from a denial of A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 relief.\nThe trial judge failed to comply with the most fundamental requirements of accepting a plea from a defendant. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Brundage was charged-with breaking or entering and burglary and was sentenced for both offenses, but he never entered a plea on the burglary charge. A plea -of nolo contendere shall be received only from the defendant himself in open court. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 24.3(a).\nBrundage did plead nolo contendere to breaking or entering and was eventually sentenced to three years on that charge. But upon accepting that plea, the judge originally imposed a sentence of seven years with four years suspended, which was actually the intended sentence for burglary. The plea agreement signed by Brundage reflected only one sentence \u2014 the seven years with four suspended. The three years for breaking or entering was not part of the plea agreement.\nThe record also reflects that the judge misstated the penalty for breaking or entering, saying it carries a maximum fine of $2000 instead of $10,000. That error alone would not justify setting aside a plea. But the accumulation of errors, the obvious confusion at the plea hearing, and the complete failure to obtain a plea on one charge, cast serious doubt on the intelligent nature of the appellant\u2019s plea. Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant\u2019s motion to set aside his plea should have been granted.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert S. Blatt, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Ann Purvis, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Daniel R. BRUNDAGE v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 88-216\n770 S.W.2d 122\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 15, 1989\nRobert S. Blatt, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Ann Purvis, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0606-01",
  "first_page_order": 642,
  "last_page_order": 643
}