{ "id": 1888418, "name": "Willie WARRIOR v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Warrior v. State", "decision_date": "1989-07-03", "docket_number": "CR 89-13", "first_page": "337", "last_page": "340", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "299 Ark. 337" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "772 S.W.2d 592" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "353 U.S. 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159521 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/353/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895730 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1630001 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/252/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 U.S. 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3504666 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/110/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1220482 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/158/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 U.S. 251", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6139987 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/305/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 U.S. 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159521 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/353/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895730 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0416-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 422, "char_count": 6706, "ocr_confidence": 0.89, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06919747058612298 }, "sha256": "8a6451a397ceb8afbe56f492b827d7fa3e7807e1a09d8e9fd21569e10949f742", "simhash": "1:8338392a2cef435a", "word_count": 1109 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:11:40.326030+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Purtle, Dudley and Newbern, JJ., dissent.", "Purtle and Newbern, JJ., join in this dissent." ], "parties": [ "Willie WARRIOR v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice.\nWillie Warrior was convicted of delivering a controlled substance and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. We affirm. His only argument for reversal is the trial judge should have compelled the state to disclose the identity of a confidential informant.\nThe state\u2019s chief witness, Officer Robert Thomas, testified that a confidential informant was with him when he made a cocaine \u201cbuy\u201d from the appellant. The appellant\u2019s attorney asked him to disclose the name of the informant, and the officer refused. The appellant\u2019s attorney then asked for a bench conference. It was at that point that the trial judge learned that the appellant had filed a motion for disclosure of the informant\u2019s identity two days before the trial. However, the appellant\u2019s attorney had not brought it to the court\u2019s attention even though an opportunity existed. In fact the judge remarked:\nWhy didn\u2019t you bring that up this morning, Mr. Massie? That\u2019s why we have those 8:30 meetings. . . This is the first time I\u2019ve seen it. . . [I] f you wanted the identity of the informant and it was something that was vital to your case, obviously you would have brought it to the Court\u2019s attention before now so you could find out who it was and get the person here to testify.\nThe trial judge denied the motion evidently because it was untimely. We affirm since we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion.\nThe state has the privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a violation of a law. A.R.E. Rule 509(a); see also A.R.Cr.P. Rule 17.5(b). But there is no reason for the state to invoke the privilege until the defense has requested disclosure of the informant\u2019s identity. Once such a request is made and the privilege invoked, a hearing may be necessary to determine if the informant could provide relevant testimony. A.R.E. Rule 509(c). In other cases involving confidential informants, timely motions have been made and hearings held before trial has begun. See McDaniel v. State, 294 Ark. 416, 743 S.W.2d 795 (1988); see also Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53 (1957).\nAbsent surprise or other mitigating factors, the orderly procedures of a trial are best served by a preliminary ruling on this matter. See generally A.R.E. Rule 104(a). Here, the appellant does not claim surprise, did not request a continuance, and did not give a reason for failing to obtain a ruling prior to trial.\nThe court was under no obligation to bring the trial to a halt, hold a hearing and possibly postpone the trial to subpoena the informant when the appellant could have obtained a pretrial ruling that would have prevented such a delay. For these reasons, we cannot say the judge abused his discretion in denying the appellant\u2019s motion.\nAffirmed.\nPurtle, Dudley and Newbern, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice." }, { "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice,\ndissenting. It is undisputed that the confidential informant was present and participated in the illegal transaction at issue in this case. During the cross-examination of an undercover police officer, appellant asked the name of the confidential informant. The witness refused to answer, and the court refused to compel an answer. The majority affirms that ruling because, it states, the question was untimely. I dissent.\nThe question asked on cross-examination was designed to produce relevant evidence since the only person, other than appellant, who could controvert the undercover officer\u2019s testimony was the informer. A.R.E. Rule 402 provides in pertinent part: \u201cAll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, or by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this State.\u201d One of the exceptions is the government informer\u2019s privilege. That privilege is defined in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1956), as follows:\nWhat is usually referred to as the informer\u2019s privilege is in reality the Government\u2019s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316. The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.\nWe have adopted the government informer\u2019s privilege. Bennett v. State, 252 Ark. 128, 477 S.W.2d 497 (1972); A.R.Cr.P. Rule 17.1(b). The privilege, which is an exception to the relevant evidence rule, gives way when, as here, the disclosure of an informer\u2019s identity, or the contents of his communication, would be relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused. Roviaro v. United States, supra; Bennett v. State, supra; A.R.Cr.P. Rule 17.1(b). Preliminary questions regarding the existence of a privilege may be submitted to the trial court. A.R.E. Rule 104(a). Thus, the State, not the appellant, had the duty, if anyone did, to obtain a preliminary ruling that it could invoke the privilege.\nThere is no authority whatsoever for the majority opinion\u2019s statement that the appellant was at fault for \u201cfailing to obtain a ruling prior to trial.\u201d The majority opinion, in accepting the State\u2019s argument, confuses a \u201cruling prior to trial\u201d with a preliminary ruling. Under A.R.E. Rule 104(a), a trial judge is to make a preliminary ruling on questions involving qualifications of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence. This simply means that the judge preliminarily acts both as a trier of fact and the evaluator of legal standards in making a determination of admissibility of the evidence. Cotchett and Elkind, Federal Courtroom Evidence 18 (1986). It does not mean that the judge must make a ruling prior to trial, and the trial judge does not have the authority to require that such a ruling be made prior to trial. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in so ruling. Neither case cited by the majority, McDaniel v. State, 294 Ark. 416, 743 S.W.2d 795 (1988), nor Roviaro v. United States, supra, holds that a defendant must file a motion prior to trial for the state to claim a privilege. Accordingly, I dissent.\nPurtle and Newbern, JJ., join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "James P. Massie, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: O\u00edan W. Reeves, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Willie WARRIOR v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-13\n772 S.W.2d 592\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 3, 1989\nJames P. Massie, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: O\u00edan W. Reeves, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0337-01", "first_page_order": 363, "last_page_order": 366 }