{
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  "name": "Sterlin P. JONES v. Brian GOODSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Goodson",
  "decision_date": "1989-07-10",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Sterlin P. JONES v. Brian GOODSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThis is a tort case in which Brian Goodson sued his stepfather, Sterlin P. Jones, and obtained a judgment awarding damages in the amount of $27,500. In an effort to satisfy his judgment, Goodson caused writs of garnishment to be issued against banks which held accounts on behalf of Jones. In addition, Goodson caused a writ of execution to be issued for purposes of levying upon Jones\u2019s wheelchair which was valued at approximately $4,000. Jones objected to the writs of execution and garnishment issued under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-110-402 (Supp. 1987). He argued that the wheelchair and bank accounts were exempt from execution and garnishment under federal laws pertaining to Veterans Administration and Social Security benefits. The trial court rejected Jones\u2019s contention as to the accounts, which consisted of certificates of deposit purchased with veteran benefits, but held his wheelchair and any social security funds were exempt. Jones appeals from the ruling that the accounts consisting of veterans benefits are subject to garnishment, and Goodson cross-appeals from the ruling that the wheelchair and the funds consisting of social security benefits are exempt from process. We reverse the trial court\u2019s holding in Jones\u2019s direct appeal and affirm its decisions on cross-appeal.\n1. Veterans Administration Benefits\nIn the direct appeal, the parties\u2019 first argument concerns whether certificates of deposit purchased with veterans benefits are exempt under 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 3101(a) (1988), which provides in pertinent part as follows:\nPayments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Veteran\u2019s Administration . . . shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, levy, or seizure by or under any equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.\nIn considering the foregoing law, the Supreme Court in Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962), stated that such legislation should be liberally construed to protect funds granted by the Congress for the maintenance and support of the beneficiaries thereof. The Court observed that the Congress intended that veterans in the safekeeping of their benefits should be able to utilize those normal modes adopted by the community for that purpose \u2014 provided that the benefit funds, regardless of the technicalities of title and other formalities, are readily available as needed for support and maintenance, actually retain the qualities of moneys, and have not been converted into permanent investments. In applying these guidelines, the Porter court held a veteran\u2019s benefits which were deposited, in a federal savings and loan account were exempt from attachment. Cf. Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1983) (court held that land purchased by the guardian with veteran benefits was not exempt); Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545 (1939) (court held that United States bonds purchased from veteran\u2019s benefits were not exempt from execution); Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 (1937) (court held that bank credits derived from veteran\u2019s benefits were within the exemption).\nIn Fayette County Hosp. v. Reavis, 523 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. 3d 1988), the Illinois Court of Appeals held that a judgment debtor\u2019s certificate of deposit, which was purchased solely with social security benefits and payable upon his death to a funeral home, was exempt from garnishment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407 of the Social Security Act. That Act provides that \u201cnone of the monies paid or payable or rights existing [under the social security act] shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process . . .\u201d The court concluded, citing Philpot v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973), that the funds in a certificate of deposit were readily withdrawable, retained the \u201cquality of money,\u201d had not become a permanent investment, and were thus exempt under \u00a7 407(a). Significantly, the Supreme Court in Philpot reviewed its decision in Porter and determined that the analysis used with respect to veterans benefits under 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 3101 (a) is applicable to social security benefits.\nIn the instant case, it was undisputed that Jones had immediate access to the funds as needed and that while there would be a penalty of loss of interest for early withdrawal, the principal would be unaffected. We note also that legislation of this type should be liberally construed to protect funds granted by the Congress for the maintenance and support of the beneficiaries thereof. Porter, 370 U.S. 159. In sum, since the funds in question were readily withdrawable, retained the quality of money, and had not become a permanent investment, we reverse the trial court\u2019s finding that the veterans administration funds were nonexempt.\nCiting Rose v. Rose, 107 S. Ct. 2029 (1987), Goodson argues that the exemption provided in \u00a7 3101 (a) does not apply to family members and that as a stepson of Jones, he is a family member in the \u201cstrictest sense of the word.\u201d We do not address this argument since it was not raised below. Malakul v. Altech Arkansas, Inc., 298 Ark. 246, 766 S.W.2d 433 (1989).\n2. Social Security Benefits\nOn cross-appeal, Goodson argues that the trial court erred in holding that the social security benefits were exempt from garnishment. This argument is meritless because, as noted above, the exemption in 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407, extends to \u201cmoneys paid.\u201d See Bennett v. Arkansas, 108 S. Ct. 1204 (1988); Philpot, 409 U.S. 413. This exemption applies even after the benefits are in the debtor\u2019s hands. Bennett, 108 S. Ct. 1204; Philpot, 409 U.S. 413.\nIn Philpot, the Essex County welfare in the state of New Jersey was attempting to garnish funds on deposit in the recipient\u2019s account pursuant to the recipient\u2019s agreement to reimburse. In denying recovery, the court stated:\nThe protection afforded by sect. 407 is to \u201cmoneys paid\u201d and we think the analogy to veteran\u2019s benefits exemptions which we reviewed in Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159, is relevant here. We held in that case that veteran\u2019s benefits deposited in a savings and loan association on behalf of a veteran retained the \u201cquality of moneys\u201d and had not become a permanent investment. Id., at 161-162.\nIn the present case, as in Porter, the funds on deposit were readily withdrawable and retained the quality of \u201cmoneys\u201d within the purview of sect. 407.\nIn this case, it is undisputed that Jones\u2019s social security benefits were on deposit in his checking account, were readily withdraw-able, and had not been invested in any manner. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that the social security benefits were exempt from execution.\n3. The Wheelchair\nFinally, Goodson, citing Porter, argues that the trial court erred in quashing his writ of execution. Porter held that the exemption \u201cshall not extend to any property purchased in part or wholly out of such payments.\u201d We first note that the unrebutted evidence at the hearing revealed that Jones\u2019s wheelchair was purchased with the approval of the Veterans Administration. In other words, the wheelchair was a direct benefit from the Veterans Administration as opposed to personal property that was purchased in part, or wholly, out of payments.\nMoreover, we feel that allowing the writ of execution in this case would contravene the intent of Congress which is to exempt from legal process those benefits which are necessary for the maintenance and support of the veteran, in this case, the wheelchair. There was unrebutted testimony at the hearing that Jones, who has Parkinson\u2019s disease, needed a mechanized wheelchair for mobility because he could not operate a standard wheelchair very well. It bears repeating that legislation of this type should be liberally construed to protect funds granted by the Congress for the maintenance and support of beneficiaries thereof. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that the trial court was correct in quashing Goodson\u2019s writ of execution.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Raymond Harrill, for appellant.",
      "Ivester, Henry, Skinner & Camp, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Sterlin P. JONES v. Brian GOODSON\n89-58\n772 S.W.2d 609\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 10, 1989\nRaymond Harrill, for appellant.\nIvester, Henry, Skinner & Camp, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0495-01",
  "first_page_order": 521,
  "last_page_order": 525
}
