{
  "id": 1881216,
  "name": "Chowning vs. Barnett",
  "name_abbreviation": "Chowning v. Barnett",
  "decision_date": "1875-11",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "560",
  "last_page": "566",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "30 Ark. 560"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "9 Ark., 159",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8727110
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/9/0159-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 501,
    "char_count": 11411,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.418,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.363177542583211e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8754014230173265
    },
    "sha256": "260fef6992ae217a609086c095222178ab0197eb0b001358ffb35fdddcea59c9",
    "simhash": "1:cd87bd877a7ad355",
    "word_count": 1986
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:21:05.477348+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Mr. Justice Harrison did not sit in this case."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Chowning vs. Barnett."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "S. W. Williams, Sp. J. :\nThis was a suit instituted by Chowning on the 10th day of January, 1874, in which he filed before a justice- of Dorsey county his complaint, with an account for supplies furnished, and affidavit required by the 6th section of the act to regulate the labor system of this State, approved March 8th, 1867, and a contract for labor.\nBy the complaint, and other papers in the case, it appears that on the 12th day of March, 1873, the defendants in the suit, S. B. Henry, William Sewell and R. T. Henry, jointly agreed with Chowning to make and gather' a crop upon his land, which contract was filed with the complaint, together with a bill of particulars for' supplies furnished defendants named in the complaint, by which a balance was claimed as being due Chowning from these laborers of $143.25. That about the first of April, 1873, defendants abandoned said crop and were employed by N. V. Barnett; that the plaintiff notified Barnett of S. B. Henry, William Sewell and R. T. Henry\u2019s indebtedness to him, in accordance with section 5, of th\u00a9 act above mentioned, and that plaintiff would enforce the statutory lien against the defendant\u2019s future wages; that the defendants remained in the employment of said N. V. Barnett long enough, since said notice of their indebtedness to plaintiff, to secure in said N. V. Barnett\u2019s hands plaintiff\u2019s debt and cost. Judgment is prayed against defendants, the laborers, who had entered into the joint written contract, which was the foundation of the suit, and N. V. Barnett for one hundred and 25-100 dollars. \u2022\nThe summons (with a writ of garnishment against Barnett) was issued on 10th January, 1874. On the 12th day of February, the principal case was tried, in the justice\u2019s court by jury, on the claim of plaintiff and offset of defendants, who rendered a verdict for Chowning for $30. On the same day Barnett answered the garnishment, denying any indebtedness to the defendants in that action. On this answer, he was discharged, and from this judgment discharging Barnett, Chowning appealed to the Circuit Court. Judgment was rendered in his favor, by the justice, against the Henry\u2019s and Sewell for thirty dollars, on the verdict.\nFrom this judgment there was no appeal by either party.\nIn the Circuit Court Barnett demurred to the complaint, and the court sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the action. Chowning excepted and appealed to this court and\u2019here contends, that the complaint was unnecessary, and immaterial, and that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer. In this he is undoubtedly correct, and the court certainly erred in noticing any formal written complaint-, in a case pending before it on appeal from a justice of the peace, where no special pleading is required.\nIf the plaintiff showed a cause of action in his contract, account and affidavit under the act, he had a case which should have been tried upon the merits. In these papers he had to show substantially the whole nature of his case, which discloses a proceeding instituted after the lapse of more than ninety days from the abandonment of his service by the defendants, which proceeding was based upon the fifth section of the act, and was intended to enforce the statutory lien contemplated by that section, on wages dire from Barnett, as the same cause of action which was tried before the justice of the peace must be tried in the Circuit Court. See Gantt\u2019s Digest, section 3837. There could be no other or different cause of action tried in the Circuit Court in this .case. Therefore it would be of no value to reverse this cause for a formal error, if the plaintiff discloses no cause of action upon which a judgment could be based.\nThe first and second sections of the act of 1867, provide for the making of laborers\u2019 contracts; section three provides that specific liens are hereby reserved, upon so much of the produce raised, and articles constructed or manufactured by laborers during the contract as will secure all moneys, and the value of all supplies furnished them by the employer, and all wages or shares \u2022due the laborers, etc.\nThis section was intended to give reciprocal liens on produce, for supplies to the employer and wages to the laborer, and was specially applicable to the most common of labor contracts of Arkansas at that time \u2014 share cropping.\nThis section is the only one Avhich secures any lien for supplies, and this lien is on the product of the labor, the liens created by this act are statutory, and we cannot extend them by construction.\nThe fourth section, in case the employer dismisses the laborer without cause, before the expiration of his term, makes him liable for full wages and expressly provides for a lien for the wages on the product of the labor as proAdded in the third section.\nBut in the fifth section, upon which this suit is based, there is a lien given upon future wages, for damages provided for and liquidated in the act; no lien is given for supplies on future wages in this or any other section -of the act.\nSection five of the act provides \u201cif any laborer shall without cause, abandon his employer, prior to the expiration of his contract, he shall thereupon be liable to him for the full amount that would, at the expiration of the contract, have been due him from the employer.\u201d\nChoAvning\u2019s counsel contends that there is a manifest error in the printed act, caused by a transposition ; instead -of, due him from the employer, it should read, due from him to the employer.\nAs we find that the enrolled act in the secretary of state\u2019s office contains the same language, we must take it as expressing the legislative will, unless to give it this construction would render the act nonsensical, which could be avoided by some other rational construction. We think it was the intention of the legislature, by this section, in case of abandonment, to provide for damages for the breach of this contract, and establish a standard of liquidation, to-wit: the amount due from the employer to the laborer in share or wages at the end of the term, as it may be presumed that the employer expected at least to make the laborer\u2019s wages, and of course would be damaged to this extent, and this section was designed to put at rest the amount of damage, for breach of contract, and for this damage and for this only, provided for a lien on future wages; and as the third section, only, provided for lien for supplies, the employe]\u2019 who allowed supplies before any results were produced to which his lien could attach, had no lien for supplies as such, and had no remedy except for the breach of contract under the fifth .section, and as no prudent man would advance more to a laborer than his wages or share would be worth, this damage at least afforded a sort of compensation. This view of the case is sufficient to show that appellant had no case against Barnett.\nBut the sixth section of the act requires that the proceeding under the act shall be commenced in ninety days from the time the lien becomes due. We think the fifth section contemplates an immediate right of action, whenever the laborer abandons his employer without cause, and we have not been able to see the correctness of the argument presented by counsel, that to require suit to be brought within ninety days after abandonment would defeat the remedy. If there is anything in it, it applies with most force against that construction contended for, which would make the lien due at the end of the contract term, for in the meantime the laborer might work, collect all his wages, and at the end of the contract term wait ninety days, without working, or work and collect by the day, and thus in like manner defeat the remedy, just as well as he could for the first ninety days after abandonment. The argument is not sound, nor is this the correct construction of the fifth section.\nThe laborer \u201c thereupon \u201d becomes liable, and \u201c thereupon \u201d there is a right of suit, and therefore \u201cthereupon\u201d the lien for damages provided for is due.\nThe garnishment against Barnett cannot be maintained as an ordinary garnishment -in attachment, because the affidavit required 'by the sixth section of the labor act, which was filed in this case, contains none of the essential requisites of an affidavit for an ordinary attachment, nor was any writ of attachment issued.\nIt follows from these views that Chowning can in no event in this suit enforce a lien on the wages of the laborers: First\u2014 Because he has none, for supplies furnished; and, Secondly\u2014 Because if he had, his suit was out of time.\nIt is urged here, that the court below erred in dismissing the proceedings because a judgment for thirty dollars had been rendered against the Henrys and Sewell, and they did not defend.\nBut neither did Chowning or themselves appeal from this judgment in the case. There was nothing before the Circuit Court upon record before us except Chowning\u2019s appeal from the branch of the case in which the justice discharged Barnett Rom the garnishment so expressly limited in the prayer, and order of appeal. The act on which this suit was founded was repealed by act of April 22d, 1873, and if the statute was merely remedial would have defeated this suit. But, as it provides for a lien, and also for giving damages, to be liquidated \u25a0 by a certain standard in the fifth section provided, we think there was, under the contract of March 12th, 1873, a substantial right \u2014 allegation of contract \u2014 which the act of 22d April, 1873, could not impair.\nThe judgment, for the cause aforesaid, is affirmed.\nMr. Justice Harrison did not sit in this case.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "S. W. Williams, Sp. J. :"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "M. L. Jones for appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chowning vs. Barnett.\n1. Pleading: Before justice of tlte peace.\nFormal pleadings are not required in proceedings before a justice of the peace, and, on appeal to the Circuit Court, a demurrer should not be sustained to the complaint.\n2. Appeal from Justice of the Peace: Same cause of action must be tried.\nOn appeal from a justice of the peace, the same cause of action must be\ntried in the Circuit Court as was tried before the justice.\n3. Proceedings to enforce Ear loyePs Lien, etc.\nThe 5th section of the labor system act, approved March 8th, 1867, gives the employer no lien for supplies upon future wages of the laborer. The 3d. section confers a lien for supplies on the product of his labor. Proceedings to enforce a lien under the 5th section must have been commenced within ninety days after the abandonment.\n4. Statutes: Effect of the repeal of the labor system act.\nThe act of March 8th, 1867, was repealed by the act of April* 22d, 1873, and if it had been remedial merely, the repeal would have defeated any future proceedings under it; but inasmuch as it also provided for damages, the repeal did not affect future proceedings under the act for their recovery.\nAPPEAL from Dorsey Circuit Court.\nHon T. E. Sorrejas, Circuit Judge.\nM. L. Jones for appellant.\nNo complaint was necessary to obtain the writ of garnishment, only the account filed and affidavit. Acts 1867.\nThe limitation of ninety days does not begin until the expiration of the contracted time of service.\nThe demurrer was bad; there was good cause of action against defendants. )\nThe proceeding as to Barnett was in rem. He had nothing to do with the cause of action against the principal defendants. He should have moved to quash. ' Childress v. Fowler, 9 Ark., 159.\nError in the printed act suggested, fifth line of section 5."
  },
  "file_name": "0560-01",
  "first_page_order": 560,
  "last_page_order": 566
}