{ "id": 1886858, "name": "Jesse WILFORD v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Wilford v. State", "decision_date": "1989-10-16", "docket_number": "CR 89-111", "first_page": "185", "last_page": "187", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "300 Ark. 185" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "777 S.W.2d 855" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-403", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-402", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873693 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-12-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-12-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892755 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0089-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 236, "char_count": 3333, "ocr_confidence": 0.89, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06916136809520555 }, "sha256": "039d2c183d6dcae93cd246a6a07555be6c7d2666c5086ca7a0fcc7d57df2aa77", "simhash": "1:662ac54543277a50", "word_count": 562 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:14:13.062447+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jesse WILFORD v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nAppellant, Jesse Wilford, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of rape. He argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction on one of the aggravated robbery charges. We affirm the judgment of conviction.\nOn October 8,1988, three young women, Tammy, Angelia, and Ch\u00e1ncela, attended a concert at the State Fair in Little Rock. When they were returning to their car later that night, they were approached by two males, one of whom was subsequently identified as appellant. Appellant pulled a pistol, held it to Tammy\u2019s chest, and demanded her wallet. She told him she did not have a wallet, but offered him all the change that she had in her pocket. He then waved the pistol at Ch\u00e1ncela and Tammy. Ch\u00e1ncela reached in her pocket and gave the second man all of her money. The second man then came around behind Angelia and stuck his hands in her jean pockets. He then began to undress Angelia and subsequently raped her while appellant held the gun on Tammy and Ch\u00e1ncela.\nAppellant concedes that there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for the rape of Angelia, and for aggravated robbery with respect to Tammy and Ch\u00e1ncela. He argues, however, that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated robbery with respect to Angelia.\nOn appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, and the judgment will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Taylor v. State, 296 Ark. 89, 752 S.W.2d 2 (1988). A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery and is armed with a deadly weapon. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-12-103 (1987). A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a theft, he employs or threatens to employ immediate physical force upon another. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-12-102 & 5-36-103 (1987). Intent or purpose to commit a crime is a state of mind which must be inferred from the circumstances because it is not ordinarily capable of proof by direct evidence. Kinsey v. State, 290 Ark. 4, 716 S.W.2d 188 (1986). A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person when he is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-402 (1987). A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, he aids or attempts to aid the other person in committing it. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-403 (1987).\nHere, there was substantial evidence that the three (3) women were together when the appellant and an accomplice approached them. Appellant pulled a pistol, held the pistol to Tammy\u2019s chest, and demanded money. He then waved the pistol at Angelia and Ch\u00e1ncela. Ch\u00e1ncela handed over her money. Meanwhile, the accomplice stuck his hands in Angelia\u2019s pockets. The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated robbery of Angelia.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, and Thomas B. Devine III, Deputy Public Defender, by: Jerry J. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly A. Procter, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jesse WILFORD v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-111\n777 S.W.2d 855\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 16, 1989\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, and Thomas B. Devine III, Deputy Public Defender, by: Jerry J. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly A. Procter, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0185-01", "first_page_order": 213, "last_page_order": 215 }