{ "id": 1886824, "name": "Roy Don BURNS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Burns v. State", "decision_date": "1989-11-20", "docket_number": "CR 89-128", "first_page": "469", "last_page": "474", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "300 Ark. 469" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "780 S.W.2d 23" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "873 F.2d 1168", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10538675 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/873/1168-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9431 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ark. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141437 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11298090 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/461/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "741 F.2d 753", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 618532 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/741/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 F.2d 440", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 349032 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/767/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 F.2d 105", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1310566 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/838/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873680 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ark. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/7/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.W.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1597655 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/248/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ark. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 526, "char_count": 7913, "ocr_confidence": 0.921, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9834845211831453e-07, "percentile": 0.8511965369409568 }, "sha256": "21241373f4f8166f3c600b3130e2439071620b00736d6c4265746613031a34f0", "simhash": "1:4b16f41dd41284a1", "word_count": 1279 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:14:13.062447+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Roy Don BURNS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant appeals his convictions of rape, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and theft. We accept jurisdiction under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 29(l)(b) because appellant received a combined sentence of life plus seventy-five years. He raises two issues, arguing first that the trial court erred by denying his motion for continuance and second that the court erred by denying him an instruction for a lesser included offense. We summarily dispose of appellant\u2019s second point because he failed at trial to proffer an instruction, setting out the lesser included offense to which he now says he is entitled. See Murphy v. State, 248 Ark. 797, 454 S.W.2d 302 (1970); Green v. State, 7 Ark. App. 175, 646 S.W.2d 20 (1983). Upon considering appellant\u2019s remaining point on its merits, we hold the trial court was correct in denying appellant\u2019s continuance motion, and therefore affirm.\nAppellant\u2019s request for a continuance arose immediately following the court\u2019s denial of his earlier motion for the court to appoint him new counsel. Appellant was indigent, and at arraignment on January 11, 1989, the court appointed the Public Defender\u2019s officer to represent the appellant. At that same hearing, appellant pled not guilty, and the court set a bond of $100,000. Appellant\u2019s appointed counsel filed a number of motions, and those matters were considered by the trial court at pre-trial hearings on March 20 and March 31, 1989. The trial was held on April 3.\nAt the Friday, March 31 hearing, the appellant asked the trial judge for a new attorney because appellant did not feel he was being properly represented. Appellant gave the following reasons for his motion: (1) He had asked his attorney for a copy of appellant\u2019s case file and it took his attorney one week to get it to the appellant; (2) the attorney had a negative attitude about appellant\u2019s case, and he tried to get the appellant to plea bargain; (3) his attorney would not request a new bond hearing unless appellant showed him $20,000 in cash; and (4) the appellant and counsel did not get along. After the court denied appellant another attorney, appellant moved for a continuance, so he would have time to prepare his case. He explained that his access to the prison\u2019s law library had been limited to one thirty-minute period per week. The trial court denied the appellant a continuance and then asked the appellant if he intended to represent himself. Appellant answered that he would if he could not get another attorney.\nWe have held that the right to counsel of one\u2019s choice is not absolute and may not be used to frustrate the inherent power of the court to command an orderly, efficient and effective administration of justice. Leggins v. State, 271 Ark. 616, 609 S.W.2d 76 (1980). Once competent counsel is obtained, the request for a change in counsel must be considered in the context of the public\u2019s interest in the prompt dispensation of justice. Id.; Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986). A defendant\u2019s refusal without good cause to proceed with able appointed counsel constitutes a voluntary waiver of his sixth amendment right. U.S. v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1988); Carey v. State of Minn., 767 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1985); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1984).\nHere, the record reveals appellant\u2019s appointed counsel was acting diligently and competently in appellant\u2019s behalf. Upon his appointment, counsel filed numerous motions and aggressively pursued those matters at the three pre-trial hearings. Counsel spent approximately eighty hours on appellant\u2019s case and was ready to proceed with the scheduled trial on April 3, 1989. The record further reveals counsel conducted extensive cross-examination at the suppression hearing on March 20, and appellant offered no criticism of counsel until the final hearing held three days before trial.\nIn considering the nature of the complaints the appellant voiced about his attorney, none of them bear adversely on the attorney\u2019s competence or his ability to represent appellant. The case file information appellant requested was forthcoming and the one-week delay in receiving it reflects no prejudice to the presentation of appellant\u2019s case at trial. Regarding the attorney\u2019s condition that appellant obtain $20,000 in cash before counsel would request another bond hearing, such a condition merely reflects the realities of the circumstances. Appellant was indigent, and the court had already set bond at $100,000 with no indication that a lower one would be set most likely because of the seriousness of the charges against the appellant. Finally, neither the appellant\u2019s general complaint that he and his attorney did not get along nor counsel\u2019s recommendation that appellant accept the state\u2019s negotiated plea offer are good causes to discharge appointed counsel. In Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1982), the Court made it clear that the sixth amendment does not guarantee that an appointed attorney establish an exemplary rapport with the accused, nor does it guarantee an accused a \u201cmeaningful attorney-client relationship.\u201d Here, counsel gave appellant frank advice when considering the state\u2019s charges against him and the overwhelming evidence as to the appellant\u2019s guilt. In fact, counsel\u2019s recommendation was shown to be realistic and practical in view of the sentence finally imposed in this matter. If appellant had accepted the state\u2019s earlier offer, appellant\u2019s punishment would have been less.\nWe note at this point that appellant seems to rely on the court of appeals\u2019 earlier decision in Parker v. State, 18 Ark. App. 252, 715 S.W.2d 210 (1986). He argues that the reasons he argues here for discharging counsel are the same as those raised by the defendant in Parker, because the appellate court found such reasons sufficient in Parker, appellant argues we should do likewise. While we acknowledge some similarity between the arguments made in this case and Parker, we overrule Parker to the extent that our decision and rationale conflicts with Parker.\nIn conclusion, we would add that, in making his decision to represent himself, the trial court made appellant well aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see also Berry v. Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1989). The trial court continually encouraged appellant to use his appointed counsel, pointing out that the attorney was trained to go to court, while appellant was not. The court warned appellant that he would have to follow the court\u2019s rules and procedures and could not make speeches. In the preliminary proceedings, appellant was made aware of the nature and seriousness of the charges against him and the penalties that could be imposed. Appellant had previously been convicted of larceny and sodomy charges in Oklahoma, so he was no newcomer to the judicial system. In sum, the record reflects that the appellant knowingly and intelligently decided to proceed pro se, but even so, the court required appointed counsel to stand by and to assist when the circumstances dictated counsel\u2019s services.\nFor the reasons given above, we affirm.\nSee 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 11.4(b) (1984) for an excellent discussion regarding replacement of appointed counsel and what has and has not been recognized as good cause for discharging current counsel and appointing new counsel.\nAppointed counsel aided appellant in selecting the jury, arguing to the jury, performing some of the examination at trial, and in interposing objections, including making a directed verdict motion.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by; Thomas B. Divine III, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roy Don BURNS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-128\n780 S.W.2d 23\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 20, 1989\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by; Thomas B. Divine III, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0469-01", "first_page_order": 497, "last_page_order": 502 }