{
  "id": 1885557,
  "name": "Archie WILSON v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wilson v. State",
  "decision_date": "1990-02-12",
  "docket_number": "CR 89-195",
  "first_page": "342",
  "last_page": "345",
  "citations": [
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      "type": "official",
      "cite": "301 Ark. 342"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "783 S.W.2d 852"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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  "cites_to": [
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-2-402",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
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    {
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1981,
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1981,
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        "/ark/271/0692-01"
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    {
      "cite": "265 Ark. 662",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1664776
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
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        "/ark/265/0662-01"
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-36-103",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1989,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(a)(1)"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:23:07.951222+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Archie WILSON v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant was convicted of burglary and theft of property. On appeal, he claims the state\u2019s evidence was insufficient to support the theft conviction. We disagree and affirm.\nUnder Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-36-103(a)(1) (Supp. 1989), a person commits theft of property if he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over, or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another person, with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof. Here, appellant and an accomplice, Lee Turner, were seen entering the apartment of Kim Cruise at a time she was out of town. The witnesses observing the appellant and Turner called the police and then called on the assistance of the apartment complex\u2019s maintenance supervisor and four men, who were nearby playing basketball. Upon reaching Cruise\u2019s apartment, the men opened the door and saw appellant holding a stereo and a big TV; Turner was holding a pillow case with stuff in it. The apartment was in shambles. The appellant and Turner ran out of the apartment after putting down the items they were holding. When they were caught by the men who had found them, appellant had none of Cruise\u2019s property, but Turner had possession of a watch and lighter owned by Cruise.\nAppellant contends that because he never left Cruise\u2019s premises with any property, the state failed to prove he had consummated the crime of theft, as defined under \u00a7 5-36-103 (a)(1). Such an argument is contrary to case law.\nIn Jarren v. State, 265 Ark. 662, 580 S.W.2d 460 (1979), this court affirmed Jarrett\u2019s conviction for theft of property where the evidence showed that he loaded a shopping cart with meat, rolled it into the storeroom where the public was not supposed to be, and began putting the meat into sacks that he had stuck in the back of his pants. Jarrett was stopped while he was loading the meat into sacks in the store, and therefore he was arrested before leaving the store with the meat. In affirming the conviction, this court stated that it was reasonable for the trial judge to believe that, if Jarrett had meant to buy the large quantity of packaged meat, he would have taken it to the check-out counter. Further, this court held that the trial judge could infer from the evidence that Jarrett was exercising unauthorized control over the property with the intention of taking it out of the store in sacks, as if it. had been paid for. In fact, the court stated that no other explanation for Jarrett\u2019s conduct is readily apparent. See also White v. State, 271 Ark. 692, 610 S.W.2d 266 (Ark. App. 1981).\nThe rule and holding in Jarrett are controlling here. Witnesses testified that they saw the appellant and Turner break into Cruise\u2019s apartment. The men who were called to help said that they saw the appellant with a television and stereo in his hands while he was standing in Cruise\u2019s living room. The appellant had removed the television from where the victim kept it in the apartment and was obviously ready to remove it from the premises. In fact, Turner, his accomplice, testified that he and the appellant planned on stealing items from the apartment. His story was sufficiently corroborated by the men who testified that when they entered the Cruise apartment, they discovered the appellant holding the television. Definitely, the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that the appellant had the intent of depriving the victim of her television, and as shown by the holding in Jarrett, actual removal of the items from the apartment is not necessary to show theft.\nEven if we had found merit in appellant\u2019s foregoing contention, he was clearly guilty as an accomplice. This court has repeatedly held that there is no distinction between the criminal responsibility of an accomplice and the person who actually commits the offense. Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981); see also Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-2-402(2) and2-403(a) (1987). The trial court here instructed the jury as to accomplice liability.\nThe evidence reflects the appellant accompanied Turner when they unlawfully entered Cruise\u2019s apartment. Turner admitted that upon entering the apartment, they intended to steal items of property. Turner also admitted he had a lighter and watch belonging to Cruise when he left her premises and was subsequently apprehended. Turner was clearly guilty of theft under these circumstances and, at the very least, the evidence shows the appellant actively planned and participated in Turner\u2019s commission of the crime.\nWe affirm.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Val P. Price, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Sandra Bailey Moll, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Archie WILSON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-195\n783 S.W.2d 852\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 12, 1990\n[Rehearing denied March 19, 1990.]\nVal P. Price, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Sandra Bailey Moll, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee.\nPrice, J., not participating."
  },
  "file_name": "0342-01",
  "first_page_order": 372,
  "last_page_order": 375
}