{ "id": 1885564, "name": "M.N. OSBORNE, Agent, and Jerry A. King Ministries, Inc. v. CITY OF CAMDEN", "name_abbreviation": "Osborne v. City of Camden", "decision_date": "1990-02-26", "docket_number": "89-287", "first_page": "420", "last_page": "423", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ark. 420" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "784 S.W.2d 596" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 S.W.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ark. 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1418443 ], "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/191/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-56-416", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ark. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1646441 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/224/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748051 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ark. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1881097 ], "year": 1875, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/30/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-56-422", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720825 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0556-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 389, "char_count": 6147, "ocr_confidence": 0.914, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3745614795530733e-07, "percentile": 0.639211591100485 }, "sha256": "b796a82c8cbe417126eaebf8dd6c4e27b185dd1a186b601fd6af734c08ce7a46", "simhash": "1:7fe0ee4ef34e1302", "word_count": 1043 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:23:07.951222+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hays and Glaze, JJ., not participating." ], "parties": [ "M.N. OSBORNE, Agent, and Jerry A. King Ministries, Inc. v. CITY OF CAMDEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nM.N. Osborne purchased a 33,000 square foot building in Camden. After purchasing the property, he discovered that a zoning line traversed the building at an angle, leaving practically all of the building zoned \u201cneighborhood commercial.\u201d Only a small part of the rear right of the building was zoned \u201clight industrial.\u201d Osborne petitioned the City Planning Commission to zone all of the tract on which the building was located to \u201clight industrial.\u201d The Commission denied his request. He then petitioned the Board of Directors of Camden to overturn the Commission\u2019s zoning decision. The Board affirmed the Commission\u2019s decision and denied appellant\u2019s rezoning petition. Osborne transferred the property to appellant Jerry King Ministries, Inc., but continued to seek rezoning, acting as King\u2019s agent in this action. Appellant filed suit in chancery court to enjoin the City from enforcing the zoning ordinance. The trial court upheld the ordinance. We affirm the result by the trial court, but for a reason different from the one given by the Chancellor.\nMunicipal zoning authority is conferred solely by State enabling legislation. Taggart v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570, 647 S.W.2d 458 (1983). Failure to comply with a mandatory procedural requirement of the enabling statute renders a zoning ordinance invalid. City of Searcy v. Roberson, 224 Ark. 344, 273 S.W.2d 26 (1954). A zoning ordinance \u201cshall consist of both a map and a text.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-56-416(a)(2) (1987). Compliance with this provision of the statute is mandatory, and failure to comply with it will render a zoning ordinance void. City of Benton v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 961, 88 S.W.2d 828 (1936); City of Searcy v. Roberson, supra. The purpose of this provision is to give notice of the city\u2019s zoning proposal so that, before adoption, residents may object or make suggestions, and after adoption, land purchasers may acquaint themselves with the zoning restriction. City of Benton v. Phillips, supra.\nIn this case the zoning ordinance in dispute was the comprehensive zoning ordinance of 1977, which consisted only of a text. No map was approved by the City as the 1977 zoning map. A Camden official explained that the City was frugal. Sometime later a city planner drew a map which contained, he said, the boundaries which the City had intended. The Chancellor upheld this \u201cworking map\u201d as being sufficient to validate the ordinance. The cases of City of Benton v. Phillips, id. and City of Searcy v. Roberson, id., are squarely in point, and the ruling was in error. The 1977 comprehensive zoning ordinance was invalid because it did not contain a map.\nThe invalidity of the 1977 ordinance causes the City to fall back to its prior comprehensive zoning ordinance, the one of 1964. In 1964 the city officials were not so parsimonious. They employed the City Planning Division of the University of Arkansas to prepare a map and made it a part of the ordinance. However, this 1964 ordinance does not give appellant any zoning relief because the property was zoned at that time the same as it was in 1977. As could be expected, appellant argues that the 1964 ordinance is also invalid. The Chancellor did not rule on this argument. Rather than remand, and in order to end the controversy, we will decide the issue.\nAn appeal in a chancery case opens the whole case for review as if no decision had been made in the trial court. Ferguson v. Green, 266 Ark. 556, 587 S.W.2d 18 (1979). \u201cIt has been the invariable practice of this court not to remand a case to a chancery court for further proceedings and proof where we can plainly see what the equities of the parties are, but rather to render such decree here as should have been rendered below.\u201d Ferguson v. Green, id. at 565. Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the 1964 ordinance was valid.\nAppellant contends that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-56-422(5) (1987) requires that both the text and the map of the 1964 ordinance be filed in the City Clerk\u2019s office. Evidence established that the map was filed in the City\u2019s Planning and Code Enforcement Office, and not the City Clerk\u2019s office. Such a filing will not render the ordinance invalid.\nThe City Planner\u2019s office does not have an outside door, and entry into the office is through the City Clerk\u2019s office. When citizens went to the clerk\u2019s office and asked for a zoning map they were referred into the planning office. Thus, there was substantial compliance with the statute.\nIn reading this opinion, one may wonder why we invalidate one ordinance for failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirement to make a map part of the ordinance and, in the same opinion, uphold another ordinance on the basis of substantial compliance when the map is not filed precisely as directed by the enabling legislation. The reason is in one instance the statute is mandatory and in the other it is directory. As early as Edwards v. Hall, 30 Ark. 31, 37 (1875), we adopted the principle that those things which are of the essence of the thing to be done are mandatory, while those not of the essence are directory only. We have continued to follow that distinction. Taggart v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570, 647 S.W.2d 458 (1983). In this case the existence of a map is the essence of the enabling statute and of the zoning ordinance, while the place a map is filed is not.\nAdditionally, the appellant argued below that the 1964 classification of appellant\u2019s property was a mistake, and it was arbitrary and capricious for the City not to correct the mistake. We quickly dispose of the argument because the alleged mistake was never presented to the City; it was only presented to the court. The City did not arbitrarily refuse to correct its mistake when its alleged mistake was not shown to it.\nAffirmed.\nHays and Glaze, JJ., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mitchell, Williams, Selig & Tucker, by: W. Christopher Barrier, for appellants.", "Bramblett & Pratt, by: James M. Pratt, Jr., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "M.N. OSBORNE, Agent, and Jerry A. King Ministries, Inc. v. CITY OF CAMDEN\n89-287\n784 S.W.2d 596\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 26, 1990\nMitchell, Williams, Selig & Tucker, by: W. Christopher Barrier, for appellants.\nBramblett & Pratt, by: James M. Pratt, Jr., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0420-01", "first_page_order": 452, "last_page_order": 455 }