{ "id": 1885494, "name": "Thomas Lee DEERE v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Deere v. State", "decision_date": "1990-03-05", "docket_number": "CR 89-152", "first_page": "505", "last_page": "510", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ark. 505" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "785 S.W.2d 31" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "273 Ark. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720404 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/273/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9431 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 S.W.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8719184 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0237-02" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ark. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719184, 8719130 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0237-02", "/ark/288/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 489, "char_count": 8573, "ocr_confidence": 0.924, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6336553104040893e-07, "percentile": 0.6892853598800548 }, "sha256": "13797073bdeb87a5c73aefc881895de95189ce7e1bcfc8f0eeda7356eee5ea4f", "simhash": "1:f462a8bfbb0b2ef4", "word_count": 1488 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:23:07.951222+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Price, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Thomas Lee DEERE v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Otis H. Turner, Justice.\nThe appellant, Thomas Lee Deere, upon conviction of two counts of burglary, was sentenced to consecutive terms of thirty years and ten years. In addition, he was sentenced to thirty years on another burglary count and thirty years for the sale of a controlled substance; both sentences were to run concurrently with the others.\nThe thirty-seven year old appellant\u2019s educational background consists of eight grades of formal schooling, a General Education Certificate, two years of vocational training, as well as considerable practical education from four previous criminal trials, in one of which he represented himself.\nAt a pretrial hearing, the appellant expressed a desire to represent himself, although he was offered appointed counsel, and counsel was in fact appointed to assist him at his request. At the pretrial hearing the following exchange occurred between the appellant and the trial court:\nTHE COURT: Mr. Deere, I understand through your attorney that you wish to represent yourself, is that true?\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Do you feel like you\u2019re competent to do that?\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: You have the absolute constitutional right to an attorney, and you have one, but also, you have the absolute constitutional right to represent yourself if you\u2019re competent to do so. I know you\u2019ve been through the criminal justice mill just about every way you probably can. You\u2019ve probably been through several trials haven\u2019t you?\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: How many trials would you say you\u2019ve been through?\nMR. DEERE: Four.\nTHE COURT: Did you have lawyers?\nMR. DEERE: In all of them but one.\nTHE COURT: I know one of them you had here; you were acquitted. . . .\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir. I had two jury trials here and one in Texarkana. I represented myself in the Eighth Circuit Court in Pine Bluff.\nTHE COURT: How about your education, what kind of education do you have?\nMR. DEERE: I got a GED, and I got two years of vo-tech.\nTHE COURT: Do you have any mental problems, learning disabilities, or anything like that?\nMR. DEERE: No.\nTHE COURT: Do you feel comfortable representing yourself?\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir, I do.\nTHE COURT: Do you understand all the pitfalls? You probably don\u2019t have any understanding of the twenty-eight exceptions of the hearsay rule and all sorts of things like that you wouldn\u2019t know anything about.\nMR. DEERE: All I can really ask for at this time is I got a couple of motions to file, but I would like to have a little bit of time to go over the evidence. . . .\nTHE COURT: Do you want Mr. Cooper to be standby counsel and help you?\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir, I do.\nTHE COURT: But you don\u2019t want him to represent you, you just want him to be there, is that what you want?\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir, just as a guide.\n(T. 52-55)\nThereafter, subsequent to a hearing on the motions, the following dialogue ensued:\nTHE COURT: Now, Mr. Deere, you\u2019ve been through these motions, and you understand how difficult it is for you not having any legal knowledge, but you appear to me to be competent. I\u2019m going to allow you to continue representing yourself if you feel that\u2019s what you want to do.\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir, that is what I want to do.\nTHE COURT: There\u2019s some advantages. You can bring things out that you probably couldn\u2019t when you weren\u2019t representing yourself through your opening statement and closing argument, but the downside is that you don\u2019t know a whole lot about the rules of evidence.\nMR. DEERE: Yes, sir. I just got a book yesterday on the rules of evidence.. . . I\u2019m ready today if they want to go ahead today. I\u2019m ready for them.\nTHE COURT: Well, I just want to make sure that you know what you\u2019re doing when you represent yourself. I\u2019m going to let you do it, because I think you\u2019re competent to do so. Do you understand all the dangers of representing yourself?\nMR. DEERE: I\u2019ll go ahead and wait until Wednesday. I need to do a little reading and research, but I\u2019ll be ready Wednesday.\nTHE COURT: I find you competent to represent yourself.\n(T. 98-99)\nAfter conviction and sentencing, the appellant expressed a desire to appeal, and his present attorney was appointed to prepare this appeal. Four points for reversal are stated but none have merit, and the conviction is affirmed on all counts.\nRule 11 (h) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, dealing with non-meritorious appeals, provides:\nAny motion by counsel for a defendant in a criminal case for permission to withdraw made after notice of appeal has been given shall be addressed to this court, shall contain a statement of the reason for the request, and shall be served upon the defendant appealing. A request to withdraw on grounds that the appeal is wholly without merit shall be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, together with a list of all objections made by the appellant and overruled by the court, and all motions and requests made by the appellant and denied by the court, accompanied by a statement as to the reason counsel considers that the points thus raised would not arguably support the appeal. The brief may be typewritten if counsel is representing an indigent person by appointment, as in other cases. The Clerk of this court shall furnish the appellant with a copy of his counsel\u2019s brief, and advise the appellant that he has 30 days within which to raise any points that he chooses and that this may be done in typewritten or hand-printed form and accompanied by his affidavit that he has not received any assistance from any inmate of the Department of Correction or of any other place of incarceration in the preparation of this response. The Clerk shall see that such responses by an appellant are served on the Attorney General who shall proceed to file his brief on behalf of the state pursuant to sections [subsections] (f) and (g) of this rule within 30 days after such service and to serve a copy of his brief on the appellant as well as on appellant\u2019s counsel. After a reply brief has been filed or after the time for filing such a brief has expired, the motion for withdrawal shall be submitted to the court as other motions are submitted. If, upon consideration of the motion, it shall appear to the court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed or reversed, the court may take such action on its own motion, without any supporting opinion.\nThe appellate counsel on the one hand admits there is no merit to this appeal and moves to withdraw as counsel, but at the same time he fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 11(h). Counsel has stated that he has written his brief \u201cin the spirit of, (if not in actual compliance with), the concept of an Anders brief.\u201d However, he has neglected to refer to anything in the record supportive of an appeal or to supply a list of the appellant\u2019s objections and motions. Instead, he raises two issues not addressed at the trial court level. We are unable to consider them.\nIt is well-settled law that an accused may make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in his defense. Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237, 704 S.W.2d 608 (1986). In order to effectively waive the right to counsel, the accused must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, must know what he is doing and thus make his choice with \u201ceyes open.\u201d Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). We are convinced that this thirty-seven year old accused was properly advised not only of his right to counsel, but also of the dangers inherent in self-representation. With such knowledge, the appellant made his own choice. Though counsel was appointed for him and remained present throughout the trial, the appellant elected neither to seek his assistance nor to employ him in the course of the proceedings.\nThe appellant and his present court-appointed appellate counsel cannot complain that the trial court should have directed the court-appointed trial counsel to be more aggressive in rendering assistance. The state may not force a defendant to accept counsel against his will or deny his request to conduct his own defense. Nichols v. State, 273 Ark. 466, 620 S.W.2d 942 (1981).\nThe judgment of the lower court is affirmed.\nPrice, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Otis H. Turner, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Morris & Hodge Lawyers, by: Henry C. Morris, Esq., for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: John David Harris, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Thomas Lee DEERE v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-152\n785 S.W.2d 31\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 5, 1990\nMorris & Hodge Lawyers, by: Henry C. Morris, Esq., for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: John David Harris, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0505-01", "first_page_order": 537, "last_page_order": 542 }