{ "id": 1885530, "name": "Tyrone JONES v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. State", "decision_date": "1990-03-12", "docket_number": "CR 89-198", "first_page": "530", "last_page": "534", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ark. 530" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "785 S.W.2d 218" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "278 Ark. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748324 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ark. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720452 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ark. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1888424 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/299/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ark. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1885543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/301/0510-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 409, "char_count": 5776, "ocr_confidence": 0.919, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.47786350302063e-07, "percentile": 0.660520169322613 }, "sha256": "9ea2aa0a7e3bf6166b6b7ba87d749f915adbdfae407b8570cfb2c76a62030f7b", "simhash": "1:d788e90feb6e0822", "word_count": 994 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:23:07.951222+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Price, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Tyrone JONES v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Otis H. Turner, Justice.\nThe appellant, Tyrone Jones, was convicted of the crime of aggravated robbery, a class Y felony, and was sentenced to forty years imprisonment. The trial court ordered the sentence to run consecutively with previous consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and thirty-seven years.\nTwo issues are raised as grounds for reversal. First, the appellant contends that he should receive credit against his sentence for time spent in confinement while awaiting trial. Because we are reversing on the other issue, it is unnecessary for us to address that question. However, in a companion case decided today, Jones v. State, 301 Ark. 510, 785 S.W.2d 217 (1990), that issue is fully discussed; there, the appellant was credited with jail-time while incarcerated awaiting trial on those charges and the charges here. The holding in that case applies as well here.\nFor his second point for reversal, the appellant objects to two gratuitous comments made by the trial judge in the course of jury voir dire. He contends that the remarks were inappropriate and so prejudicial in character that a mistrial should have been declared. We agree.\nAfter the twelve prospective jurors were seated, the following transpired:\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: There\u2019s one thing I should say, I was a victim of a crime in March. My car was broken into in my driveway, but as far as I am concerned it wouldn\u2019t have any bearing on my decision today, but I thought I should tell you this.\nCOUNSEL FOR STATE: I appreciate it. Was some resolution achieved in that case or is it still \u2014\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: It\u2019s still pending. Nothing was \u2014 personal items were taken, credit cards and \u2014\nCOUNSEL FOR STATE: I see. Is there anything about that particular incident that makes you uncomfortable about being here today for this one?\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, sir.\nHi * *\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. I\u2019ll ask you all the same questions I have asked everybody. Would any of your answers be different than the answers given by the other jurors to my questions? Mr. Dunn, I appreciate your candor on that one issue. Were you a witness in this case?\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: My particular \u2014\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: There\u2019s nothing that will solve this case.\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: But you weren\u2019t an eyewitness?\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. It happened in the night and my car was in my driveway and I discovered it the next morning.\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT? Okay. And you would be able to set that aside and hear the case today?\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, sir.\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Okay. Anything else from anybody else? Thank you very much.\nTHE COURT: Thank you . . . [Addressing the prospective juror] Did you read in the paper the other day someone got shot breaking in a car?\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, sir, I did.\nTHE COURT: Attorney General tells me that\u2019s against the law. I don\u2019t think it is.\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: I agree with you.\nTHE COURT: I think the Attorney General says you are supposed to say \u201cStop\u201d and if he doesn\u2019t (sic) stop you let them go. If you tell them to stop and they don\u2019t stop, you shoot them.\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: My car sits right out of my bedroom, and I can just look right out and see my car. Whoever did it was awfully quiet.\nTHE COURT: It\u2019s a shame. How many here would convict someone of shooting somebody getting in their car? You think you would convict someone who did that?\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: Could or would?\nTHE COURT: Convict someone? Find them guilty of battery or something like that.\nPROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think I would.\nTHE COURT: No, no. If you shot someone, like take this fellow over here. The paper said they hadn\u2019t decided whether or not to bring charges. And he was brought here to court and he\u2019s the defendant and he gets up here and testifies that, \u201cI shot, fired a warning shot, and that fellow started running off and I shot him in the rear with a .22.\u201d How many of you would find him guilty? Any of you find him guilty? I wouldn\u2019t. I\u2019ll probably get in a lot of trouble for saying that.\n* * *\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I\u2019ve got kind of a problem with the conversation regarding how \u2014\nTHE COURT: Oh, you want to move for a mistrial?\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I think I will.\nTHE COURT: Well, good. It\u2019s denied.\nWe hold that these comments, made by the trial court to prospective jurors as they were questioned and being qualified to try a case of aggravated robbery, constitute error per se. We have consistently acknowledged the great influence that a trial judge has on jurors. He must, therefore, refrain from impatient remarks or unnecessary comments which might indicate his personal feelings or which might tend to influence the minds of jurors to the prejudice of a litigant. See Oglesby v. State, 299 Ark. 403, 773 S.W.2d 443 (1989).\nThe trial judge is the one person who controls the conduct of all participants in the course of a trial, from beginning to end, and instructs the jury regarding the law which must be applied to the facts. Hence, a judge presiding at a trial should manifest the most impartial fairness in the conduct of the case. Chapman v. State, 257 Ark. 415, 516 S.W.2d 598 (1974).\nIn the present case, the appellant made a timely motion for a mistrial. Though mistrial is a drastic remedy, if justice cannot be served by continuing, it is nevertheless an appropriate remedy. Floyd v. State, 278 Ark. 342, 645 S.W.2d 690 (1983).\nReversed and remanded.\nPrice, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Otis H. Turner, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Jerry J. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Tyrone JONES v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-198\n785 S.W.2d 218\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 12, 1990\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Jerry J. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0530-01", "first_page_order": 564, "last_page_order": 568 }