{
  "id": 1884265,
  "name": "Steele HOLT v. CITY OF MAUMELLE, et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Holt v. City of Maumelle",
  "decision_date": "1990-04-02",
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    "judges": [
      "Holt, C.J., not participating."
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    "parties": [
      "Steele HOLT v. CITY OF MAUMELLE, et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Otis H. Turner, Justice.\nThis appeal is brought by the plaintiff class from a decision of the Pulaski County Chancery Court granting the appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss and upholding an initiated ordinance approved by a majority of the voters of the City of Maumelle. The ordinance provides for a \u201cservice charge for police and fire protection and street lighting.\u201d\nThe ordinance provides for a monthly charge of fourteen dollars for \u201chouses and other similar dwelling structures\u201d; twelve dollars per month for \u201ccondominiums and apartments\u201d; and variable charges for commercial establishments and industries based upon a stated formula. (There is no representative member of the class or representative of commercial establishments and industries; the ordinance sections applicable to the businesses and industries are not at issue here.)\nThe parties stipulate that the charges levied by Maumelle under the provisions of the ordinance are \u201ctaxes\u201d and not \u201cfees\u201d; that if the tax is a property tax, the millage rate is at a maximum of five mills; and that the tax was approved by the voters of Maumelle.\nFor reversal, the appellants argue first that the tax levied by the ordinance is an illegal exaction because the tax is not authorized by any delegated power of taxation. They also contend that the method of taxation is flawed and violates the statutory mandate as it has no relation to the value of the property being taxed or the benefits the property owner will derive from the purpose of the tax. The second point argued for reversal is that the tax violates the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s equal protection clause. We disagree on both points and affirm the decision of the trial court.\nThe key issue in this case is whether the taxes levied by the city are \u201cproperty taxes\u201d within the meaning of Article 12, Section 4, of the Arkansas Constitution and therefore subject to the limitations of that provision, or on the other hand, whether the tax is a tax \u201cnot otherwise prohibited by law\u201d within the meaning of Act 942 of 1977, Section 3, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-73-103(a) (1987).\nArticle 12, Section 4 of the Arkansas Constitution provides:\nNo municipal corporation shall be authorized to . . . levy any tax on real or personal property to a greater extent, in one year, than five mills on the dollar of the assessed value of the same.\nIf the tax is a real or personal property tax within the meaning of Article 12, Section 4, then Article 16, Section 5, provides that all real and personal property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform.\nIn 1883, the legislature enacted a measure designated as Act 114. The sections of that Act applicable to the issues here are codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 26-25-102 and 103 (1987).\nSection 102 provides that the amount of taxes which may be levied for general purposes in any one year by any city may equal but not exceed the five mills as provided in the Arkansas Constitution, Article 12, Section 4. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 103 then provides that all levies of taxes in cities shall be upon the appraisement of the county assessor, as equalized, and placed upon the tax book by the county clerk, and collected in the same manner and by the same person who collects county taxes. It is clear that Act 114 tracks Article 12 of the Arkansas Constitution.\nThe basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretative guides are really subordinate, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Hice v. State, 268 Ark. 57, 593 S.W.2d 169 (1980). The legislative intent is derived not only from the context of the statutory language but also from the entire act from which the statute originated. Hot Springs School Dist. No. 6 v. Wells, 281 Ark. 303, 663 S.W.2d 733 (1984); Henderson v. Russell, 267 Ark. 140, 589 S.W.2d 565 (1979).\nWhen reading the applicable provisions of Act 114 of 1883 in conjunction with Article 12 of the Constitution, it is abundantly clear that both enactments have reference to taxes on property, especially since Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-25-102 refers not only to Article 12, but also to taxes levied for general purposes. Further, in 1883, the only taxes of consequence were taxes on property, and the provisions of Act 114 should be construed keeping in mind the historical context and the taxing alternatives and conditions existing at the time of enactment. See White v. Thornbrough, 229 Ark. 96, 313 S.W.2d 384 (1958).\nIf, as the appellees contend, the levy by Maumelle is not a tax on property, is there statutory or constitutional authority for the tax?\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 26-73-103(a) provides that, in addition to all other authority to levy taxes provided by law, any municipality may levy any tax not otherwise prohibited by law. However, no ordinance levying any other tax shall be valid until adopted at a special or general election by the qualified electors of the city.\nThus, if the tax is not a property tax levied for general purposes and subject to the limitations of Article 12 and Act 114 of 1883, the tax was one \u201cnot otherwise prohibited by law\u201d and was approved by a vote of the citizens of Maumelle as required by the statute.\nWe conclude that the tax in question is not a property tax within the meaning of Article 12 or of Act 114. We construe the ordinance as one placing the tax on the \u201cresident\u201d or \u201coccupant\u201d of the property as opposed to a tax on the \u201cresidence\u201d or upon the \u201creal property.\u201d This conclusion is supported by the following facts: if the property is not occupied no tax is assessed; owners of undeveloped real property are not taxed; the apartment occupier, as opposed to the apartment owner, is taxed; the ordinance does not give rise to any lien on the \u201cproperty\u201d in the event of non-payment of the assessment.\nAs a second point for reversal, the appellants contend that the ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The appellant\u2019s hypothesis that the owner or occupier of a more valuable home receives more police protection or fire protection or street lighting is unsupported by any evidence. It rests entirely upon speculation rather than reliable forms of proof.\nIt is well-established that a strong presumption of validity attaches to legislation enacted by the General Assembly; this principle holds for tax statutes as well as any other variety of legislation. See Dicks v. Naff, 255 Ark. 357, 500 S.W.2d 350 (1973). In City of Mountain Home v. Drake, 281 Ark. 336, 663 S.W.2d 738 (1984), where an ordinance which imposed an occupation tax was upheld, this court quoted with approval language from Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940):\n. . . [T]he presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. . . . [T]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.\nThe record in the present case contains only the appellants\u2019 assertions of the tax\u2019s unequal impact \u2014 there was no explicit demonstration that the taxing method proved oppressively discriminatory. No disputed question of material fact existed apart from these unsubstantiated (and therefore immaterial) allegations. Hence, the trial court properly granted the appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nAffirmed.\nHolt, C.J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Otis H. Turner, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John Wesley Hall, Jr., P.C., by: Sam T. Heuer, for appellants.",
      "Hilburn, Calhoon, Harper, Pruniski & Calhoun, Ltd., by: Greg Stephens, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Steele HOLT v. CITY OF MAUMELLE, et al.\n89-254\n786 S.W.2d 581\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 2, 1990\nJohn Wesley Hall, Jr., P.C., by: Sam T. Heuer, for appellants.\nHilburn, Calhoon, Harper, Pruniski & Calhoun, Ltd., by: Greg Stephens, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0051-01",
  "first_page_order": 77,
  "last_page_order": 81
}