{
  "id": 1884309,
  "name": "Tommy LUCKEY v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Luckey v. State",
  "decision_date": "1990-04-23",
  "docket_number": "CR 89-192",
  "first_page": "116",
  "last_page": "119",
  "citations": [
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      "type": "official",
      "cite": "302 Ark. 116"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "787 S.W.2d 244"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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  "cites_to": [
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      "cite": "294 Ark. 127",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1987,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-501",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "296 Ark. 479",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1988,
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        "/ark/296/0479-01"
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    {
      "cite": "284 Ark. 234",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1984,
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "297 Ark. 218",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1891361
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1988,
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    {
      "cite": "296 Ark. 328",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1892713
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/296/0328-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:34:09.444418+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Tommy LUCKEY v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nThis appeal stems from an aggravated robbery of a truck stop convenience store near Prothro Junction, on February 23, 1989. The store clerk recognized the robber as having been in the store several days before. She helped the police make a composite drawing of the perpetrator and later picked appellant out of a photographic lineup.\nThe appellant waived a jury and after hearing the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him as an habitual offender with more than four prior felony convictions to 100 years for aggravated robbery and one year for theft. The appellant argues on appeal the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and the sentence is cruel and unusual. We cannot sustain the arguments.\nThe appellant moved for a directed verdict challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at the end of the state\u2019s case and again at the close. The motions were denied and appellant renews the argument on appeal, now challenging specifically the sufficiency of the clerk\u2019s identification. Appellant has attempted to frame his argument in terms of one of the standard objections to identification testimony, i.e., that if the photo lineup is impermissibly suggestive, the in-court identification is then only admissible if otherwise reliable, based on established factors. See Maulding v. State, 296 Ark. 328, 757 S.W.2d 916 (1988).\nHere, the appellant made no pretrial suppression motions and at trial there was no objection when the clerk identified the appellant as the robber, dr when she testified to having identified appellant from the photographic lineup. Similarly, there was no objection when an investigating officer testified about the clerk\u2019s identification from the photo lineup. It was only when the state had finished examining the officer and the photo lineup had been received as an exhibit, that appellant made any objection and then, only to the exhibit itself, on the basis that it was not a fair representation of appellant among the others in the lineup. Thus the argument made in Maulding v. State, supra, not having been made in the trial court, is of no avail. Hedgewood v. State, 297 Ark. 218, 760 S.W.2d 859 (1988).\nThe only question preserved for appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the reliability of the clerk\u2019s identification. Here there is no question but that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. The clerk gave unequivocal testimony in her identification of the appellant, saying she was \u201cone hundred percent\u201d certain of her identification. Thus, her testimony was a matter of credibility for the trier of fact. Penn v. State, 284 Ark. 234, 681 S.W.2d 307 (1984). As we have often said, the testimony of one eyewitness alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Carmichael v. State, 296 Ark. 479, 757 S.W.2d 944 (1988).\nAppellant also argues that his sentence of 100 years is cruel and unusual and not within the given statutory limits of the habitual offender statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-501 (1987), which provides:\n* * *\n(b) A defendant who is convicted of a felony committed after June 30,1983, and who has previously been convicted of four or more felonies or who has been found guilty of four or more felonies, may be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment as follows:\n(1) For a conviction of a Class Y felony, a term of not less than forty years nor more than life . . .\nAppellant maintains his lengthy sentence is \u201cmore than life\u201d and therefore contrary to the statutory limit provided for in \u00a7 5-4-501, as he would then be 128 years old. We answered the same argument in Malone v. State, 294 Ark. 127, 741 S.W.2d 246 (1987), where the sentence imposed was 348 years. We upheld the sentence and stated:\nA sentence of \u2018more than life\u2019 under our statutes would be life without the possibility of parole or death, the only penalties more severe than life in prison. There is no provision under Arkansas law or the United States Constitution which prohibits a sentence of a term of years which exceeds the usual life span of human beings.\nThe judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Steele Hays, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Cash Law Firm, by. William A. Cash, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Tommy LUCKEY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-192\n787 S.W.2d 244\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 23, 1990\nCash Law Firm, by. William A. Cash, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0116-01",
  "first_page_order": 142,
  "last_page_order": 145
}