{
  "id": 1884253,
  "name": "Billy Earl RAINWATER v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rainwater v. State",
  "decision_date": "1990-06-18",
  "docket_number": "CR 89-238",
  "first_page": "492",
  "last_page": "497",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:34:09.444418+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Billy Earl RAINWATER v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of LSD, possession of diazepam and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to a total of forty years in the penitentiary. On appeal, he claims police officers used invalid search warrants to seize drugs found in this car and home and the evidence obtained as a result of such searches should have been suppressed by the trial court. We hold the court\u2019s ruling finding the warrants valid was correct, and therefore affirm.\nAppellant first challenges the validity of the car search and relies heavily on A.R.Cr.P. Rule 13.1(b). He argues that the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant was hearsay and based almost entirely on information gained from unnamed confidential informants. He further contends that the affidavit fails to meet the requirements of Rule 13.1 (b) because it lacks particular facts concerning the informants\u2019 reliability and also fails to disclose, as far as practicable, the means by which information was obtained.\nAppellant\u2019s argument, as posed, is wrong in two important respects. First, much of the information contained in the affidavit for the car search warrant (and the house search warrant as well) resulted from the affiant\u2019s, Officer Kyn Wilson\u2019s, personal investigation and his surveillance of the appellant\u2019s house which took place before appellant\u2019s arrest and the search of his car and home. Second, in citing Rule 13.1 (b), appellant limits his reliance on language contained in the Rule which codifies the two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), for determining whether an informant\u2019s tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant. That test, of course, has been abandoned by the Supreme Court in favor of a new, more flexible one called the \u201ctotality of the circumstances test.\u201d Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In further explaining how the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is to be applied, the Supreme Court stated the following:\nThe task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the \u201cveracity\u201d and \u201cbasis of knowledge\u201d of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a \u201csubstantial basis for . . . concluding]\u201d that probable cause existed.\nWith the Gates test in mind, we examine the car search warrant and its supporting affidavit to determine whether sufficient information was presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause.\nWe review the facts contained in the affidavit in the chronological sequence of the officer\u2019s investigation leading to the appellant\u2019s arrest. Officer Wilson averred that he personally had observed appellant\u2019s home and that, during his and his police department\u2019s surveillance, Wilson saw an extremely high volume of traffic go in and out of the home at all hours of the day and night. Individuals would come and go, and in doing so, spent short periods of time in the house. Wilson knew that some of these individuals drove vehicles that were registered to persons who had been arrested and convicted for possession or use of controlled substances. Wilson further averred that he personally knew appellant\u2019s sole job was owner/operator of a coin laundry business in Clarksville, Arkansas, and the high volume of people going to appellant\u2019s house was inconsistent with any legitimate business needs. Wilson also related that he had prior reports from individuals who said that they had purchased illegal drugs from the appellant, but none of those individuals were willing to assist the police because they feared for their personal safety.\nWilson also described the appellant as a white male with brown hair and in his forties. This description later matched with confidential informant information which led to appellant\u2019s arrest on October 14,1988. That informant said that a white male with brown hair, who was in his forties, had been seen in Dallas, Texas, placing two garment bags containing marijuana and/or cocaine in the trunk of a 1984 silver Mercury Marquis, Arkansas vehicle license number OEY 115. Wilson confirmed that vehicle was registered to appellant, and this information also corroborated other prior informant information that appellant\u2019s source of controlled substances was in Dallas, where appellant drove to procure them. Finally, the affiant, Wilson, recited that he had received information from a confidential informant that, at approximately 12:00 a.m. on the night of October 13, 1988, the vehicle to be searched (appellant\u2019s) left Dallas, Texas in route to Clarksville, Arkansas. He concluded that this informant was a concerned citizen who had received nothing for reporting this information; he further stated that the informant had no criminal record.\nAs can be discerned from the above, Officer Wilson did not act solely upon the advice or information given him by confidential information. Instead, his independent police work corroborated or confirmed many of the tips given by informants. Certainly the affidavit offered the magistrate sufficient verified information to show there was a fair probability that appellant\u2019s car contained controlled substances at the time the warrants were issued. Although it might not meet the \u201creliability\u201d or \u201cveracity\u201d test established in Aguilar, we believe Wilson\u2019s affidavit suffices for the practical, common sense judgment called for in making a probable cause determination under the standard in Gates.\nBefore leaving the car search issue, we note appellant\u2019s allegation that Officer Wilson\u2019s affidavit misled the magistrate into believing that Wilson, not the state police, had obtained information directly from the informant, who gave the details of appellant\u2019s presence and illegal activities in Dallas on October 13, 1988. He asserts that such a misrepresentation contaminated any seizures resulting from the warrant issued by the magistrate.\nAgain, we disagree with the appellant\u2019s analysis and interpretation of the affidavit in issue. It is true that, at the suppression hearing, Wilson stated that he had not previously dealt with the informant and the informant information he obtained was from the state police. However, all Wilson related in his affidavit was that he had \u201creceived information from a confidential informant\u201d concerning appellant\u2019s activities in Dallas. While this statement, in retrospect, could have been worded better, it does not undermine the credibility of the information given in light of other facts Wilson related in his affidavit. Further, Wilson\u2019s statement does not negate the implication that the informant\u2019s tip could have been given him by a third party, such as the state police.\nAppellant also attacked the validity of the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant for his house, and while it was essentially identical to the one used for the car search warrant, it further recited having searched and found cocaine in the appellant\u2019s car. Wilson\u2019s initial surveillance of appellant\u2019s house and other information given him directly by informants may not have been sufficient to establish reasonable cause. However, as the investigation of the appellant continued, earlier information implicating appellant as one who trafficked in drugs was confirmed. Of course, no doubt existed after officers found cocaine and diazepam tablets in appellant\u2019s car. By the time Wilson requested a warrant to search appellant\u2019s house, his earlier tips and information had been corroborated at least to the extent that there was probable cause to believe that controlled substances were located in appellant\u2019s home.\nBoth parties, citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), argue their opposing views concerning the \u201cgood faith\u201d exception to defects in search warrants. While the searches involved here could also be upheld under the Leon rationale, we need not discuss this point because we hold the search warrants were valid and the evidence seized as a result of the searches was admissible.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm.\nBy Per Curiam February 5, 1990, effective March 1, 1990, we amended Rule 13.1(b) so it would reflect language consistent with the Gates decision. See In Re Committee on Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 301 Ark. appendix (1990). In that respect, we deleted none of the existing language in the rule but added the following:\nAn affidavit or testimony is sufficient if it describes circumstances establishing reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place. Failure of the affidavit or testimony to establish the veracity and bases of knowledge of persons providing information to the affiant shall not require that the application be denied, if the affidavit or testimony viewed as a whole, provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place.\nWe note that, at the suppression hearing, appellant raised a question as to whether the affidavit contained the car\u2019s description as given by the informant, but in reading the entire affidavit, we agree with the trial court that it did.\nAppellant tried to discredit the information given by the informant, who apparently saw appellant in Dallas, by pointing out that, when appellant was stopped and arrested in Clarksville, no marijuana or cocaine was found in garment bags in the trunk of appellant\u2019s car. Even so, officers found cocaine in a bag inside appellant\u2019s car and while no drugs were found in his car\u2019s trunk, they did discover two garment bags in it.\nOfficers found 695 grams of marijuana, four microdots of LSD, three sets of scales and other items as a result of their search.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gibbons & Walker, by: David L. Gibbons, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Billy Earl RAINWATER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-238\n791 S.W.2d 688\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 18, 1990\nGibbons & Walker, by: David L. Gibbons, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0492-01",
  "first_page_order": 520,
  "last_page_order": 525
}