{
  "id": 1882784,
  "name": "Frank PILCHER v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pilcher v. State",
  "decision_date": "1990-10-15",
  "docket_number": "CR 90-89",
  "first_page": "335",
  "last_page": "339",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "303 Ark. 335"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "796 S.W.2d 845"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-91-113",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "294 Ark. 287",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1895795
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/294/0287-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "660 S.W.2d 91",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "280 Ark. 577",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1744808
      ],
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/280/0577-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "270 Ark. 972",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1709150
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/270/0972-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "296 Ark. 8",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1892697
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/296/0008-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "294 Ark. 227",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1895825
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/294/0227-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-403",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "284 Ark. 501",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1878632
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/284/0501-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "301 Ark. 303",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1885550
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1990,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/301/0303-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "291 Ark. 575",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1872612
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1987,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "587"
        },
        {
          "page": "287"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/291/0575-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-108",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(c)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 458,
    "char_count": 7081,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.881,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.000193403521306e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9360586273562668
    },
    "sha256": "385acf2422b566b714bbf79eb70d70e956142ffa0208fa57731fa4dbab656dc9",
    "simhash": "1:0b8a0542e50ed862",
    "word_count": 1207
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:41:20.399175+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Frank PILCHER v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nThe appellant, Frank Pilcher, was convicted of capital felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The evidence showed that Pilcher shot the decedent, Jeffery E. Rhoades, to avoid paying for cocaine he had bought from Rhoades. The state presented testimony of Marissa Lynn Bragg, appellant\u2019s girlfriend, who witnessed the acts from which the charges arose. Bragg was granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for her testimony. Appellant asserts four points for reversal.\nI\nPilcher argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of venue in Saline County, where Pilcher was tried. The state stipulated that the shooting occurred in Grant County. Appellant cites Ark. Const, art. 2, \u00a7 10, which provides that the accused is entitled to a trial by jury in \u201cthe county in which the crime shall have been committed.\u201d\nPilcher met with Rhoades at Rhoades apartment in Saline County where Rhoades delivered one fourth ounce of cocaine \u201con front\u201d to Pilcher. Pilcher and Bragg invited Rhoades to go with them to get the money to pay for the cocaine. The robbery was completed and the homicide occurred in Grant County and thereafter the body was returned to Saline County.\nThe relevant statute is Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-108(c) (1987), which provides:\nWhere the offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the acts, or effects thereof, requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two (2) or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county.\nUnder the statute, venue was proper in either Saline or Grant County. The delivery of the cocaine on credit and Pilcher\u2019s invitation to Rhoades to accompany him were acts \u201crequisite to the consummation of the offense.\u201d Also, appellant and Bragg returned to Saline County and disposed of Rhoades\u2019s body in a trash dump. In Thrash v. State, 291 Ark. 575, 587, 726 S.W.2d 283, 287 (1987), we held that venue was proper in the county where appellant hatched the plan to commit the robbery-murder and to which the body was returned.\nII\nPrior to cross-examination of witness Marissa Bragg, the court limited defense counsel\u2019s inquiry regarding the identities of other individuals from whom Bragg and Pilcher had purchased drugs. Appellant argues that this line of questioning was an attempt to raise an inference that there may have been an accomplice to the homicide, from which the jury could infer that Bragg was biased and protecting some person(s) who might have actually committed the crime. Pilcher maintains this denial violated the Confrontation Clause and deprived him of the right to demonstrate that Bragg was biased.\nThe trial court ruled that the identity of the individuals was not relevant and, without a proper foundation, was merely a collateral issue. The trial court was correct. A.R.E. Rule 401, 402. Moreover, the effect of the intended testimony would have been to encourage the jurors to form an opinion based on supposition. See Bowden v. State, 301 Ark. 303, 783 S.W.2d 842 (1990); Maxwell v. State, 284 Ark. 501, 683 S.W.2d 908 (1985).\nIll\nPilcher next contends the trial court erred in refusing to declare Marissa Bragg an accomplice as a matter of law. Instead, the court instructed the jury to determine whether Bragg was an accomplice to the robbery and murder of Jeffery Rhoades.\nAn accomplice is one who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, either solicits, advises, encourages or coerces the other person to commit it, aids, agrees to aid or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it, or fails to make a proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense, provided he has a legal duty to prevent it. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-403 (1987). It is the defendant\u2019s burden to prove that a witness is an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 227, 742 S.W.2d 877 (1988). A person\u2019s status as an accomplice is a mixed question of law and fact, and the issue should be submitted to the jury where there is evidence to support a jury\u2019s finding that the witness was an accomplice. Ford v. State, 296 Ark. 8, 753 S.W.2d 258 (1988). The finding of the jury is binding unless the evidence shows conclusively that the witness was an accomplice. Cate v. State, 270 Ark. 972, 606 S.W.2d 764 (1980).\nThe record reveals that Pilcher and Bragg, using Bragg\u2019s pickup truck, went to the apartment of Jeffery Rhoades where the cocaine purchase was instigated. They then led Rhoades (following on a motorcycle) through a remote area to a point near Tull in Grant County. Bragg testified the purpose of the trip was to lose Rhoades \u201cthrough the bottoms\u201d in the Tull area. Although Bragg was present at the scene and helped load Rhoades\u2019s body in the back of her truck, she denied any knowledge that Pilcher intended to murder Rhoades. Bragg said she was in the truck when she heard Rhoades say, \u201cMan, this is just twenty-five dollars.\u201d Then she heard a gunshot. Bragg testified that she and Pilcher were not planning a murder and nothing in the evidence points conclusively to the contrary.\nMere presence at the scene of the crime or failure to inform law enforcement officers of a crime does not make one an accomplice as a matter of law. Spears v. State, 280 Ark. 577, 660 S.W.2d 91 (1983). Nor does a grant of immunity alone cause a witness to be an accomplice as a matter of law. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 287, 742 S.W.2d 884 (1988). The facts do not show conclusively that Bragg was an accomplice. The trial court was correct in refusing to declare her an accomplice as a matter of law and properly submitted the issue to the jury.\nIV\nFinally, when the state rested defense counsel moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied. Pilcher contends that had the trial court correctly ruled that Marissa Bragg was an accomplice as a matter of law, the motion of directed verdict should have been granted because there was insufficient evidence to corroborate her testimony.\nAppellant did not move for a directed verdict based on the state\u2019s failure to corroborate the testimony of Marissa Bragg. Instead, defense counsel simply moved for a directed verdict on grounds that there was insufficient evidence to find appellant guilty of capital felony murder or any crime. Because there was a failure to raise the specific basis for a directed verdict at trial, Pilcher cannot now challenge it on appeal.\nUnder Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-91-113 (1987), as put into effect by our Rule 11(f), we consider all objections brought to our attention in the abstracts and briefs in appeals from a sentence of life imprisonment or death. In this case we find no prejudicial error in the points argued or in the other objections abstracted for review.\nAffirmed.\n\u201cOn front\u201d means in effect the drugs are sold on credit.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Steele Hays, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard L. Hughes, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Frank PILCHER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 90-89\n796 S.W.2d 845\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 15, 1990\nRichard L. Hughes, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0335-01",
  "first_page_order": 373,
  "last_page_order": 377
}
