{ "id": 1882823, "name": "Debra Lynn TAYLOR v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Taylor v. State", "decision_date": "1990-11-12", "docket_number": "CR 89-222", "first_page": "586", "last_page": "594", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "303 Ark. 586" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "799 S.W.2d 519" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "301 Ark. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1885511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/301/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ark. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1740716 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884334 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892720 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 U.S. 516", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3503887 ], "year": 1884, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/110/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ark. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1888366 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/299/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ark. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1629865 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/252/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-406", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 51", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11298793 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892765 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" }, { "page": "526" }, { "page": "59" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 800, "char_count": 15775, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.859848864038466e-07, "percentile": 0.9327688602694597 }, "sha256": "a198e5aa935422b5248bcd3476595fa684d7b09b4454c938ee6904979e723208", "simhash": "1:bbf9a40e7134d3e5", "word_count": 2596 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:41:20.399175+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Debra Lynn TAYLOR v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant was charged as an accomplice to the premeditated murder of her husband, Roy Taylor. Henry Price also was charged with the murder, but he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to forty years imprisonment. At appellant\u2019s trial, Price testified and admitted to his and appellant\u2019s respective roles in the crime. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. She raises seven points for reversal.\nWe first consider appellant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements she made to investigating officers. Taylor\u2019s body was found at home on October 22, 1988, and appellant initially gave a statement to North Little Rock officers on that date. She gave another statement on October 27, the day of Taylor\u2019s funeral, and in that statement, gave general background information in an attempt to locate or eliminate suspects. On this date, and after her statement, the police placed her under surveillance. At this stage of their investigation, the officers believed she had been engaged in an extramarital affair, and it was during this surveillance that they observed her spending several nights in motels with Price. During this same period, the officers were investigating a boyfriend of a woman whom Taylor had been seeing prior to his death.\nAppellant again met with the North Little Rock police on November 4 for another investigative interview which focused on any drug contacts or extramarital relations Taylor might have had that could possibly be connected with his death. In this same interview, the officers first became aware that appellant was being untruthful with them because while appellant denied having had any affairs with anyone, they had just confirmed that she was intimately involved with Price.\nFinally, on November 9, the police took Price in for questioning, and upon learning of this, appellant called the police to inquire about this latest event. Appellant was asked to come to the station, and she did, whereupon she was notified that she was a suspect in her husband\u2019s killing. The officers then told her some of the evidence that implicated her in the murder, and afterwards, they read her her Miranda rights. Following this procedure, appellant gave a statement, which reflected her involvement in the murder.\nRecently, we reiterated the settled rule that the safeguards prescribed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 341 (1976), become applicable as soon as a suspect\u2019s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 754 S.W.2d 518 (1988). We further stated as follows:\n[NJo Miranda warnings are required if the questioning by officers is simply investigatory and that an officer\u2019s unarticulated intent has no bearing on the question of whether a suspect is in custody; rather, on that issue, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation. (Emphasis supplied.)\nId., 296 Ark. at 58, 754 S.W.2d at 526.\nAccording to the testimony at the suppression hearing, appellant voluntarily appeared at the police station on each of the aforementioned occasions, and, except for her last visit, her freedom was never curtailed, and she was free to leave at all times. The record reflects that the police officers initially did not suspect the appellant of any complicity in her husband\u2019s murder and only became aware that she had been untruthful with them when on November 4 she denied any involvement with Price. After that date, the officers focused their investigation on Price and appellant, and when she appeared at the police station on November 9, the officers prevented her from making any statements concerning her involvement in the murder until she had been informed of and had waived her rights.\nWe conclude the evidence clearly supports the trial court\u2019s ruling that the officers\u2019 investigation had not reached the accusatory state towards appellant until after November 4. Further, appellant\u2019s interviews did not become custodial in nature until November 9, at which time she was properly advised of and waived her rights before giving the statements that implicated her in the murder.\nBefore leaving this suppression issue, we note appellant\u2019s argument that she had asserted her right to counsel on October 25, and that, under the principles set out in Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1980), the officers were obliged to stop further interrogation of her until her counsel was present or unless she initiated further communication with the police.\nAs pointed out above, the appellant was not a suspect on October 25, the date when she initially appeared at the police station with a friend, who also was an attorney. Appellant\u2019s purpose for appearing on this date was to obtain some items that had been confiscated by police as part of the investigation. She did not give a statement on this visit. The attorney testified that at the time he and appellant went to the station, no one suspected the appellant of murder, and he made it clear to the police that he in no way legally represented the appellant. After their initial trip to the police station, the attorney said the appellant called him later, and in this conversation, he advised her to obtain counsel if the officers should read her her rights. Again, the record simply fails to support her claim that she had asserted her right to counsel. Indeed, the proof clearly supports the view that she knew her attorney friend did not represent her in this matter, and that, at all relevant times, she voluntarily chose to meet with the officers who were conducting an ongoing investigation of Taylor\u2019s murder. That being so, appellant\u2019s reliance on Shea and Edwards is misplaced. The trial court was correct in allowing her statements into evidence.\nAppellant next contends that her conviction cannot be based solely upon Price\u2019s (her accomplice\u2019s) testimony unless corroborated by other evidence which connects her with the commission of her husband\u2019s murder. See Carr v. State, 300 Ark. 158, 777 S.W.2d 846 (1989); Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-111 (1987). She also argues the broader issue that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We disagree with both contentions.\nFirst, having determined appellant\u2019s statements admissible, we conclude that an abundance of evidence exists to corroborate Price\u2019s testimony implicating appellant in the crime. For example, she admitted in her statement to the police and in her testimony at trial that, approximately two and one-half months prior to Taylor\u2019s murder, she and Price had discussed killing her husband. She also admitted they discussed having someone perform the murder or that they might cause his death to appear as a result of a hunting accident or a robbery at his office. During this planning stage, appellant obtained an increase of $300,000 in her husband\u2019s life insurance. In reaching their final plans, she conceded that she and Price agreed that Taylor must be shot, but that appellant must be elsewhere when the murder occurred. Appellant stated further that she and Price discussed these plans during the week Taylor was killed. On October 21, she went to her brother\u2019s home in Texarkana and called Price that night. She admitted that, in her conversation with Price, he told her Taylor \u201cmight not be there\u201d when she got back, and she took this to mean Taylor would be dead. According to Price, appellant was to call back the next morning to find out whether Price had actually killed Taylor and appellant\u2019s statement and phone records corroborate Price\u2019s assertion.\nPrice\u2019s other testimony is generally consistent with the foregoing evidence connecting the appellant with Taylor\u2019s murder. He related that he and appellant developed a code by which appellant would call Price on the morning of October 22, and he would tell her to shop for a black dress, indicating Taylor had been killed. While appellant denied such a code, appellant admitted to having called Price on the morning of October 22 and claims he said, \u201c[H]e could not do it (kill Taylor).\u201d Such an admission, while specifically denying knowledge of a code, certainly leads to the inference that she had called Price to find out if he had killed Taylor. Considerable proof was offered reflecting appellant\u2019s intimate relationship with Price, their shared concern over Taylor\u2019s abusive nature towards the appellant and their repeated discussions concerning plans to murder Taylor. At the end of the officers\u2019 investigation of Taylor\u2019s murder, appellant conceded to one officer that \u201cshe knew that she would be caught.\u201d Other evidence exists that further reflects appellant\u2019s complicity in Taylor\u2019s murder, but we believe the foregoing sufficiently supports her involvement and connection with the crime.\nAppellant also urges the trial court erred in failing to give jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of manslaughter or negligent homicide. She cites Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-406 (1987), which provides that when two or more persons are criminally liable for an offense of which there are different degrees, each person should be liable only for the degree of the offense that is consistent with his own mental culpability. In using \u00a7 5-2-406 as her basis, appellant claims that she had nothing to do with planning Taylor\u2019s murder, but because of Price\u2019s love for her, their inability to be together and her telling Price how Taylor had abused her, she may have, by her negligent conduct, misled Price into committing the homicide. In other words, she submits that the intentional or premeditated state of mind of Price, the principal, in committing the murder should not automatically be assigned to her as an accomplice, since she never actually intended for Price to kill Taylor. She explains that Price\u2019s and her discussions regarding the various ways to murder Taylor were only fantasies.\nThe trial court indicated that Price\u2019s intent was controlling when selecting instructions in the appellant\u2019s case, but regardless of whose intent controlled, appellant\u2019s or Price\u2019s, the court stated, and justifiably we believe, that it was unconvinced that an instruction on manslaughter or negligent homicide applied to the conduct of either Price or the appellant. Where the evidence shows the guilt of the defendant as to the greater offense, it is not error to refuse instructions on the lesser included offenses. Caton v. State, 252 Ark. 420, 479 S.W.2d 537 (1972). In any event, the court\u2019s instructions given here on first and second degree murder focused on appellant\u2019s intent, not Price\u2019s, and the jury was not deprived of its ability to determine appellant\u2019s intent with respect to Taylor\u2019s murder.\nIn addition, we point out that the jury convicted appellant on the greater offense of first degree murder even though the lesser included offense of second degree murder had been given. Under these circumstances, we have held that any error resulting from the failure to give lesser included offenses is cured. See Branscomb v. State, 299 Ark. 482, 774 S.W.2d 426 (1989).\nAppellant\u2019s next point for reversal concerns the trial court\u2019s admission into evidence of a photograph depicting Taylor with his children. She claims the picture was irrelevant, but if relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. We disagree. Here, appellant injected into the trial the issue of Taylor\u2019s abusive and cold nature towards her and the children. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when allowing the photograph for whatever limited purpose it might have shed on Taylor\u2019s relationship with his children. See Gardner, 296 Ark. at 59, 754 S.W.2d at 527.\nAppellant raises another argument that she seems to concede has little or no merit, viz., she is constitutionally entitled to an indictment by grand jury. It is well settled that states are not required to charge by indictment but may charge by information. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). This court has addressed this issue on a number of occasions and has consistently refused to extend the right to grand jury indictment to proceedings in this state. Hamm v. State, 296 Ark. 385, 757 S.W.2d 932 (1988).\nAppellant also claims error resulted from the trial court\u2019s failure to grant a mistrial because of a bomb threat that occurred in the courthouse on the first day of her trial. Actually, the threat proved to be unrelated to appellant\u2019s case, and the trial judge so informed the jurors. Apparently, a news account in the next day\u2019s newspaper erroneously related the threat with the appellant\u2019s case. However, to guard against such accounts and possible prejudice, the court had previously admonished the jurors not to discuss the case, nor read, watch or listen to any media account of it.\nAfter the news article and on the second day of trial, the judge expressly questioned the jurors to insure no prejudice resulted from the bomb threat or any account of it. We have held that a mistrial is an extreme remedy that should only be granted when justice cannot be served by continuing the trial. Richmond v. State, 302 Ark. 498, 791 S.W.2d 691 (1990). Here, the appellant failed to demonstrate, and we fail to see, how the threat prejudiced her case. To the contrary, we believe the precautions taken by the judge assured no prejudice infected the trial.\nFinally, while this case was pending on appeal, appellant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming she is entitled to a new trial because Price, by letter, has recanted part of his trial testimony that implicated appellant in the murder. At trial, Price testified that he got a gun from his brother-in-law. He apparently used the gun to shoot Taylor. After he shot Taylor, he said that he hid the gun in the attic of the Taylors\u2019 house. He further testified that he later showed appellant where the gun was, and she retrieved it for him. He subsequently threw it into the Arkansas River.\nIn a letter written by Price after the trial, Price indicated his testimony connecting appellant with Taylor\u2019s death was either misleading or false, stating specifically that appellant \u201cnever gave Price any gun.\u201d Price\u2019s subsequent denial that appellant had anything to do with the murder weapon clearly does not dispell appellant\u2019s participation in her husband\u2019s murder, especially in view of all the evidence we reviewed above that connected her with the crime. Her statement with Price\u2019s and the other physical evidence meshed remarkably to show her connection and involvement in the murder.\nAs we held in Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426 (1984), a writ of error coram nobis is a rare remedy, more known for its denial than its approval. The writ is granted only when there is an error of fact extrinsic to the record such as insanity at the time of trial, a coerced plea of guilty, or material evidence withheld by the prosecutor. Id. It must be a fact which might have resulted in a different verdict. Id. The situation in the present case simply fails to fit within the remedy sought. See also Smith v. State, 301 Ark. 374, 784 S.W.2d 595 (1990). Accordingly, we deny appellant\u2019s petition.\nPursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 11 (f), we have reviewed the record and all objections ruled adversely to the appellant and find no prejudicial error. For the reasons given above, we affirm the trial court on all points, and in addition, deny appellant\u2019s request for a writ of error coram nobis.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark S. Cambiano, P.A., for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., Kelly K. Hill, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Debra Lynn TAYLOR v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 89-222\n799 S.W.2d 519\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 12, 1990\nMark S. Cambiano, P.A., for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., Kelly K. Hill, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0586-01", "first_page_order": 628, "last_page_order": 636 }