{ "id": 1880995, "name": "NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE (of El Dorado, Arkansas) Conservator of the Estate (only) of Linda Hoffman; and Steve Hoffman, Her Husband; and National Bank of Commerce (of El Dorado, Arkansas) Guardian of the Estate (only) of Brett Hoffman, Kent Hoffman and Allison Hoffman, Minors v. Dr. Sam BEAVERS and Dr. Shelby Woodiel", "name_abbreviation": "National Bank of Commerce v. Beavers", "decision_date": "1990-12-10", "docket_number": "89-305", "first_page": "81", "last_page": "89", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ark. 81" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "802 S.W.2d 132" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "302 Ark. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884228 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 S.W.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "687 S.W.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9959352 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/687/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ark. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1876650 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/287/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886847 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-33-304", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 802", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723739 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0802-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ark. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871344 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715471 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895805 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884239 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 A.2d 992", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7893676 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/525/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ark. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "award of punitive damages justified only where evidence indicates defendant acted wantonly or with such conscious indifference to consequences that malice may be inferred" }, { "parenthetical": "award of punitive damages justified only where evidence indicates defendant acted wantonly or with such conscious indifference to consequences that malice may be inferred" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 S.W.2d 943", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "250 Ark. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1636955 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/250/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715471 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884239 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0310-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 959, "char_count": 22545, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.345350444247211e-07, "percentile": 0.6321117563224729 }, "sha256": "29824823830524af81f880e8183d009c6af9f4f34e3fcab5d6c9cdbc100b5719", "simhash": "1:f3ad5c845cac54be", "word_count": 3655 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712931+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Newbern, Corbin, and Brown, JJ., not participating." ], "parties": [ "NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE (of El Dorado, Arkansas) Conservator of the Estate (only) of Linda Hoffman; and Steve Hoffman, Her Husband; and National Bank of Commerce (of El Dorado, Arkansas) Guardian of the Estate (only) of Brett Hoffman, Kent Hoffman and Allison Hoffman, Minors v. Dr. Sam BEAVERS and Dr. Shelby Woodiel" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThe appellants, National Bank of Commerce, Conservator of the Estate of Linda Hoffman; Steve Hoffman; and National Bank of Commerce, Guardian of the Estate of Brett, Kent, and Allison Hoffman, minors, brought suit against the appellees, Dr. Sam Beavers and Dr. Shelby Woodiel to recover damages for injuries allegedly arising from the negligent treatment of Linda Hoffman for a condition known as temporomandibular joint dysfunction, or \u201cTMJ.\u201d\nAppellants contend that Mrs. Hoffman\u2019s treatment for \u201cTMJ\u201d consisted of two phases. It is alleged that Dr. Woodiel improperly treated Mrs. Hoffman during phase one and then negligently referred her to Dr. Beavers, who was not qualified to treat her disorder. It is contended that Dr. Beavers rendered negligent care to Mrs. Hoffman during phase two of her treatment. The jury found no negligence on the part of either Dr. Woodiel or Dr. Beavers and returned a verdict in their favor.\nOn appeal, appellants raise six points of error, all of which have no merit.\nI. SUPPRESSION OF TESTIMONY\nAppellants first contend that the trial court erred in the suppression of testimony that prevented the jury from being informed of the true facts surrounding the occurrence. They claim the jury was \u201conly permitted to be informed of the tip of the iceberg.\u201d This allegation appears to be based on appellants\u2019 assertion that the suppressed evidence was admissible on the issue of punitive damages, i.e. to show wanton and willful conduct on the part of Dr. Woodiel and Dr. Beavers, a theory rejected by the trial court. See National By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co., Inc., 292 Ark. 491, 731 S.W.2d 194 (1987) (award of punitive damages justified only where evidence indicates defendant acted wantonly or with such conscious indifference to consequences that malice may be inferred).\nIn analyzing the record before us, we note that the appellants do not furnish specific arguments in support of the proffered testimony which was excluded by the trial court; rather, this court is cited, generally, to various rules of the evidence, to case law concerning the admissibility of same or similar occurrences, and to excerpts from a Delaware case discussing the admissibility of evidence where punitive damages are involved. See Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992 (Del. Supr. 1987).\nUnlike the present case, the defendant in Strauss conceded liability for compensatory damages, leaving the jury with only the amount to be determined. The plaintiffs theory in Strauss was that the defendant was running a \u201cpodiatric mill\u201d for profit, and the plaintiff was permitted to place into evidence additional acts of negligence to show the defendant\u2019s conduct was deliberate, thereby warranting punitive damages.\nHere, appellants similarly theorize that Dr. Woodiel and Dr. Beavers were running a \u201cdental mill\u201d and that testimony regarding various acts of negligence and the competency of both doctors should have been admitted to show their willful and wanton misconduct surrounding Hoffman\u2019s treatment. In support of their theory, appellants furnished to the trial court proposed testimony and numerous depositions, supported by writings labeled \u201c\u2019\u2019Partial Pre-trial Brief on Subjects of (A) Punitive Damages and (B) Admissibility of Evidence of Greed and Other Infractions in Support of Punitive Damages.\u201d In this brief, appellants name and diagram the various witnesses, their relationships to one another, and their purported testimony \u2014 all in support of their claim for punitive damages.\nBefore we reach a determination of admissibility of this tendered evidence in support of punitive damages, our initial, fundamental inquiry as to admissibility must be predicated on the question of whether or not it is relevant to the events in question. To be admissible, the proferred testimony must necessarily have been related to the specific treatment of Linda Hoffman. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. A.R.E. Rule 402. In addition, \u201c[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cummulative evidence.\u201d A.R.E. Rule 403. The trial court has broad discretion in decisions of admissibility, and we will not reverse its ruling absent an abuse of this discretion. Northwestern Nat\u2019l Life Ins. Co. v. Heslip, 302 Ark. 310, 790 S.W.2d 152 (1990).\nWe further note that the jury found no negligence and, consequently, awarded no damages. Since there can be no award for punitive damages, absent an award for compensatory damages, (see Bell v. McManus, 294 Ark. 275, 742 S.W.2d 559 (1988)), all testimony submitted, or not submitted to the jury in support of punitive damages is of no moment. Even if the trial court was wrong in the suppression of testimony on the basis of the issue of punitive damages, its actions, at most, would constitute harmless error since the jury failed to return a verdict for consequential damages. See Haseman v. Union Bank of Mena, 268 Ark. 318, 597 S.W.2d 67 (1980).\nAppellants presented eleven witnesses over seven of the twelve days of trial. In addition, they asked the trial court for rulings of admissibility of deposition testimony from a score of witnesses, only some of which are being challenged on appeal. Examination of this evidence reflects that it either failed to meet the threshold test of relevancy under A.R.E. Rule 402 or, if relevant, was subject to exclusion under A.R.E. Rule 403 or that it was tendered by the appellants for the purpose of establishing the issue of punitive damages, which, as previously mentioned, is of no moment.\nII. DISMISSAL OF HOFFMAN CHILDREN\nIn their second point for reversal, appellants contend the trial court erred in dismissing the Hoffman children from the lawsuit via summary judgment. Appellants claim the children had a valid cause of action against Dr. Beavers and Dr. Woodiel for \u201csetting in motion a chain of events in a domino-effect fashion,\u201d the effect of which was to cause Mrs. Hoffman to inflict physical, psychological, and emotional injuries on her children. Allegedly, Dr. Beavers\u2019 maltreatment resulted in such pain to Mrs. Hoffman as to cause her to lose control and abuse the children, thereby requiring that they be placed under the care of a psychologist.\nAppellants concede the Arkansas does not recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium (see Gray v. Suggs, 292 Ark. 19, 728 S.W.2d 148 (1987)) and, instead, characterize the above mentioned \u201cdomino effect\u201d as constituting a claim for infliction of emotional distress. Notwithstanding our unwillingness to extend this cause of action as far as appellants advocate, we need not consider its merits and whether dismissal was proper since the jury\u2019s verdict renders any potential error harmless. See Haseman v. Union Bank of Mena, supra.\nThe jury found that Dr. Beavers was not negligent in his treatment of Mrs. Hoffman. The children\u2019s claim that Dr. Beavers either negligently or intentionally treated their mother improperly, and thus indirectly inflicted emotional distress on them, becomes irrelevant. Any evidence introduced by the children, in furtherance of their claims of emotional distress, would not have affected the jury\u2019s decision with regard to the issue of Dr. Beavers\u2019 conduct. We will not reverse for error where it is evident that such error did not affect the verdict. Insured Lloyds v. Mayo, 244 Ark. 802, 427 S.W.2d 164 (1968).\nIII. VOIR DIRE\nAppellants next contend that the trial court erred in prohibiting their counsel, during voir dire, from reading the names of the individual members of each of the law firms representing the defendants. This claim is also without merit.\nAppellants provide in their brief and appendix the following exchange with the trial court during voir dire examination:\nMR. WHETSTONE:\nNow the defendants here are represented by two different law firms here in town. And even though the lawyers present in this case \u2014 you may not be involved with them in any way, if you are in anywise \u2014 you or any member of your immediate family have been represented by ,or been involved in any way with any member of their firm, it would be pertinent information that we should know and properly we should know.\nThat being true, I\u2019m going to call the names \u2014\nTHE COURT: Mr. Whetstone, I don\u2019t want you to go through the name of every lawyer in every law firm, sir. I\u2019ve asked them if they know any attorneys or have ever been represented by any attorneys in those law firms and I trust this jury to know who they\u2019re acquainted with. I just don\u2019t want to take the time of naming off every lawyer in the law firms. That\u2019d take a long time to do that, sir.\nMR. WHETSTONE: I shouldn\u2019t go into that any further at all?\nTHE COURT: No, sir. I\u2019ve asked them and we\u2019ve both asked them if they know any lawyers in those law firms and I trust these people to know who they know of the attorneys. It\u2019s not like they know a lot of attorneys out there, I\u2019m sure. I\u2019d rather we didn\u2019t take the time, Mr. Whetstone. I\u2019m sorry, sir. Let\u2019s move on.\n[Emphasis added.]\nIn charging the trial court with error, appellants quote from Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-33-304 (1987), which pertains to challenges to the trial jurors in criminal proceedings rather than Rule 47 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 47 provides:\n(a) EXAMINATION OF JURORS. The Court shall either permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper.\nIt is obvious in this instance, that the court conducted the voir dire examination in which he asked the panel whether or not they knew, or had been represented by, any of the attorneys or law firms involved in this litigation, and then determined that he did not deem it proper or necessary to permit the attorneys to supplement his inquiry.\nThere are no indications from the record that any of the jurors did, in fact, know any of the attorneys representing Dr. Woodiel and Dr. Beavers, nor did they identify any relationships with the attorneys\u2019 law firms, and we think it is sufficient to say that the appellants have not demonstrated any prejudice. The extent of juror examination rests within the trial court\u2019s discretion and, absent a showing of abuse, we will not reverse the matter on appeal. Goodwin v. Harrison, 300 Ark. 474, 780 S.W.2d 518 (1989).\nIV. IMPEACHMENT\nFor the fourth point of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred in permitting defense counsel to impeach Melissa Rollins through questioning of a subsequent witness, Peggy Hall, without first laying a proper foundation.\nPeggy Hall, Dr. Beavers\u2019 office manager, testified that either at the time, or after Melissa Rollins was discharged by Dr. Beavers, Ms. Rollins told Ms. Hall, \u201cI will get Dr. Beavers.\u201d\nAppellants contend that Ms. Hall\u2019s testimony with regard to this statement was in error of Rule 613(b) of the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence, which states:\n(b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require\nAppellants argue that Ms. Rollins was not given the opportunity to explain or deny the statement before Ms. Hall was questioned about it. We disagree. Rule 613(b) is inapplicable in this situation since nothing in the record indicates Ms. Rollins ever made a remark either in accordance with, or in opposition to, the statement testified to by Ms. Hall. Therefore, no \u201cprior inconsistent statement\u201d was at issue, and the court\u2019s overruling of the appellants\u2019 objection on this basis was correct.\nV. REPUTATION TESTIMONY\nAppellants submit, for their fifth point of error, that the trial court erred in suppressing testimony from Dr. George Lay regarding his knowledge of Dr. Beavers\u2019 reputation for truthfulness among his associates.\nDr. Lay, a witness for appellants, was questioned regarding his knowledge of Dr. Beavers\u2019 reputation for honesty in the community during direct examination. When Dr. Lay stated that he had only met Dr. Beavers once, and was not aware of his reputation in the community at large, the trial court refused to allow him to testify further on this subject. Appellants objected but failed to proffer additional testimony from Dr. Lay. We will not find error on a trial court\u2019s ruling that excludes evidence when there is no proffer. Flynn v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co., 287 Ark. 190, 687 S.W.2d 114 (1985).\nVI. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE\nFinally, appellants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The evidence consisted of a video tape and transcript of a television documentary produced by ABC\u2019s \u201c20/ 20,\u201d a weekly news program. The program, which aired following the conclusion of the trial, revealed that a Dr. Owen Rogel was running a \u201cTMJ dental mill\u201d similar, appellants alleged, to the one being operated by Drs. Beavers and Woodiel.\nDr. Rogel was acknowledged as an expert authority by one of the appellant\u2019s expert witnesses; however, he was neither a party nor a witness in the lawsuit, and we fail to see the relevance of the t.v. program to the present case. The granting of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is not a favored remedy, and a trial judge is vested with great discretion in acting on such a motion. St. Louis Southwestern Rwy. Co. v. White, 778 S.W.2d 483, 302 Ark. 193 (1990). The motion was properly denied.\nJANUARY 28, 1989\nBernard Whetstone, P.A., by: Bernard Whetstone and Bob Davidson, for appellant.\nNo response.\nAppellants have asked that we reassess and retax costs. Appellants\u2019 points relied on for reversal were vague and over-broad; we find that the appellees\u2019 designation of the record was necessary for their response and thus decline appellants\u2019 request.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." }, { "text": "SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING\nJack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThe appellants, National Bank of Commerce and Steve Hoffmann, request a rehearing on the basis of two perceived errors in our opinion.\nFirst, the appellants argue that we overlooked their theory of the case upon which certain testimony, held inadmissible by the trial court, was offered.\nWe stated in our opinion that the appellants\u2019 claim, that the jury was \u201c \u2018only permitted to be informed of the tip of the iceberg\u2019 appear [ed] to be based on appellants\u2019 assertion that the suppressed evidence was admissible on the issue of punitive damages, i.e. to show wanton and willful conduct on the part of Dr. Woodiel and Dr. Beavers. . . .\u201d We explained the rule of law (and made it part of our holding) that where there is no award for compensatory damages, as in this case, there can be no award for punitive damages and thus the suppression of testimony on the issue of punitive damages would, at most, constitute harmless error. See Haseman v. Union Bank of Mena, 268 Ark. 318, 597 S.W.2d 67 (1980).\nThe appellants rightfully point out that the appellee, Dr. Woodiel, was not included in appellants\u2019 claim for punitive damages and that the portion of appellants\u2019 complaint requesting punitive damages was directed against Dr. Beavers only. Appellants thus argue that our consideration of the proffered testimony on this basis was error as to Dr. Woodiel and, that we overlooked instances of suppressed testimony supporting \u201cthe allegations that Melissa Rollins was performing illegal and negligent treatment to Linda Hoffman.\u201d Appellants claim that \u201c[t] his was the issue (the negligence of Dr. Beavers via his unlicensed assistant Melissa Rollins) \u2014 not punitive damages.\u201d We note that this specific argument was not raised in the appellants\u2019 appellate brief and ordinarily we do not consider arguments on rehearing not raised on appeal. Burks Motor, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 250 Ark. 641, 466 S.W.2d 943 (1971). Granted, the issue was raised in appellants\u2019 complaint, which was set out in their brief, and alluded to in appellants\u2019 statement that Dr. Woodiel testified regarding the damage that might be done if services were performed by an unlicensed assistant (such as Melissa Rollins). Since such allusions may arguably be considered as \u201carguments\u201d, we will discuss the merits of the appellants\u2019 contention.\nInitially, we acknowledge that our opinion was overbroad in including both Dr. Beavers and Dr. Woodiel in our discussion of punitive damages since appellants excluded Dr. Woodiel from this part of their claim. Our discussion of the punitive damages claim and the operation of the alleged \u201cdental mill\u201d should have been confined to Dr. Beavers. The issue of punitive damages was not, however, our sole basis for affirming the trial court\u2019s suppression of the testimony in question, as the appellants contend.\nWe stated that before reaching a determination of admissibility in support of punitive damages, \u201cour initial, fundamental inquiry as to admissibility (of the evidence before us) must be predicated on the question of whether or not it is relevant to the events in question.\u201d Arkansas Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, regarding relevancy, were cited, along with the appropriate standard for review that the trial court has broad discretion in decisions of admissibility, and we will not reverse its ruling absent an abuse of this discretion. Northwestern Nat\u2019l Life Ins. Co. v. Heslip, 302 Ark. 310, 790 S.W.2d 152 (1990). In summarizing our holding on this point, we stated:\nExamination of this evidence reflects that it either failed to meet the threshold test of relevancy under A.R.E. Rule 402 or, if relevant, was subject to exclusion under A.R.E. Rule 403 or that it was tendered by the appellants for the purpose of establishing the issue of punitive damages, which, as previously mentioned, is of no moment.\nClearly, we considered, as did the trial court, the threshold issue of relevancy with regard to all of the proffered testimony. Evidence proffered in support of appellants\u2019 theory of negligence, without conforming to the rules of evidence, is not enough to warrant its admission at trial.\nThe appellants cite, as an example in support of their \u201ctheory\u201d, the testimony of Dr. Woodiel in which he testified that he considered Dr. Beavers to be incompetent and that Dr. Beavers was allowing Melissa Rollins to perform illegal and negligent work on Linda Hoffmann. We again note, as we did in our opinion, that the excerpt from Dr. Woodiel\u2019s deposition referred to by the appellants was merely quoted at length in their brief without any argument or reference as to exactly which portion of the testimony the appellants felt was wrongly excluded or the underlying rationale. The court was left to speculate as to the appellants\u2019 exact arguments by piecing together the general citations to various rules of evidence in the brief and the information contained in the pleadings and transcript.\nFurthermore, we note that some of Dr. Woodiel\u2019s testimony at issue (as well as the majority of other \u201csuppressed testimony\u201d) was quoted, verbatim, in the appellants\u2019 pre-trial brief entitled \u201cPartial Pre-trial Brief on subjects of (A) Punitive Damages and (B) Admissions of Evidence of Greed and other Infractions in Support of Punitive Damages,\u201d leading the trial court, as well as this court, to believe that a claim for punitive damages was the basis for the proffered testimony.\nNotwithstanding these problems, the trial court properly excluded Dr. Woodiel\u2019s testimony, as well as other testimony proffered by the appellants, on the basis of Rule 403, which states that evidence, although relevant, \u201cmay be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d Dr. Woodiel\u2019s admitted lack of expertise in the field of orthodontics, in addition to the fact that appellants called several other dentists as experts, rendered his testimony both misleading and cumulative.\nThe appellants also refer to \u201cdozens of other such instances overlooked in the brief,\u201d summarily concluding that \u201c. . . Judge Bogard abused his discretion in suppressing (most, if not all, of) the indicated (in brief) testimony.\u201d This broad statement does not meet the requirement of Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 20(f), which states that the petition for rehearing must \u201cdistinctly state the grounds relied upon . . . .\u201d Moreover, this \u201cother testimony\u201d consists almost entirely of the testimony of former patients, assistants, and associates of Dr. Beavers who were unconnected with the treatment of Linda Hoffmann, and was thus properly excluded as irrelevant to the issues at bar.\nFor these reasons, we leave undisturbed our holding that the appellants\u2019 proffered testimony was properly excluded either because it was submitted on the issue of punitive damages as to Dr. Beavers or because it was inadmissible under Rules 402 and 403.\nThe appellants also appear to challenge our holding with regard to the impeachment of Melissa Rollins. Appellants submit no argument but simply quote from our opinion, again, in violation of Rule 20(f) which requires distinct arguments. We thus decline to address this second point.\nPetition for rehearing is denied.\nNewbern, Corbin, and Brown, JJ., not participating.", "type": "rehearing", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bernard Whetstone, P.A., by: Bernard Whetstone and Bob Davidson, for appellant.", "Barber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, P.A., for appellee Dr. Sam Beavers.", "Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellee Dr. Shelby Woodiel.", "Bernard Whetstone, P.A., by: Bernard Whetstone and Bob Davidson, for appellant.", "No response." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE (of El Dorado, Arkansas) Conservator of the Estate (only) of Linda Hoffman; and Steve Hoffman, Her Husband; and National Bank of Commerce (of El Dorado, Arkansas) Guardian of the Estate (only) of Brett Hoffman, Kent Hoffman and Allison Hoffman, Minors v. Dr. Sam BEAVERS and Dr. Shelby Woodiel\n89-305\n802 S.W.2d 132\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 10, 1990\n[Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing January 28, 1991.]\nBernard Whetstone, P.A., by: Bernard Whetstone and Bob Davidson, for appellant.\nBarber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, P.A., for appellee Dr. Sam Beavers.\nWright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellee Dr. Shelby Woodiel.\nNewbern, Corbin, and Brown, JJ., not participating." }, "file_name": "0081-01", "first_page_order": 109, "last_page_order": 121 }