{ "id": 1880848, "name": "ARKANSAS GAZETTE COMPANY and Max Brantley v. Thomas L. GOODWIN, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Goodwin", "decision_date": "1990-12-21", "docket_number": "90-217", "first_page": "204", "last_page": "214", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ark. 204" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "801 S.W.2d 284" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 29-19-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "Supp. 1989" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045236 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183161 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719784 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767723 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-19-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882712 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-19-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872638 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889932 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 25-19-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-19-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(6)(8)" }, { "page": "(b)(8)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "281 Ark. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1742350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/281/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "845 F.2d 1513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10551566 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/845/1513-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 539", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179887 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "563, 564" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "563, 564" }, { "page": "562-567" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183161 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0368-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 23686, "ocr_confidence": 0.871, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.682667786112114e-08, "percentile": 0.45307100915922127 }, "sha256": "8703c4148c980e447f8bcd1af68778e0d1a7c4adafe48bb93be9c51ec3975603", "simhash": "1:bc5a5094f70a711a", "word_count": 3835 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712931+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Turner and Price, JJ., concur.", "Glaze, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "ARKANSAS GAZETTE COMPANY and Max Brantley v. Thomas L. GOODWIN, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThis is a Freedom of Information Act case. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-19-105 (1987). The issue is whether the records of an investigation of Steve Clark, conducted by the Arkansas State Police and other investigative agencies, should be closed to the public. The trial court held that the investigative file was closed to the public until after Clark\u2019s trial. It specifically found in its order that continued publicity would impair the court\u2019s obligation to provide Clark with a fair and impartial trial by a jury. We agree.\nOn July 11, 1990, appellant Max Brantley, Assistant Managing Editor of the Arkansas Gazette, requested the investigative file concerning Steve Clark from appellee Colonel Tommy Goodwin, Director of the Arkansas State Police, and appellee Christopher C. Piazza, Prosecuting Attorney for the Sixth Judicial District. The request was initially denied by Colonel Goodwin. Brantley was subsequently notified by the prosecuting attorney\u2019s office that it would make the requested records available on July 13, 1990, at 10 a.m. for inspection at the prosecutor\u2019s office. Criminal charges were filed against Clark, and he, simultaneously, filed a motion seeking to have the investigative file protected from disclosure and ordered sealed. Appellant, Arkansas Gazette Company, was informed by the prosecutor\u2019s office that it intended to fully support Clark\u2019s motion.\nAs a result, the appellants thereafter filed their petition for judicial review, requesting that the trial court conduct a hearing to determine if the investigative files of the state police were public records subject to public disclosure under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A hearing was conducted on the appellants\u2019 petition on July 12, and the trial court denied the petition. The court\u2019s written order of July 13 recited in part that all investigative agency files regarding Clark were to be closed until a trial of Clark was held. The appellants filed a petition to modify, asking the court to modify its order to conform to the action which was actually announced by the court from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing on the appellants\u2019 petition for review on July 12. The petition to modify was denied.\nThe appellants argue the investigative file is a public record under the FOIA and there are no applicable exceptions which would prevent its disclosure. They further contend the trial court erred in expanding its order to close the files of all investigative agencies, including the legislative audit, until after Clark\u2019s trial.\nThe appellants\u2019 petition for review was assigned to Judge Perry V. Whitmore, who was also the assigned trial judge in Clark\u2019s criminal prosecution. On July 12, the parties agreed to consider both the appellants\u2019 petition for review and Clark\u2019s motion in the criminal proceeding. The record reflects the parties argued their respective positions before Judge Whitmore primarily on the basis of whether or not the release of the investigative file would deny Clark\u2019s due process rights to a fair trial. The appellants contended at the hearing that the public interest in having access to the file outweighed Clark\u2019s right to a fair trial. Appellee Piazza relied upon Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1985), for the proposition that, as a prosecutor, he could not disseminate the requested file to the appellants. The trial court denied the appellants\u2019 petition on the basis that continued publicity would impair its obligation to provide Clark a fair trial by an impartial jury.\nThe Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees the right of a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors to the criminally accused in state criminal prosecutions. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). If, due to pretrial publicity, an impartial jury cannot be seated to try a defendant, his right to a fair trial is violated. Anderson v. State, 278 Ark. 171, 644 S.W.2d 278 (1983); Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979).\nIn this case, the high level of publicity and media attention threatened to interfere with Clark\u2019s right to a fair trial. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Court stated that, in order to safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and he may take protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary. See also Sheppared v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).\nIn discharging his duty, the trial court weighed Clark\u2019s constitutional right to a fair trial against the public\u2019s right to access to public records as provided for in the FOIA and, in exercising his authority under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 29-19-105(b) (8) (Supp. 1989), concluded a reasonable protective measure was warranted by the circumstances: the closing of the investigation files of the state police and the files of all investigative agencies, including the legislative audit.\nThis court has previously noted, \u201c [i] f the question is whether a defendant can or cannot receive a fair trial, as required by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, then conflicting law must give way to a defendant\u2019s right to due process.\u201d Anderson v. State, supra. Suffice it to say, FOIA must give way in this instance to \u201cdue process.\u201d\nAffirmed.\nTurner and Price, JJ., concur.\nGlaze, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Otis H. Turner, Justice,\nconcurring. I concur in the result reached by the majority of this court. However, I write to offer an additional compelling reason for affirmance.\nThis court is committed to the proposition that openness in government is an essential ingredient in a democratic society. The legislative act which furthers that objective, the Freedom of Information Act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 25-19-101 through 25-19-107 (1987 & Supp. 1989), is commendable and should be liberally construed to give full effect to its purpose. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989). When, however, any proceeding under the guise of freedom of information would likely hinder or impede in any manner the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial, see Anderson v. State, 278 Ark. 171, 644 S.W.2d 278 (1983), then the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act must give way.\nAdmittedly, it is the task of the media not only to report information gathered from all available sources but also to comment upon that information by way of editorials and opinion columns and frequently, the editorializing is not limited to the section reserved for editorial comment. This is a fact of life that all who qualify as \u201cpublic figures\u201d understand and live with.\nIn this case, the constitutional right to a fair trial collides head to head with the public\u2019s right to know through the statutory provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.\nAnyone who has had an opportunity to review a law-enforcement agency\u2019s investigation file knows that in many instances that file contains a hodgepodge of tips, rumors, suppositions, and hearsay \u2014 much of which may already have been or ultimately will be, determined to have no basis in fact. Such is the very nature of an \u201cinvestigation\u201d file. Moreover, much of the information, though possibly having the ring of truth, will also be found inadmissible at any trial of the case on its merits.\nAssume for the moment that the investigation file is opened to the media. There can be little doubt that all of the contents of the file will be subjected to total exposure and complete scrutiny by the media, both in news reports and editorial columns, with little or no fear of accountability under the First Amendment protection afforded the media.\nOn the other hand, assume that the attorney for the accused may well have in his file a good and sufficient explanation or defense for each of the items of media interest contained in the investigation file. Yet, the Code of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 prevents him from trying the defendant\u2019s case in the media. The defendant is therefore faced with the worst-case scenario \u2014 having his or her file, with all inferences pointing to guilt, presented to the public, without rebuttal, at a time when he or she is entitled to the full and complete benefit of the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence.\nOne may then ask why the defendant, absent his attorney, cannot refute all of the information reported from the investigation file. On the other hand, in preservation of his constitutional rights, why should he have to make such an explanation other than at trial? The answer is, of course, that he should not.\nAn individual\u2019s constitutional right to a fair trial dictates that the public\u2019s legislatively-enacted right to know be subordinated for so long as the constitutional rights of the individual may be in jeopardy.\nDale Price, Justice, concurring. The result reached by the majority is correct. It does not, however, address other issues argued on appeal concerning the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The first issue concerns the application of the FOIA to the investigative file of the state police. In order for a record to be subject to the FOIA and available to the public, it must be possessed by an entity covered by the act, fall within the act\u2019s definition of a public record, and not be exempted by the act or other statutes. Legislative Joint Auditing Committee v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d 581 (1987). This court has said on many occasions that the FOIA should be broadly construed in favor of disclosure, and exemptions construed narrowly in order to counterbalance the self-protective instincts of the governmental bureaucracy. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).\nIn the instant case the appellees contend the investigative file at issue is not a public record. The state police investigative file clearly constitutes a public record under the FOIA and as defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-19-103(1) (1987). In the alternative, the appellees argue the file falls within two of the exemptions enumerated in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-19-105(b)(6)(8) (Supp. 1989). I agree.\nThe law enforcement exemption in \u00a7 25-19-105 (b)(6) provides that \u201cundisclosed investigations by law enforcement agencies of suspected criminal activity\u201d are not subject to public inspection. This exemption has been construed by this court in several opinions. In City of Fayetteville v. Rose, 294 Ark. 468, 743 S.W.2d 817 (1988), we held that information contained in investigations conducted by the City of Fayetteville police and fire departments was not undisclosed and thus not exempt from release.'We said:\nThere was no \u2018undisclosed investigation.\u2019 Everyone knew about it. The Fire and Police Departments of Fayetteville had finished their investigation. The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire Arms had investigated the matter, turned its report over to the U.S. attorney\u2019s office, and a federal grand jury had returned an indictment. No reading of the Freedom of Information Act consistent with our decisions could support a finding that there was an \u2018undisclosed investigation\u2019 involved. Therefore, the records held by the fire and police departments are subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.\nWe stated in McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, supra, that \u201c [t]he only purpose of the exemption, as written, is to prevent interference with ongoing investigations.\u201d We held there that photographs of the crime scene and a pathologist\u2019s photograph made in connection with a police investigation were to be released in accordance with the FOIA. We also held the police file was subject to release despite the fact that it allegedly contained statements from confidential informants.\nThe investigative files at issue in City of Fayetteville and McCambridge had to do with completed police investigations. The opposite situation was presented in Martin v. Musteen, City of Rogers and Clinger, 303 Ark. 656, 799 S.W.2d 540 (1990). Pinson (Martin was Pinson\u2019s attorney and the appellant) was charged with drug violations and his attorney requested the police investigation file with respect to the charges against Pinson. Following the police chiefs refusal to release the file, Pinson\u2019s attorney brought action pursuant to the FOIA. At the hearing, the police chief characterized the investigation as an \u201congoing\u201d one. The prosecutor testified that Pinson\u2019s case was part of a larger investigation and that it would continue for some time. We held that if a law enforcement investigation remained open and ongoing, it was meant to be protected as undisclosed under the FOIA.\nIn the case at bar the appellants contend the state police investigative file was not exempt under the law enforcement exemption. I disagree. It is my opinion that a law enforcement agency\u2019s file is not disclosed merely because the press has published articles concerning the matter or everyone knows about it. If an investigative agency discloses a file, it obviously is not exempt under the FOIA. It also follows that the file does not necessarily become disclosed after a criminal conviction or acquittal. The file may still contain information not subject to disclosure under the FOIA.\nIn my view, an accused must have been acquitted or have exhausted the appeal process before a law enforcement agency\u2019s file is subject to the public\u2019s inspection and then only after the court determines whether there are other matters requiring protection from disclosure. These matters include, but are not limited to, (1) the right of another person to a fair trial, (2) privacy rights of individuals which should be protected, (3) the identification of confidential informants, (4) law enforcement techniques and procedures, (5) the safety of law enforcement personnel, and (6) the names of persons interviewed by police so that others will not be deterred from cooperating with police in the future. See J. Watkins, The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (1988). The investigative file of a law enforcement agency would then be subject to disclosure under the FOIA following the above procedure.\nIn construing the law enforcement exemption, it is my opinion this court has erroneously applied an \u201congoing\u201d investigation distinction. The statutory exemption clearly provides that \u201cundisclosed\u201d investigations are not subject to public inspection. \u201cUndisclosed\u201d means what it says; that is, the contents of investigations which have not been made known by the law enforcement agency. Accordingly, to the extent that our holdings in City of Fayetteville and McCambridge are in conflict with this concurring opinion, I would overrule them. I would, therefore, hold that the law enforcement exemption prevented public inspection of the state police investigative file in this instance.\nThe next question to be addressed is whether or not the state police investigative file is exempt from disclosure under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-19-105(b)(8), which provides that \u201cdocuments which are protected from disclosure by order or rule of court\u201d are not subject to public inspection. I would also hold the file is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the above. Clark filed a motion in the criminal proceeding to have the file protected and ordered sealed. This was done simultaneously with the filing of criminal charges, and a hearing was conducted on both Clark\u2019s motion and the appellants\u2019 petition for review. An order was entered on July 13 which closed the police investigative file and all other investigative agency files from the public. This order clearly is the type contemplated by the General Assembly in its enactment of \u00a7 25-19-105(b)(8), and the state police investigative file is, therefore, not subject to disclosure pursuant to this exemption in my opinion.\nThe last issue concerns whether or not the trial court erred by expanding its order to close the files of all investigative agencies, including the legislative audit, until after Clark\u2019s trial. The appellant formally requested access to the state police investigative file, and there was no discussion of other investigative files at the hearing on July 12. The trial court entered its order on July 13 stating:\nTherefore, it is the order of this Court that the investigative file regarding this defendant be closed and not made public and that the Prosecuting Attorney, all investigative agencies, including the Arkansas State Police, and Legislative Audit, close their files to the public and that they remain closed until a trial on the merits of this matter has been held.\nThe appellants filed their petition to modify, asking the court to modify its order to conform to the action actually announced at the hearing on their petition for review on July 12. They contended at the hearing on their petition to modify that the court\u2019s order was much broader than the court\u2019s ruling from the bench. Evidence was adduced at the hearing on the appellants\u2019 petition to modify which established that the state police had shared their investigative file with the auditors who were preparing their own investigation and audit of Clark.\nI would hold the trial court\u2019s denial of the appellants\u2019 petition to modify was proper and its order of July 13 was not impermissibly overbroad. The trial court\u2019s action in effect granted Clark\u2019s motion to seal all records relevant to his trial. This was necessitated in part by the joint investigation of both the Arkansas State Police and the legislative auditors, and I cannot say the trial court erred.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Otis H. Turner, Justice," }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\ndissenting. The majority opinion is overbroad in its attempt to protect a defendant\u2019s right to fair trial, and will serve as dangerous precedent to subvert first amendment and FOIA rights which were never intended to be limited under the Supreme Court cases relied upon by the majority. The majority cites Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), for the proposition that a trial judge has an affirmative duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial, pretrial publicity, and may take protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary. While the proposition is true, the Gannett case dealt with the issue of excluding the press and public from a pretrial hearing and did not involve the press\u2019s or public\u2019s right to access public records from sources outside a court proceeding. Here, the trial court not only barred the appellants\u2019 right to view investigative police files compiled in connection with Mr. Clark\u2019s case, it also effectively restrained them from receiving state legislative audit documents that are unquestionably public information, except for the trial court\u2019s order providing otherwise.\nThe danger in the majority\u2019s decision lies in the fact that public documents available to any citizen or member of the press can be made private and secret, thus cutting off the people\u2019s right to further scrutinize and evaluate their public officials\u2019 performance. Ironically, such public documents (expense vouchers) and their publication are what led to the criminal charge having been filed against Mr. Clark in the first place. If the public and press can be prevented from accessing public records from governmental agencies merely because a police department or law enforcement agency makes those records a part of its investigation, the peoples\u2019 ability to know what is going on in their government is seriously curtailed.\nThe Supreme Court has said that pretrial publicity, even if pervasive and concentrated, cannot be regarded as leading automatically and in every kind of criminal case to an unfair trial. Nebraska Press Ass\u2019n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1976). The decided cases \u201ccannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about news accounts of the crime alone with which a defendant is charged presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.\u201d Id. Appellate evaluations as to the impact of publicity take into account what other measures were used to mitigate the adverse effects of publicity. Id.\nIn the present case, the trial court appropriately considered Mr. Clark\u2019s rights to a fair trial, but, in reviewing the record, I find no evidence or findings to justify the court\u2019s broad protective order closing the files of the State Legislative Auditor. The trial court not only prevented appellants from obtaining the Legislative Auditor\u2019s report of Mr. Clark\u2019s office expenditures, it also closed them until he had a trial.\nThe Supreme Court has noted there are measures that may insure a defendant of a fair trial and has approved certain alternatives to the prior restraints of publication that include such measures as a change of trial venue, postponement of the trial, searching questioning of prospective jurors, sequestration of jurors \u2014- to name a few. See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563, 564. A heavy burden exists in demonstrating, in advance of trial, that without prior restraint a fair trial will be denied. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 569.\nThe majority court fails to mention or quote from the record where the trial court ever considered evidence and made findings that could justify sealing public documents, such as those generated by the Legislative Auditor in this matter. Nor can I find where the trial court made findings that other alternatives were considered short of removing access to, and thereby preventing the publication of, such documents by the appellants. At the very least, the Legislative Audit report and its underlying documents should have been available when the Clark trial commenced, since, at that point, the trial court by various measures could limit the jurors\u2019 exposure to publicity and limit, as well, what the contending lawyers, police and witnesses may say to anyone. See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563, 564.\nIn conclusion, while I am aware this matter appears moot since the Clark trial has been completed, I believe this court should hold the trial court\u2019s order was overbroad and was not supported by a proper analysis or findings. Admittedly, the press\u2019s right of access to certain information is not absolute and must be balanced against a defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to fair trial. However, I am convinced that when public records or documents are sought to be closed, a defendant, especially a public official, faces a greater burden when trying to show his or her right to a fair trial might be impaired by the release of those documents. Regardless, certain tests must be satisfied to justify abrogating the right of access by examining evidence before the trial judge when the protective order was entered, viz., (1) whether intense and pervasive pretrial publicity would or might impair the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial; (2) whether other alternatives or measures to closure would insure the defendant a fair trial; and (3) whether closure will be effective in protecting the defendant\u2019s right to fair trial. See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562-567; Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. District Court, 845 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1988). In the present case, the trial court failed to fully consider each of these tests and enter its findings. Accordingly, because the record fails in these significant respects, I believe the trial court erred in issuing its protective order. See Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152, 662 S.W.2d 174 (1983).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rose Law Firm, A Professional Association, by: Phillip Carroll, for appellant.", "Perroni, Rauls, Looney & Barnes, P.A., by: Stanley D. Rauls, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ARKANSAS GAZETTE COMPANY and Max Brantley v. Thomas L. GOODWIN, et al.\n90-217\n801 S.W.2d 284\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 21, 1990\nRose Law Firm, A Professional Association, by: Phillip Carroll, for appellant.\nPerroni, Rauls, Looney & Barnes, P.A., by: Stanley D. Rauls, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0204-01", "first_page_order": 238, "last_page_order": 248 }