{ "id": 1881091, "name": "Antonio Demarion COLEY v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Coley v. State", "decision_date": "1991-01-14", "docket_number": "CR 90-83", "first_page": "304", "last_page": "308", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ark. 304" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "801 S.W.2d 647" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "258 Ark. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1621247 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/258/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872609 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875442 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-37-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "parenthetical": "c" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882828 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ark. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721491 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/286/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ark. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1712562 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/269/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873787 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-12-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-12-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 500, "char_count": 7823, "ocr_confidence": 0.871, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5000907199648635e-07, "percentile": 0.6654978726558961 }, "sha256": "076c02ca5dddaf7e0d6981334cdea05ef5029fb104af49c2e47d3493a7d5153f", "simhash": "1:5e57c0f1648bd331", "word_count": 1431 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712931+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Antonio Demarion COLEY v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Associate Justice.\nAntonio Demarion Coley appeals from his conviction of aggravated robbery and forgery for which he was sentenced as an habitual criminal to life imprisonment plus 30 years. His sole argument is that the evidence was insufficient. We find the evidence was sufficient, and we have determined, in accordance with our Rule 11 (f), that the court made no error prejudicial to the defendant. The conviction is affirmed.\nMarie Robinson identified Coley as the man who, on January 12, 1989, appeared at the Jackpot Store where she worked and attempted to cash a check. He wrote the check in her presence, making it payable to \u201cJack Pot\u201d for $20. He then tore the check out of a checkbook and turned it over and endorsed it with the name \u201cTony Johnson\u201d and a phone number. The check, which was introduced as an exhibit, was on the account of Michelle McEwen, and it was signed with that name.\nMs. Robinson testified she explained to Coley she could not cash a check except for the amount of purchase. With that he picked up a carton of soft drinks. She said that was not enough of a purchase. Coley then asked that she call the store manager to approve the check. When she turned away to place the call, she heard the cash register make a noise as if one were trying to open it but had punched the wrong key. She turned to face Coley and told him she could not reach the manager. Coley then asked that she change a dollar. When she opened the register, Coley attempted to get his hand in it. She slammed the drawer closed and asked what he was doing. She testified Coley then backed away, placed his hand in his pocket, and said, \u201cIf you\u2019re not going to give me the money, I\u2019m going to have to shoot you.\u201d She twice asked Coley what he had said, and he repeated the statement twice. She then screamed at people on the store lot, and Coley picked up the soft drinks and ran.\nRobbery is defined by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-12-102(a) (1987) as follows: \u201cA person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a theft. . ., he. . . threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another.\u201d Aggravated robbery occurs, according to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-12-103(a)(l) (1987), if the person committing robbery \u201cis armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed . . . .\u201d\nColey cites Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1986), for the proposition that the necessary \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d of guilt must do more than create a suspicion and must be of sufficient force and character to force the mind beyond conjecture and compel a conclusion one way or the other. The evidence in this case meets that test.\n1. Aggravated robbery\nColey argues that Ms. Robinson\u2019s identification of him in a photo of a physical line-up did not occur until a month after the robbery and that she had described him to the police only as being a black man six feet tall and weighing 180 pounds. No authority is cited in support of his contention that a \u201cbelated\u201d identification or such a general description discredits Ms. Robinsons\u2019s positive identification of Coley from the line-up photo and at the trial.\nHe also argues the evidence was insufficient to prove there was a threat of force. Ms. Robinson\u2019s testimony included the following:\nA: . . . I said, \u201cWhat are you doing?\u201d And he backed off, and he put his hand in his j acket, and he said, \u201cIf you\u2019re not going to give me the money, I\u2019m going to have to shoot you.\u201d And I said, \u201cWhat?\u201d And he said, \u201cIf you don\u2019t give me the money, I\u2019m going to have to shoot you.\u201d And he told me that\u2014 I asked him again. I don\u2019t know why I asked him three times. I couldn\u2019t believe it. And he told me three times he was going to shoot me if I didn\u2019t give him the money. And I started yelling for the kids out on the parking lot, and he ran out and got in his car. He took the six-pack of Cokes with him, and left.\nQ: Were you scared?\nA: Not at first, no, sir. After he left, I was very scared. Q: Did you ever see a gun?\nA: No, sir.\nQ: Why did you ask him again?\nA: I just couldn\u2019t believe he was doing it. I mean, I didn\u2019t see a gun, and he just well, if you\u2019re not going to give me the money, I\u2019ll have to shoot you. And I just\u2014 I don\u2019t know. I guess I just was nervous or something.\nAlthough he does not cite our cases on the point, Coley\u2019s contention appears to be that Ms. Robinson\u2019s actions belied any fear on her part that Coley had a gun in his pocket. The statute says nothing about fear in the victim, but we held in Fairchild v. State, 269 Ark. 273, 600 S.W.2d 16 (1980), that to satisfy the threat of deadly force requirement there must be an appreciation on the part of the victim that the accused was armed. Fairchild acknowledged he had tried to make his victim think he had a gun by placing his hand inside his shirt; however, the evidence was that the victim placed no significance on the hand inside the shirt.\nIn Richard v. State, 286 Ark. 410, 691 S.W.2d 872 (1985), we held that the fact that Richard was armed with a cap pistol which was perceived by the victim as a deadly weapon was sufficient to satisfy the statute. We noted in passing that the \u201cgravamen of the crime of robbery is the injury or threat of injury to the victim. The threat of injury was just as real to the victim in this case as it would have been had the gun been capable of inflicting injury.\u201d\nIn Clemmons v. State, 303 Ark. 354, 796 S.W.2d 583 (1990), we held that where there has been a \u201cverbal representation\u201d of being armed with a deadly weapon the requirement of \u00a7 5-12-103(a)(1) is satisfied. Clemmons\u2019s victim testified she assumed \u201cit was his finger in his jacket\u201d although Clemmons had said \u201cI\u2019ve got a gun. Give me your purse or I\u2019m going to shoot you.\u201d We distinguished the Fairchild case solely on the basis of Clemmons\u2019s statement that he had a gun and would shoot the victim. Although Coley did not say he had a gun, his statement that he would \u201cshoot\u201d Ms. Robinson if she did not give him the money is a verbal representation that he was armed with a deadly weapon.\n2. Forgery\nForgery is described, in part, by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-37-201(a) (1987) as drawing a written instrument purporting to be the act of a person who did not authorize it. Second degree forgery occurs when a person forges a check \u201cthat does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-37-201 (c)(1) (1987). Coley\u2019s argument here is that the evidence showed that a fingerprint analysis was done of the check and it did not show Coley\u2019s prints. Michelle McEwen testified that the check was on her account, that her checkbook had been stolen, and that she had not given anyone authority to sign her name to the check.\nThe fact that Coley\u2019s fingerprints were not found on the check becomes insignificant in the face of the testimony of Ms. Robinson that she observed Coley draw the check. It was the prerogative of the jury to believe or disbelieve Ms. Robinson\u2019s testimony. Williams v. State, 289 Ark. 69, 709 S.W.2d 80 (1986).\nWe do not \u201cpass upon the credibility of the witnesses and [have] no right to disregard the testimony of any witness after the jury has given it full credence, at least where, as here, it cannot be said with assurance that it was inherently improbable, physically impossible or so clearly unbelievable that reasonable minds could not differ thereon.\u201d\nRobinson v. State, 291 Ark. 212, 723 S.W.2d 818 (1987), quoting Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370 (1975).\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Associate Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rice, Pierce and Ogles Law Firm, by: John Ogles, for appellant.", "Ron Fields, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Joseph V. Svoboda, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Antonio Demarion COLEY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 90-83\n801 S.W.2d 647\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 14, 1991\nRice, Pierce and Ogles Law Firm, by: John Ogles, for appellant.\nRon Fields, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Joseph V. Svoboda, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0304-01", "first_page_order": 342, "last_page_order": 346 }