{
  "id": 1880851,
  "name": "JoAnn CROSS v. James and Helen COFFMAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cross v. James",
  "decision_date": "1991-03-04",
  "docket_number": "90-241",
  "first_page": "666",
  "last_page": "671",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "304 Ark. 666"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "805 S.W.2d 44"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1988,
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    {
      "cite": "294 Ark. 239",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1885565
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1990,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/301/0311-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "275 Ark. 96",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1753627
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/275/0096-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-105",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:14.712931+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JoAnn CROSS v. James and Helen COFFMAN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThe sole point of error relied upon by the appellant, JoAnn Cross, is whether the trial court erred in dismissing her independent cause of action for wrongful discharge under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-105 and 107 (1987) asa matter of law.\nOn November 17, 1986, Ms. Cross allegedly suffered an injury during the course of her employment at a business owned or operated by the appellees, James and Helen Coffman. Ms. Cross reported the injury to the Coffmans and later made a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The Coffmans subsequently discharged Ms. Cross from their employment.\nMs. Cross filed suit against the Coffmans on September 30, 1988, and alleged that they \u201c. . .jointly, severally and in concert, fired, terminated or discharged [her] from her employment for filing, pursuing or exercising her legal right to secure and obtain Workers\u2019 Compensation benefits directly in violation of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and the public policy of the State of Arkansas.\" (Emphasis ours.)\nOn May 18, 1990, the trial court granted the Coffmans\u2019 motion to dismiss and stated in pertinent part as follows:\nOn January 19, 1990, came on the above matter for hearing upon Defendants\u2019 Motion and, from discussion with the court, stipulations of counsel which are incorporated herein by reference, this Court, does hereby FIND, ORDER, AND ADJUDGE:\n* * * *\n5. . . . Further, the Court finds that section 35 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission . . . does not create an independent cause of action for an employee, as here the Plaintiff, to be pursued in the Circuit, Chancery or other Courts of competent jurisdiction outside of a Workers\u2019 Compensation claim.\nMs. Cross appeals on the basis that the trial court erred in dismissing her independent cause of action for wrongful discharge under sections 11-9-105 and 107 as a matter of law.\nSection 11-9-105 provides in pertinent part as follows:\n(a) The rights and remedies granted to any employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer or any principal, officer, director, stockholder, or partner acting in their capacity as an employer, on account of the injury or death, and the negligent acts of a co-employee shall not be imputed to the employer.\n* * * *\nSection 11-9-107 addressed the penalties for discrimination for filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim and provides as follows:\nAny employer who willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring or tenure of work or any term or condition of work or any individual on account of his claiming benefits under this chapter or who in any manner obstructs or impedes the filing of claims for benefits under this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed one hundred ($100) dollars, or by imprisonment of not to exceed six (6) months, or by both fine and imprisonment.\nClearly, this act provides an exclusive remedy to recover damages from an employer based on an employee\u2019s injury. Seawright v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 275 Ark. 96, 627 S.W.2d 557 (1982); section 11-9-105. Additionally, the extent to which an employer may be criminally penalized under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law for wilfull discrimination in the tenure of an employee is set out in section 11-9-107.\nIn this case, Ms. Cross provides no coherent or convincing argument that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law allows a civil remedy for wrongful discharge. In reviewing a trial court\u2019s decision on a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. CDI Contractors, Inc. v. Goff Steel Erectors, Inc., 301 Ark. 311, 783 S.W.2d 846 (1990). Here, there are no facts alleged in the complaint, relative to the specific argument on appeal, that would support a civil cause of action for Ms. Cross under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law.\nHowever, Ms. Cross also based her cause of action on the violation of public policy. We have previously recognized that an at-will employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the state. The exception is limited and not meant to protect merely private or proprietary interests. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988).\nWe construe the Coffmans\u2019 motion to dismiss on the contention that \u201cno cause of action is recognized in Arkansas by virtue of \u2018wrongful discharge\u2019 \u201d as a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6) further states that:\n. . . If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.\nArkansas R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides in pertinent part that \u201c. . . [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . .\nIn Ms. Cross\u2019s pleading, she asserts her employment with the Coffmans\u2019, an injury resulting in the filing of a workers\u2019 compensation claim, a wrongful discharge cause of action based on the violation of a public policy of the State of Arkansas, and damages. Additionally, her answer to the Coffman\u2019s interrogatories includes the following information:\nINTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please state specifically any and all actions taken by defendants which would result in injuries alleged ... in the complaint.\nANSWER: (a) Defendants fired me on Saturday, November 29th, 1986, for filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Helen [Ms. Coffman] yelled at me saying I was being fired because I was suing them. There was not at that time any kind of a lawsuit filed. The only paper I filled out was for Workers\u2019 Compensation benefits. Mr. Coffman threatened me saying \u2018And I am going to sue you and your attorney for trivia if you lose this suit\u2019;\n(b) Defamation of character;\n(c) Threatened me \u2014 to sue me;\n(d) Slander \u2014 telling others I was suing them when I was not and telling that I had a lot of problems; and,\n(e) Giving a bad job reference against me.\nThe burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of fact is upon the moving party, and, on review, all proof submitted is viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. Any doubts and inferences are resolved against the moving party. Scully v. Middleton, 295 Ark. 603, 751 S.W.2d 5 (1988).\nTreating the facts in the complaint and interrogatories in a light most favorable to Ms. Cross, we cannot say that her asserted cause of action failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed or that the Coffmans were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Guy Jones Jr., for appellant.",
      "George Hartje, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JoAnn CROSS v. James and Helen COFFMAN\n90-241\n805 S.W.2d 44\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 4, 1991.\nGuy Jones Jr., for appellant.\nGeorge Hartje, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0666-01",
  "first_page_order": 718,
  "last_page_order": 723
}