{
  "id": 1916705,
  "name": "Chuck PENNINGTON and Stacey Sexton v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pennington v. State",
  "decision_date": "1991-04-29",
  "docket_number": "91-14",
  "first_page": "312",
  "last_page": "316",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "305 Ark. 312"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "807 S.W.2d 660"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "288 Ark. 448",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8721936
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1986,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/288/0448-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "292 Ark. 225",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1871387
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/292/0225-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "304 Ark. 393",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1881001
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "399"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/304/0393-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-318",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1989,
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "sha256": "26286bcac6f832809130b7f762ae1fdb6304905264f87e0b80f81208bbe13b11",
    "simhash": "1:ae1e499b649fcffb",
    "word_count": 1162
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:53:54.224345+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Hays, J., dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Chuck PENNINGTON and Stacey Sexton v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThe appellants, Chuck Pennington and Stacey Sexton were charged with others, in the Hot Spring County Circuit Court, with criminal mischief in the first degree, a class C felony. The charges arose from the appellants\u2019 alleged participation in the damage to some tombstones in a local cemetery. The police incident report indicated that approximately 30 tombstones had been knocked over, and several broken.\nTwo of the young men involved were nineteen and twenty years old; as appellants Pennington and Sexton were both seventeen years of age, they, together with another defendant who is not involved in this appeal, elected to file motions to transfer the case to juvenile court, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-318 (Supp. 1989). The circuit court conducted the hearing required by statute on the appellants\u2019 motions and denied the transfers.\nFrom this decision, Pennington and Sexton appeal, contending that the trial court erred in relying solely on the prosecutor\u2019s judgment in bringing the case before circuit court, despite its findings favorable to Pennington and Sexton with regard to the factors enumerated in section 9-27-318. We agree and reverse and remand to circuit court.\nSection 9-27-318(e) provides that in deciding whether to transfer the case or to retain jurisdiction, the court in which the criminal charges have been filed shall consider the following factors:\n(1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense;\n(2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such efforts; and\n(3) The prior history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the juvenile\u2019s prospects for rehabilitation.\nSubsection (f) further provides that the trial court\u2019s finding that a juvenile should be tried as an adult must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.\nWe recently held that the party seeking the transfer has the burden of going forward with the proof to show that a transfer is warranted under the statute. . . [H]e only fails if there is clear and convincing countervailing evidence to support a finding that the juvenile should remain in circuit court.\u201d Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 399, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991). Our standard of review then becomes a question of whether the trial court abused its discretion; that is, whether the decision, based on the evidence presented, was arbitrary or groundless. Walker v. State, supra; Looper v. Madison Guar. Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n, 292 Ark. 225, 729 S.W.2d 156 (1987).\nIn making its determination, the trial court had before it the prosecutor\u2019s information, the testimony of both appellants, and the testimony of one witness for the State. The information recites that the appellants \u201cdid unlawfully, purposely and without legal justification, destroy or cause damage to thirty (30) tombstones. . .amount of actual damages to said property exceeding $500.00 . . . .\u201d At the hearing, both appellants testified to completing high school through G.E.D. certification. Sexton stated that he had plans to join the navy, and Pennington testified he also had tentative plans to enlist in the military. Neither had any prior arrests or convictions, and both parties expressed a willingness to participate in rehabilitative programs.\nIn response, the State offered the testimony of Maurice Hendrix, a local resident who had relatives buried in the cemetery and who testified that the damage to the tombstones was emotionally upsetting to his family. Mr. Hendrix stated that the appellants should be tried in circuit court as it was his understanding that they would receive more lenient treatment in juvenile court. Mr. Hendrix conceded he had no knowledge of the workings of the court system.\nFollowing the testimony and arguments of counsel, the trial court recited its findings of fact, acknowledging that the crime involved was not violent in nature; that the act did not appear to be part of a pattern of past or future criminal activity; that Pennington and Sexton showed no history of problems \u201cother than problems that most kids go through\u201d; and that there was no reason to believe they could not be rehabilitated.\nThe court then continued, however, with these remarks:\n. . .[B]ut all these kids, these three kids are seventeen years old. There were two others involved, one nineteen and one twenty. They\u2019re all hovering right around the age of adults, either as young adults or almost young adults.' The prosecutor chose to charge these individuals as adults and charged them with felonies rather than with misdemeanors and Fm not going to upset that charge. Fm not going to substitute my judgment in this case for that of the prosecutor. If he wants to proceed with felony charges against these three, well, he certainly may do so. Motion to transfer is denied.\nThe court correctly considered each of the three factors as required by section 9-27-318 and, in reaching its decision, the circuit court was not required to give equal weight to each factor, nor was the prosecutor required to introduce proof against the juvenile with regard to each factor. See Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 448, 706 S.W.2d 381 (1986); Walker v. State, supra.\nHowever, it is obvious, as Pennington and Sexton contend, that despite careful consideration of the statutory factors, the trial court ignored its own findings favorable to them and deferred solely to the prosecutor\u2019s judgment in selecting a forum for trial. Such action on the part of the trial court defeats the purpose of the Arkansas Juvenile Code which recognizes the need for careful, case-by-case evaluation when juveniles are charged with criminal offenses. Section 9-27-318 clearly delegates the responsibility for determining which court is most appropriate to the court in which the charges were brought, and the abdication of this responsibility to the prosecutor, in this case, was an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion.\nOnce the appellants went forward with their proof to warrant moving the case to juvenile court, the State was required to produce countervailing evidence warranting its retention in circuit court. This was not done. The State introduced no evidence of violence, negative past history or criminal records, or any character traits which would reflect poorly on the appellants\u2019 prospects for rehabilitation.\nThis case does not resemble, in the least, Walker v. State, supra, where we held that the felony information, in and of itself, sufficiently highlighted the seriousness and violence involved in the juvenile\u2019s first degree murder offense to justify the case\u2019s retention in circuit court.\nFor the foreseeing reasons, we reverse and remand both cases to the trial court for appropriate disposition.\nHays, J., dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Willie E. Perkins, Jr., for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Sandy Moll, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chuck PENNINGTON and Stacey Sexton v. STATE of Arkansas\n91-14\n807 S.W.2d 660\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 29, 1991\nWillie E. Perkins, Jr., for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Sandy Moll, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0312-01",
  "first_page_order": 338,
  "last_page_order": 342
}