{ "id": 1900988, "name": "Kenneth Ray CLEMENTS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Clements v. State", "decision_date": "1991-10-07", "docket_number": "CR 91-160", "first_page": "596", "last_page": "609", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "306 Ark. 596" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "817 S.W.2d 194" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "400 N.W.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10658541 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/400/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591271 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 P.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10463545 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/526/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 P.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Cal. Rptr. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 S.W.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1893800, 1895710 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/295/0131-01", "/ark/294/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ark. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893800 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/295/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884344 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882749 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 A.2d 1101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8076812 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1105", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/387/1101-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880911 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882733 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0319-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 885, "char_count": 20851, "ocr_confidence": 0.876, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.921300772772016e-07, "percentile": 0.8466290891862808 }, "sha256": "a4276b762af19cd3780d817be1ce2dd0a5ac08cd6bcdfc6c92dcb9cdb122ebde", "simhash": "1:8665914b2fce8914", "word_count": 3607 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:19:57.276738+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Kenneth Ray CLEMENTS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThe appellant, Kenneth Ray Clements, brings this interlocutory appeal alleging that the trial .court\u2019s removal of his appointed attorney, Richard Atkinson, violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel under the United States Constitution and his right to counsel under Art. 2, Section 10 of the Arkansas Constitution. The State agreed with Clements and has waived its right to file a brief in response. We also agree, and reverse and remand.\nThis case involves the retrial of Clements for capital murder in the shooting death of police officer Ray Noblett. See Clements v. State, 303 Ark. 319, 796 S.W.2d 839 (1990). On April 23, 1991, Messrs. Richard Atkinson and Kenneth Suggs were appointed by Judge Floyd Lofton to defend Clements at his second trial. Judge Lofton was assigned to the case following the recusal of the Faulkner County judges. A trial date was scheduled for June 24, 1991.\nAt a pretrial hearing on June 17, Atkinson moved for a continuance of the June 24 trial date, citing the voluminous nature of the discovery, the time needed to review the transcript and documents from the previous trial, and the fact that a new theory of defense was being developed. Judge Lofton found both Messrs. Atkinson and Suggs negligent, held them in contempt of court, fined them $1,000 each, and removed them from the case. Judge Lofton appointed attorneys, Messrs. Ray Hartenstein and Blake Hendrix, as replacements. [Mr. Atkinson has filed a separate appeal with this court, challenging the contempt citation, Case No. 91-191, filed July 10, 1991.]\nClements now appeals, requesting the reinstatement of Mr. Atkinson. Clements stated that he was not pleased with Mr. Suggs\u2019 representation, and the record reflects Mr. Suggs did not object to his discharge from the case.\nIn order to provide a full understanding of what occurred at the pretrial conference, we find it necessary to set out the entire record colloquy pertaining to Mr. Atkinson\u2019s motion for continuance.\nMR. ATKINSON: Your Honor, at this time I\u2019d like to make an oral motion for a continuance \u2014\nTHE COURT: We\u2019ve already ruled on that.\nMR. ATKINSON: \u2014 in this case. Your Honor, I\u2019d like to make a record.\nTHE COURT: Your man says he\u2019s ready to go. Says he\u2019s satisfied with you.\nTHE DEFENDANT: I said I was satisfied with the attorneys. I never said anything about satisfied with the trial, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Well, we haven\u2019t even started the trial yet.\nTHE DEFENDANT: I know it. But you said I said I was satisfied with it.\nTHE COURT: Well, you told me you were satisfied with it.\nTHE DEFENDANT: With the attorneys.\nTHE COURT: Well, we\u2019ll \u2014 we\u2019ll \u2014\nTHE DEFENDANT: I haven\u2019t said anything about trial.\nMR. ATKINSON: Your Honor, in all fairness, I think you were asking Mr. Clements to make conclusions that an attorney would have to make as far as readiness for trial.\nTHE COURT: Well \u2014\nMR. ATKINSON: I don\u2019t think that he has the expertise to make those determinations. And from discussions prior to and up until this morning, it is Mr. Clements\u2019 desire that this case be continued based upon \u2014\nTHE COURT: Well, he hasn\u2019t \u2014\nMR. ATKINSON: \u2014 his consultation with his counsel.\nTHE COURT: But he hasn\u2019t told me why. He wants some things done but he doesn\u2019t know what they are. And, Mr. Atkinson, are you telling me that you\u2019ve been negligent?\nMR. ATKINSON: No, your Honor, I am not.\nTHE COURT: Well \u2014\nMR. ATKINSON: I am telling you that sixty days has not been sufficient time to prepare for this case.\nTHE COURT: Why isn\u2019t it?\nMR. ATKINSON: Because the case is too complex. The discovery is too much. There are piles and piles of papers that need to be gone through. I was not privy to this trial the first time it was tried. I have a transcript of that trial \u2014\nTHE COURT: Have you read it?\nMR. ATKINSON: \u2014 which I have read.\nTHE COURT: Well.\nMR. ATKINSON: I have read that transcript.\nTHE COURT: Well, that\u2019s \u2014\nMR. ATKINSON: In all fairness to Mr. Suggs, Mr. Suggs has not read that transcript. It\u2019s been in my possession. But Mr. Suggs has not read that transcript. Your Honor, the discovery has not been completely digested by Defense in order to completely develop the defense that\u2019s been offered. This defense was not offered at the first trial.\nTHE COURT: Which is amusing to me. But go ahead.\nMR. ATKINSON: I do not know why the defense was not offered at the first trial. I can\u2019t answer for that. I was not defense counsel \u2014\nTHE COURT: Well, you know, we don\u2019t know that it will be offered at the next one either. We may find another one.\nMR. ATKINSON: That\u2019s very correct, your Honor. But there is no way that defense can be readied and properly presented fairly for this man on the twenty-fourth.\nTHE COURT: If that is so, Mr. Atkinson, then the Court will have no choice but to find you negligent and in contempt, and so with Mr. Suggs, because you represented to this Court that you could and would get ready. I sent notices out to you. You both concurred in this trial date. And all I hear you saying is that, \u201cWe\u2019ve sat on our fanny and not done anything about this and we want a continuance.\u201d But you can\u2019t tell me what it is you want to do. And you have no assurance \u2014 I have no assurance that if I give you another thirty days you\u2019ll do any more than you have in the last sixty.\nMR. ATKINSON: I\u2019ll tell you exactly what we want to do, your Honor. I have spent hours upon hours and almost bankrupted my law practice in trying to prepare for this case by the twenty-fourth. I have come to the conclusion within the last five or six days that it\u2019s humanly impossible to be prepared to give this man a fair defense on the twenty-fourth of this month.\nTHE COURT: Why?\nMR. ATKINSON: Because I have not been able to go through the discovery, much of it, more than one time. I have not had the time to do it. I have read the transcript. I have gone through the discovery as it has come in. Discovery was available but not produced to the Defense by the prosecution, much of it \u2014\nTHE COURT: See, he\u2019s not \u2014\nMR. ATKINSON: \u2014 until the last week.\nTHE COURT: He\u2019s not dissatisfied with you. He thinks you\u2019re doing a wonderful job. And you haven\u2019t done a damn thing apparently. He\u2019s just unhappy with Kenny.\nMR. ATKINSON: Your Honor, the discovery has not been fully disseminated. The witnesses have not been \u2014 have not had opportunity to develop who all of the witnesses will be or to interview the witnesses that will be called. And this defense needs more time to be developed.\nTHE COURT: If I have to give you a continuance, I\u2019m going to find you ill prepared and relieve you from the case and you will not try it at all. I\u2019ll get somebody else to do it. That means you don\u2019t take care of your practice apparently.\nMR. ATKINSON: I understand, your Honor. But this man deserves a fair trial.\nTHE COURT: Well, why haven\u2019t you been busy about it, Mr. Atkinson?\nMR. ATKINSON: I have been very busy, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Not very busy. If you can\u2019t read a transcript and get prepared in sixty days, then you\u2019ve got no business practicing this kind of law.\nMR. ATKINSON: With all due respect, your Honor, we\u2019re not trying the last trial. We\u2019re trying a new trial \u2014\nTHE COURT: I know.\nMR. ATKINSON: \u2014 and we\u2019re not trying that transcript again.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s why it\u2019s not important for you to have read it. If there\u2019s not anything in there, what difference does it make if you haven\u2019t read it but one time?\nMR. ATKINSON: I have read the transcript.\nTHE COURT: One time. And there\u2019s nothing in there. You\u2019re trying a new case. So. You should have found that out early on.\nMR. ATKINSON: I never represented to the Court that there was nothing in the transcript. There\u2019s very valuable information in the transcript.\nTHE COURT: You just told me you\u2019re not trying that other case, you\u2019re trying a new case.\nMR. ATKINSON: That\u2019s absolutely correct.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Hartenstein?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: Yes, your. Honor.\nTHE COURT: Can you represent this man?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: No way I can represent him by Monday.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m not asking about Monday.\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: If the Court sees to \u2014\u2022 wants to appoint me, I will accept the appointment.\nTHE COURT: But, now, when will you try it?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: All I have seen of this case thus far is a sixteen volume transcript and several huge boxes of paper.\nTHE COURT: Well, you can rest assured that\u2019s not going to help you because they\u2019re read it and they don\u2019t know what they\u2019s talking about \u2014\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: I may differ.\nTHE COURT: \u2014 and they\u2019re not trying that other case. Huh?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: I may differ with them.\nTHE COURT: Well, I\u2019m sure you will.\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: I don\u2019t want to \u2014\nTHE COURT: Mr. Foster, I don\u2019t really see much sense in pursuing this when we\u2019ve got two lawyers admitting negligence on their part and dereliction of duty. I don\u2019t see any sense in pursuing this. Do you?\nMR. FOSTER: Pursuing the?\nTHE COURT: Trial.\nMR. FOSTER: Your Honor, it\u2019s \u2014 It\u2019s our \u2014 We do resist the motion for a continuance, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: I understand. But, you know, if you\u2019ve got two lawyers who admit their negligence and haven\u2019t prepared this case and can\u2019t represent this man, we\u2019re just kidding ourselves. It\u2019s going to be expensive for both of them. But, Ray, I tell you what I\u2019ll do. I\u2019ll recess this case until you can go back to your office and get your calendar back over here. And, if you will accept it, do you want some help?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: Certainly.\nTHE COURT: Who?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: Can I think about that while I\nTHE COURT: Sure. What time is it? Can you be back by noon?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Let\u2019s recess until 11:45. Gentlemen, you all stay in the courtroom. And, Mr. Clements, let me ask you this. Are you satisfied with Mr. Hartenstein?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: There ain\u2019t going to be no more, \u201cI\u2019m not satisfied.\u201d\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: And your defense is, \u201cI didn\u2019t do it; somebody else did.\u201d\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: All right. We\u2019re in recess until 11:45..\n(THEREUPON, court was in recess for approximately thirty minutes; then the following proceedings occurred:)\nTHE COURT: All right. Mr. Atkinson, the motion before the Court is for a continuance. I\u2019ve asked Mr. Hartenstein if he can accept an appointment. Mr. Hartenstein, can you?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: And you want Mr. Blake Hendrix to help you?\nMR. HARTENSTEIN: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re relieved, Mr. Atkinson. Do you want to be relieved?\nMR. ATKINSON: No, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Do you want to be relieved?\nMR. SUGGS: Yes, I do.\nTHE COURT: Ken Suggs and Richard Atkinson relieved, held to be negligent and failing to prepare case and get ready for trial, and held in contempt of Court and assessed a fine of a thousand dollars each to be paid within ten days unless a Notice of Intent to Appeal is filed. Ray Hartenstein and Blake Hendrix are appointed. Mr. Clements, have you got any problem with what I\u2019m doing?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I was just hoping that Mr. Atkinson can stay.\nTHE COURT: Well, I wish you\u2019d make up your mind. You weren\u2019t happy with him. Now, you\u2019re unhappy [sic] with him.\nTHE DEFENDANT: I told you earlier I was happy with him.\nTHE COURT: Well, he hasn\u2019t done anything for you.\nTHE DEFENDANT: Well, I see that he has, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Well, are you ready to go to trial with him Monday?\nTHE DEFENDANT: That\u2019s up to the attorneys.\nTHE COURT: Now, wait a minute. Now wait a minute. I\u2019m talking to you. If you\u2019re happy with him, I\u2019ll let him stay on the case and we\u2019ll go to trial Monday.\n(THEREUPON, Counsel for the Defense conferred privately with the Defendant; then the following proceedings occurred:)\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: No, sir, what?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I\u2019m not happy with him.\nTHE COURT: Well, he just told you that.\nTHE DEFENDANT: Fm not ready to go to trial.\nTHE COURT: I know. You\u2019re not ever going to get ready to go to trial. But that may not be an election that you have. Are you happy with Mr. Atkinson and you want to go to trial Monday?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I don\u2019t.\nTHE COURT: All right. When\u2019s the trial date, Mr. Prosecutor?\nMR. FOSTER: Your Honor, I believe that September 23rd the courtroom would be available in Conway.\nTHE COURT: September 23rd?\nMR. FOSTER: I believe that\u2019s correct, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: At nine a.m.\nMR. FOSTER: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Ray and Mr. Prosecutor, after you all have had some time, let me know when you want a hearing, an omnibus hearing, and get with Terry and Fll set it any time you all want it. Fm at your mercy. And Fll stay as late as you need. And I want this man represented and I don\u2019t want to hear him complaining and fussing anymore, although Fm not really upset with him. If I had two lawyers that hadn\u2019t done anything about it, I\u2019d be upset, too. And they\u2019re relieved and have no more responsibility in it. And Fll expect a check from them. You all let me know what you want to do.\nMR. FOSTER: We\u2019ll do so, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. Court\u2019s adjourned.\nA defendant\u2019s right to counsel of choice is grounded in the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, and is also granted by Art. 2 Section 10 of the Arkansas Constitution. Applying this principal to court-appointed, as well as privately retained, attorneys we have held, however, that the. right to counsel of one\u2019s choosing is not absolute and may not be used to frustrate the inherent power of the court to command an orderly, efficient, and effective administration of justice. Burns v. State, 300 Ark. 469, 780 S.W.2d 23 (1989). An example of such purposeful frustration occurs when a defendant requests new counsel merely in order to obtain a continuance of trial. See Bryant v. State, 304 Ark. 514, 803 S.W.2d 546 (1991). Certainly this was not the situation here, and, in fact, both Clements and Mr. Atkinson clearly expressed their desire for Mr. Atkinson to remain on the case. Clements only relinquished that request when the trial court literally forced him to choose between accepting new counsel, to whom he was opposed, in order to obtain the continuance, or retaining Mr. Atkinson, as he wished and immediately proceeding to trial unprepared.\nThis case thus presents the unique situation where a trial court removes an attorney from the case against the wishes of both the defendant and the attorney. Some courts have found this to be a violation of the accused\u2019s sixth amendment right to counsel, and we find their logic compelling.\nIn Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101 (1978), the trial court removed the defendant\u2019s appointed attorney, over the protestations of both client and attorney, because the attorney stated that he could not be an effective advocate without access to the names of certain eyewitnesses. The trial court abruptly cut him off and construed the attorney\u2019s statement as an attempt at making a record for ineffectiveness of counsel when, in reality, the attorney was simply trying to convince the court to grant his motion for discovery.\nIn reversing, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that an indigent does not have an unqualified right to counsel of his choice, and that substitution of counsel rests within the discretion of the trial court. The court concluded, however, that:\n\u2018[0]nce counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or the accused, the accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at trial.\u2019 The right to assistance of chosen counsel is not absolute, however. A trial judge may \u2018in the interest of justice\u2019 substitute one counsel for another. Gross incompetence or physical incapacity of counsel, or contumacious conduct that cannot be cured by a citation for contempt may justify the court\u2019s removal of an attorney, even over the defendant\u2019s objection.\nHarling, 387 A.2d at 1105 (citations omitted). The appellate court found that there was no justifiable basis for the trial court\u2019s removal of the appointed attorney:\nCounsel\u2019s efforts were within the bounds of reasonable advocacy. His conduct appears neither contemptuous, insolent, nor unprofessional. The court\u2019s response to counsel\u2019s persistence was both intemperate and unwise: Mere disagreement as to the conduct of the defense certainly is not sufficient to permit the removal of any attorney.\nId. Likewise, we find no support in the record for the trial court\u2019s discharge of Mr. Atkinson.\nMr. Atkinson was appointed to the case only two months prior to the trial date. The case has a complex history, involving two other alleged accomplices. See Leach v. State, 303 Ark. 309, 796 S.W.2d 837 (1990); McMillen v. State, 302 Ark. 601, 792 S.W.2d 315 (1990). Mr. Atkinson was not only attempting to read and digest what must have constituted reams of documentation compiled during the first trial, but was conducting his own investigation as he is required to do. See David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988). The record reflects that he and Mr. Suggs had already filed numerous motions before they were released from their representation of Clements. Even assuming Mr. Atkinson to have been negligent, as the trial court charged, there was certainly no evidence of gross malfeasance, physical incapacity, or belligerent conduct, such as would justify his removal.\nWe have held that once competent counsel is obtained, any request for a change in counsel must be considered in the context of the public\u2019s interest in the prompt dispensation of justice. Leggins v. State, 271 Ark. 616, 609 S.W.2d 76 (1980). Certainly, the same consideration should apply to a trial court\u2019s removal of appointed counsel. We find the holding of the Supreme Court of California particularly instructive:\n[W]e must consider whether a court-appointed counsel may be dismissed, over the defendant\u2019s objection, in circumstances in which a retained counsel could not be removed.\nA superficial response is that the defendant does not pay his fee, and hence has no ground to complain as long as the attorney currently handling his case is competent. But the attorney-client relationship is not that elementary; it involves not only just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client\u2019s life or liberty. Furthermore, the relationship is independent of the source of compensation, for an attorney\u2019s responsibility is to the person he has undertaken to represent rather than to the individual or agency which pays for the service. It follows that once counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship which is no less inviolable than if counsel had been retained. To hold otherwise would be to subject that relationship to an unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising merely from the poverty of the accused.\nSmith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 (1968). Accord, McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1974); People v. Davis, 114 Ill. App. 3d 537, 449 N.E.2d 237 (1983); Matter of Welfare of M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987.). Recognizing that each case must be examined on its own set of facts, we hold that where, as here, a trial court terminates the representation of an attorney, either private or appointed, over the defendant\u2019s objection and under circumstances which do not justify the lawyer\u2019s removal and which are not necessary for the efficient administration of justice, a violation of the accused\u2019s right to particular counsel occurs.\nHere, the trial court did not simply grant or deny Mr. Atkinson\u2019s motion for continuance as it should have, rather it placed Clements in a catch-22 position that compelled him to accept new, unrequested counsel in order to gain a continuance or proceed immediately to trial against the advice of his previously assigned attorney, with whom he had developed a working relationship. In essence, the trial court attempted to barter with Clements for a continuance. This action on the part of the trial court is arbitrary and unacceptable. Granted, the public has an interest in the prompt disposition of justice, Leggins v. State, supra, however, it must be served in an even-handed manner. . .fair to the state, yet fair to the defendant. Under the circumstances of this case, Clements is entitled to retain Mr. Atkinson as his counsel.\nThis case is reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to proceed consistent with this opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ray Hartenstein, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Kenneth Ray CLEMENTS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 91-160\n817 S.W.2d 194\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 7, 1991\nRay Hartenstein, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0596-01", "first_page_order": 648, "last_page_order": 661 }