{
  "id": 1902439,
  "name": "BIRDSONG CABINET SHOP, INC. v. Ray BLAND and Hazel Bland",
  "name_abbreviation": "Birdsong Cabinet Shop, Inc. v. Bland",
  "decision_date": "1991-11-04",
  "docket_number": "91-111",
  "first_page": "149",
  "last_page": "153",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "307 Ark. 149"
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      "cite": "817 S.W.2d 886"
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    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-304",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
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      "year": 1989,
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      "cite": "84 Ariz. 314",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ariz.",
      "case_ids": [
        648032
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1958,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "affirming a pro-rata distribution of interpled funds to unpaid co-defendant creditors"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "affirming a pro-rata distribution of interpled funds to unpaid co-defendant creditors"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:45:32.876763+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Brown, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BIRDSONG CABINET SHOP, INC. v. Ray BLAND and Hazel Bland"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice.\nOn October 16,1989, Ray and Hazel Bland filed an interpleader action in the Van Bur\u00e9n County Chancery Court seeking to interplead the sum of $11,580.06. This sum represented the contract, balance the Blands owed to Linn Perry d/b/a Perry Construction Co. (\u201cPerry\u201d) for construction of the Blands\u2019 residence in Fairfield Bay.\nThe Blands filed the interpleader action after learning that Perry had failed to pay various subcontractors, mechanics, materialmen and laborers for work on the Blands\u2019 residence. Hoping to avoid the assertion of multiple liens and liability claims by Perry\u2019s creditors, the Blands named Perry and fifteen of his unpaid creditors as parties defendant in the interpleader action. Appellant Birdsong Cabinet Shop, Inc. (\u201cBirdsong\u201d) was an interpled creditor to whom Perry owed $6,749.00 for Birdsong\u2019s construction and installation of cabinets in the Bland residence.\nAfter the Blands filed the bill seeking interpleader on October 16, 1989, appellant Birdsong and the other party defendant creditors asserted cross-claims against co-defendant Perry for the amounts Perry owed to them. Perry admitted that the total sum he owed to his unpaid creditors exceeded the amount that the Blands sought to interplead, and Perry never asserted a claim to the funds.\nOn March 22,1990, the Van Bur\u00e9n County Chancery Court entered a decree granting the Blands\u2019 motion for interpleader. At the oral hearing on the interpleader, appellant Birdsong claimed that Birdsong was entitled to priority in the distribution of the interpled funds. Birdsong argued for distribution priority based on its allegation that Birdsong had obtained a prior judgment for $6,949.00 against co-defendant Perry in an earlier Van Bur\u00e9n County Circuit Court proceeding. Birdsong informed the court that on the morning of March 12, prior to the interpleader hearing, Birdsong had obtained a writ of execution from the circuit court commanding the sheriff of Van Bur\u00e9n County to take into his possession funds held by the Chancery Clerk \u201con behalf of and for the credit of Perry Construction Co.\u201d\nAfter hearing Birdsong\u2019s allegations, the chancellor stated that he would need briefs on the issue as he was unfamiliar with the law on priorities. Consequently, the chancellor\u2019s decree reflected that the priorities issue would remain open pending submission of briefs, and further ordered the chancery clerk to hold the interpled funds pending future orders of the court.\nThe chancellor entered a final order in the interpleader action on October 22,1990. This order denied Birdsong\u2019s motion for priority, and decreed that the interpled funds should be distributed on a pro-rata basis to Perry\u2019s co-defendant unpaid creditors. The decree also awarded the creditors deficiency judgments plus post judgment interest against co-defendant Perry. Finally, the decree awarded attorney\u2019s fees totalling $750.00 to co-defendant Perry\u2019s attorney. Provision for the attorney\u2019s fees was as follows: $500.00 payable out of the interpled funds prior to distribution, and $250.00 payable specifically from Birdsong\u2019s pro-rata share of the funds.\nAppellant Birdsong challenges the chancellor\u2019s decree on two grounds. First, appellant alleges that the chancellor erred in not according Birdsong the distribution priority of a lien creditor. Second, appellant argues that the chancellor erred in awarding attorney\u2019s fees to co-defendant Perry\u2019s attorney because Perry was not a successful party in the interpleader action. We affirm the chancellor\u2019s pro-rata distribution of the interpled funds, and reverse the award of attorney\u2019s fees to Perry\u2019s attorney.\nAppellant Birdsong argues for priority based on the writ of execution Birdsong obtained on its prior judgment against Perry. However, Birdsong\u2019s attorney did not raise the priority issue until the March 12, 1990 oral hearing on the interpleader action. At that time, Birdsong\u2019s attorney orally informed the chancellor of Birdsong\u2019s judgment and writ of execution. Birdsong did not attempt to enter into the record either the judgment or writ of execution.\nAfter the chancellor informed present counsel that he would need briefs on the priorities issue, Birdsong\u2019s attorney specifically stated, \u201cI\u2019ll state on the record, Y our Honor, that we \u2014 if you rule against us on this priority issue, then we have no problem with the settlement. We\u2019ll agree with the settlement and with the payout period.\u201d At the close of the hearing, the chancellor requested that present counsel stipulate the facts into the record and into the briefs on the priority issue. The record reflects no such stipulation.\nAt the final hearing on October 22, 1990, the chancellor ruled that the interpled funds should be distributed pro rata among the co-defendant unpaid creditors. Birdsong did not object to the chancellor\u2019s ruling and again failed to introduce into the record its prior judgment or writ of execution. Nor did Birdsong call any witnesses or introduce any evidence regarding Birdsong\u2019s lien claim or the claims of the other co-defendant unpaid creditors. In fact, the other defendants agreed to a settlement providing for pro-rata distribution of the interpled funds.\nOur review of the record indicates that appellant Birdsong did not introduce any evidence to support its priority claim. We further believe Birdsong waived its objection to a prorata distribution by expressing its consent to the settlement at the March 12 hearing. Consequently, we affirm the chancellor\u2019s prorata distribution of the interpled funds. See Arizona Public Service Co. v. Lamb, 84 Ariz. 314, 327 P.2d 998 (1958) (affirming a pro-rata distribution of interpled funds to unpaid co-defendant creditors).\nAppellant\u2019s second allegation of error challenges the chancellor\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees in the interpleader action to John Aldworth, co-defendant Perry\u2019s attorney. We reverse this award.\nIn Saunders v. Kleier, 296 Ark. 25, 751 S.W.2d 343 (1988), we specifically addressed the issue of attorney\u2019s fees in interpleader actions. After noting that ARCP Rule 22, the rule governing interpleader, does not even mention the issue of attorney\u2019s fees, we affirmed the denial of attorney\u2019s fees based on our general rule that attorney\u2019s fees are not allowed except when expressly provided for by statute. Saunders, supra. We apply the same rationale in the instant case to find that the chancellor had no authority under Rule 22 to award attorney\u2019s fees to co-defendant Perry\u2019s attorney.\nPerry\u2019s attorney relied on the attorney\u2019s lien statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-304 (Supp. 1989), in arguing that he should be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees. We likewise find no authority under this statute for an award of attorney\u2019s fees.\nSection 16-22-304 provides in pertinent part:\n(a)(1) From and after service upon the adverse party of a written notice signed by the client and by the attorney at law,. . .the attorney at law,. . . shall have a lien upon his client\u2019s cause of action, claim, or counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, judgment, or final order in his client\u2019s favor, and the proceeds thereof[.] [Emphasis supplied.]\nIn the instant case, co-defendant Perry did not receive a verdict in his favor in the interpleader action. Rather, the final decree ordered distribution of the interpled fund among Perry\u2019s co-defendant unpaid creditors. As Perry did not receive any portion of this fund, no judgment exists on which his attorney may attach a lien. Consequently, we reverse the chancellor\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees to Perry\u2019s attorney.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nBrown, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert L. Thacker, for appellant.",
      "Dan Stripling, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BIRDSONG CABINET SHOP, INC. v. Ray BLAND and Hazel Bland\n91-111\n817 S.W.2d 886\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 4, 1991\nRobert L. Thacker, for appellant.\nDan Stripling, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0149-01",
  "first_page_order": 175,
  "last_page_order": 179
}