{
  "id": 1904326,
  "name": "Reginald SMITH v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Smith v. State",
  "decision_date": "1992-03-09",
  "docket_number": "CR 91-216",
  "first_page": "603",
  "last_page": "609",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1984,
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1709165
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      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/270/0496-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:22:40.186541+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Reginald SMITH v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nThe appellant, Reginald Smith, appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his life sentence on essentially two grounds. He first argues that the circuit court unduly limited him in presenting his case and further erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. As part of this contention, he asserts that the circuit court was biased toward his defense counsel, and this denied him a fair trial. For his second point, the appellant urges that the circuit court erred in disallowing his conspiracy instruction. Neither argument has merit, and we affirm.\nOn May 27, 1990, the appellant and the victim, Gordon Little, were involved in an altercation at a shopping center in North Little Rock. The two men cursed each other and exchanged racial slurs. The appellant, Smith, is black; the victim, Little, was white. Little, who was accompanied by a female friend, drove away in his truck and in the process hit the appellant\u2019s truck. The appellant followed and fired a shot and hit Little\u2019s truck. The appellant\u2019s sister, Dolly Smith, trailed the two men in another vehicle. The appellant eventually caught up with Little at a stop light and pulled in front of Little\u2019s truck. He then shot Little six times through the windshield of his truck. He contended that Little, who was driving a pickup truck and pulling a gooseneck horse trailer, pinned him in between Little\u2019s truck and the appellant\u2019s truck when the appellant got out to discuss the traffic accident. Little died from those shots. Dolly Smith arrived at the scene, and she took the appellant\u2019s pistol and disposed of it behind a bush.\nThe appellant and Dolly Smith were subsequently arrested. The appellant was charged with capital murder, and Dolly Smith was charged with hindering arrest. The two defendants were tried jointly on May 29 and 30, 1991, and the appellant argued justification as a defense. Dolly Smith was acquitted, and the appellant was convicted of the lesser offense of first degree murder.\nThe appellant\u2019s initial point centers on a perceived curtailment of his case by the circuit court and overt bias toward his defense counsel, which the appellant asserts, under the totality of the circumstances, denied him a fair trial. The appellant supports this allegation with fifteen illustrations:\n1. Ata pretrial hearing, the circuit court called the appellant\u2019s motions \u201cridiculous\u201d and \u201cbureaucratic nonsense.\u201d\n2. At the same pretrial hearing, the appellant\u2019s defense counsel stated that he felt that his method of practice had been maligned. The circuit court answered that it had not done this, although it could have.\n3. In chambers before selection of the jury, the circuit court, in, commenting on pretrial publicity, stated that \u201ceverybody, including the jury out there, knows that anything you read in the press is probably wrong.\u201d\n4. Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney commented on the victim and the state\u2019s witness who had been a passenger in the victim\u2019s car that he found it incredible that one involved in a six-year adulterous relationship had never told a lie to cover it up. The circuit court answered that it was not impressed with what the attorney found to be incredible. This statement was made before the trial began.\n5. During cross-examination of a state\u2019s witness, Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney remarked that he was simply trying to get a straightforward answer. The circuit court commented, \u201cYou got one and it wasn\u2019t what you wanted. So let\u2019s go on.\u201d\n6. The circuit court interrupted Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney and corrected him concerning the number of rounds that the appellant\u2019s pistol held. The attorney then agreed with the court\u2019s correction.\n7. A conference was held among the circuit court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor at sidebar concerning the introduction into evidence of a photograph of the interior of the appellant\u2019s car and the gun clips. The appellant\u2019s counsel objected, and though the circuit court stated it would admit the photograph later after an appropriate foundation was laid, the photograph was never received into evidence. The gun clips were admitted later but only Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney objected.\n8. At trial, the prosecutor questioned whether a defense witness was telling the truth after she had sworn to do so on the Bible. The prosecutor said that sometimes the oath was \u201cnot sufficient.\u201d The appellant\u2019s counsel asked the court to tell the prosecutor to \u201cbehave,\u201d and the circuit court replied by telling the prosecutor to \u201cgo ahead.\u201d No further request for relief was made by the appellant\u2019s counsel.\n9. The attorney for Dolly Smith objected to the prosecutor\u2019s repetitive questioning of a defense witness about whether testimony from other witnesses was correct. The circuit court ruled that he would let it in for credibility purposes and added, \u201cWe\u2019ll remember what previous testimony has been, if there has been such.\u201d The court also said that he was trying to keep the rules the same for both sides.\n10. The attorney for Dolly Smith asked the court to hold the prosecutor to the same rules as the defense. The circuit court responded, \u201cMr. Craig, that\u2019s the reason we make a record. I am to the best of my ability. And, if it\u2019s not satisfactory, we can get it corrected.\u201d\n11. Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney stated that he was tired of the manner in which the prosecutor was asking questions which presupposed that the appellant intentionally shot at the victim. The circuit court responded that it was not interested in whether Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney was tired or not but only \u201cin the rules of evidence.\u201d The court added, \u201cAnd, Mr. Craig, when I rule in your favor, it is not necessary that you thank the Court, nor is it necessary that you try to intimidate me when I rule against you. I\u2019m just following the rules.\u201d\n12. Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney attempted to make a motion outside of the presence of the jury, and the circuit court refused and then said that counsel could make the motion at a later time.\n13. Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney asked before he rested that motions be allowed outside of the jury\u2019s presence. The circuit court ruled that it wanted to hear all of the testimony first and then would entertain motions.\n14. Dolly Smith\u2019s attorney moved for a mistrial on grounds that the circuit court had acted improperly in receiving evidence and berated him before the jury. The appellant\u2019s attorney joined in that motion. The court responded that the appellant\u2019s counsel as well as counsel for Dolly Smith had tried to intimidate him in this and other cases and criticized both attorneys for improperly injecting race into the trial. The motion and the collateral conversation occurred in chambers.\n15. The circuit court refused to give a conspiracy instruction offered by the appellant\u2019s counsel. The refusal and comments by counsel took place outside of the hearing of the jury.\nOne point bears mention at the outset. All but one of the fifteen incidents enumerated by the appellant\u2019s counsel involved conversations that occurred outside of the jury\u2019s hearing or they were objections raised by counsel for Dolly Smith, not counsel for the appellant. Clearly, matters occurring away from the jurors would not prejudice the appellant in their eyes. See Combs v. State, 270 Ark. 496, 606 S.W.2d 61 (1980). Moreover, the appellant cannot benefit from objections made on behalf of another defendant or personal exchanges between counsel for the other defendant and the court. Unless the appellant\u2019s counsel objects on the appellant\u2019s behalf, the matter is not preserved for him on appeal.\nWe address two matters which the appellant\u2019s counsel raises. The first relates to the prosecutor\u2019s questioning a defense witness\u2019s veracity, after she had sworn on a Bible. Although the appellant\u2019s counsel requested the court to tell the prosecutor to behave, he did not pursue his objection or ask for an admonition or for any other form of relief. Moreover, there was no prejudice arising from this exchange.\nThe second matter concerns the appellant\u2019s motion for a mistrial. This motion embraced assertions that the circuit court had acted improperly in receiving evidence before the jury and had chastised the appellant\u2019s counsel in chambers, all of which prejudiced the appellant. We do not agree. A mistrial is an extreme remedy which should be granted only where an error is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by a continuation of the trial. See Combs v. State, supra. There were clearly strong feelings and some rancor and irritability exhibited in this case between both defense attorneys and the court. Nonetheless, we have held that reversible error does not occur when the record reveals that the trial court was merely irritated by the defense counsel\u2019s trial tactics. See McDaniel v. State, 283 Ark. 352, 676 S.W.2d 732 (1984). And we do not observe that the circuit court rebuked, ridiculed, or humiliated the appellant\u2019s counsel in front of the jury so as to warrant a reversal. Again, we note that most of the illustrations of prejudice advanced by the appellant involved counsel for Dolly Smith, who was acquitted.\nFor his final point, the appellant asserts error caused by the circuit court\u2019s failure to give the conspiracy instruction, AMCI 201. The appellant is convinced that a conspiracy instruction would have obviated any notion in the jurors\u2019 minds that the murder had been planned by the two defendants before the confrontation or that they were acting in concert so that evidence against one defendant could be considered against the other.\nThere must be some evidentiary basis for a jury instruction, however, and here there was no evidence presented that a conspiracy to kill Little occurred before the argument between the appellant and Little or that this murder had been planned in any respect. The court did instruct the jury that \u201cyou shall consider the evidence for or against each defendant separately and render your verdicts as if each were being tried separately.\u201d The court further admonished the jurors immediately before they began their deliberations to consider the two defendants separately and independently. That was enough. We have held that the circuit court is not required to give multiple instructions stating the law in various ways. See Marx v. State, 291 Ark. 325, 724 S.W.2d 456 (1987). Under these circumstances, the circuit court was correct in refusing the instruction.\nAn examination of the record has been made in accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 11 (f), and it has been determined that there were no rulings adverse to the appellant which constituted prejudicial error.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ralph M. Cloar, Jr., for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Gil Dudley, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Reginald SMITH v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 91-216\n826 S.W.2d 256\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 9, 1992\n[Rehearing denied April 13, 1992.]\nRalph M. Cloar, Jr., for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Gil Dudley, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0603-01",
  "first_page_order": 631,
  "last_page_order": 637
}