{ "id": 1906065, "name": "Henry NIEMEYER v. Beverly Eugene GRIFFIN and Joann Griffin", "name_abbreviation": "Niemeyer v. Griffin", "decision_date": "1992-04-06", "docket_number": "91-311", "first_page": "97", "last_page": "101", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "309 Ark. 97" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "826 S.W.2d 821" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "129 A.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "561 P.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 66313 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/221/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ark. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1668938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ark. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1869778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Lane v. Pfeifer, 264 Ark. 162, 568 S.W.2d 212 (1978)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Lane v. Pfeifer, 264 Ark. 162, 568 S.W.2d 212 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/293/0133-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 361, "char_count": 5237, "ocr_confidence": 0.918, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06955038691444945 }, "sha256": "66adf8da737f71f4e4f9c8c1a38b1a4f8ecc92edf486c04418841b1568aca95c", "simhash": "1:b6fcca40b4941330", "word_count": 870 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:54.665869+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hays, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Henry NIEMEYER v. Beverly Eugene GRIFFIN and Joann Griffin" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nThe primary issue presented is whether the chancellor erred in finding that the language in a deed creating an easement was ambiguous and consequently erred in going beyond the terms of the easement to determine the extent of the easement granted. We find that the chancellor erred in restricting the easement to 21 feet and hold that the easement, by its express language, contemplates a 30 foot wide easement.\nOn October 25, 1985, the appellees, Beverly Eugene and Joann Griffin, purchased property subject to the following easement created in 1957 by a predecessor in title:\nThis conveyance is subject to additional right-of-way easement of five (5) feet along the East line of lands herein conveyed in order that Crystal Valley Road have a total r/ w of Sixty (60) feet; also subject to easement for public roadway across the west 30 feet of lands herein conveyed, providing ingress and egress across Plots 20 and 21 from Whipporwill Lane to the NW\u00a14 SE\u2019f Section 25, Township 1 North, Range 14 West, Pulaski County, Arkansas.\n(Emphasis added.)\nOn October 8, 1990, after discussions with the appellant, Henry Niemeyer, regarding his proposed improvements to the area described in the easement, the Griffins filed a complaint in the Pulaski County Chancery Court seeking an injunction to prohibit Mr. Niemeyer from proceeding with his plans. Mr. Niemeyer answered and counterclaimed by seeking an injunction against the Griffins to prohibit them from obstructing his ingress and egress over the area described in the easement.\nThe chancellor determined on May 9, 1991, that the emphasized language in the easement was ambiguous and held that 21 feet was an adequate quantity of land so as to allow reasonable use by both parties.\nMr. Niemeyer filed a motion for reconsideration, amendment of judgment, or new trial, which was denied by the chancellor, and he now appeals. We find that the chancellor erred and reverse.\nIt is a well-settled principle of law that where an instrument is unambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary its terms. Brown Properties, Inc. v. Looper, 293 Ark. 133, 732 S.W.2d 471 (1987)(citing Lane v. Pfeifer, 264 Ark. 162, 568 S.W.2d 212 (1978)). In this case, the chancellor specifically found that the word \u201c \u2018across\u2019 is not a definitive, geometric, or spacial designation of width. It is an action. It is going from one point to another, getting there. And within that \u2018across,\u2019 the issue the Court is to decide is what is reasonable under the circumstances at this point for ingress and egress.\u201d\nThe word \u201cacross\u201d is defined as \u201cfrom one side to the opposite side of,\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1961), and \u201c[f]rom side to side. Transverse to the length of.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Interposing these definitions in place of the word \u201cacross\u201d in the express easement, the language reads as follows:\n. . . also subject to easement of public roadway [from one side to the opposite side of] the west 30 feet of lands herein conveyed, providing ingress and egress [transversing the length of] Plots 20 and 21 ... .\nIn viewing the plot plan furnished to the trial court as Exhibit 3 and reproduced below,\nit can easily be seen that the language provides that the parameters of the easement on the west side of the conveyed property are 30 feet wide and the length of Plots 20 and 21. Consequently, as the terms are definite and unambiguous, it was error for the chancellor to admit extrinsic evidence to contradict its terms.\nThe chancellor\u2019s reliance on Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties, 561 P.2d 818 (Kan. 1977), and Hyland v. Fonda, 129 A.2d 899 (N.J. 1957) is misplaced. In Aladdin Petroleum Corp., the court construed the words \u201calong and across approximately the west 60 feet of said property\u201d as a description of the general area and location of an easement. The easement is not qualified by the word \u201capproximately\u201d in this case.\nIn Hyland, the New Jersey court found ambiguity in the following language: \u201cright of ingress and egress for roadway purposes along a strip 25 feet in width.\u201d In looking to the surrounding circumstances, the court found that the reservation was \u201cnot to be construed as having necessarily withheld for the benefit of the occupants of the rear property a continuous right to the absolute use at all times of a roadway actually 25 feet wide, whether or not so much was reasonably necessary for ingress and egress.\u201d The court did not interpret the word \u201cacross,\u201d but instead made its determination on the use of the word \u201calong\u201d in that case.\nAccordingly, we reverse the chancellor\u2019s finding of fact that the terms of the easement were ambiguous, and her resulting decision that the reasonable use of the easement was 21 feet, and hold that Mr. Niemeyer\u2019s easement encompasses the full 30 foot width expressly enumerated in the provision of the easement.\nReversed.\nHays, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wetzel, Jones, Pruniski & Moore, P.A., by: John E. Moore, Jr., for appellant.", "Wallace & Hamner, by: Michael A. LeBoeuf, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Henry NIEMEYER v. Beverly Eugene GRIFFIN and Joann Griffin\n91-311\n826 S.W.2d 821\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 6, 1992\nWetzel, Jones, Pruniski & Moore, P.A., by: John E. Moore, Jr., for appellant.\nWallace & Hamner, by: Michael A. LeBoeuf, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0097-01", "first_page_order": 121, "last_page_order": 125 }