{
  "id": 1906090,
  "name": "George WILLIS v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Willis v. State",
  "decision_date": "1992-05-11",
  "docket_number": "CR 91-106",
  "first_page": "328",
  "last_page": "331",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "309 Ark. 328"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "829 S.W.2d 417"
    }
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  "court": {
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    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1988,
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    {
      "cite": "303 Ark. 524",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1990,
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    {
      "cite": "290 Ark. 223",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1986,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/290/0223-01"
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    {
      "cite": "304 Ark. 159",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1880841
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1990,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/304/0159-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 12-12-313",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:54.665869+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "George WILLIS v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nGeorge Willis, the appellant, was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and sentenced to life imprisonment and a $20,000 fine. He contends the Trial Court erred by allowing an improperly authenticated laboratory analysis report and a photograph of a mock up of the crime scene to be introduced into evidence. The report was properly authenticated and admissible, and the photograph was not unfairly prejudicial in view of the explanation of the evidence presented to the jury. The conviction is affirmed.\nWillis, along with co-defendant Robert Bogard, was arrested when Magnolia police officers were informed that persons in a white Cadillac were selling drugs on the corner of South Madison at Alcardun Heights. Officer McKinnis and another patrolman saw the car. As they approached, they observed Bogard standing at the rear of the car with one foot on the bumper. Willis was sitting on the ground next to the car. At Bogard\u2019s feet was a crumpled sack. The officers opened the sack and found a small pill bottle of what appeared to the officers to be crack cocaine.\n1. The laboratory report\n\u25a0 The bottle and its contents were sent to the State Crime Laboratory for analysis. A staff chemist identified the substance as cocaine and returned a report to the investigating officer with the chemist\u2019s attestation attached to the manila envelope in which the bottle was sealed. The analysis was admitted as evidence at trial over Willis\u2019s objection.\nThe objection was that the report was not properly notarized, was hearsay, and was without foundation. A partial notary statement and signature appeared on the report. The Court overruled the objection and stated that an attestation in accordance with Act 889 of 1989 was all that was needed for authentication. The relevant portion of the Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 12-12-313 (a) (Supp. 1991), permits introduction of a drug analysis report when \u201cattested to by the executive director [of the State Crime Laboratory] or his assistants, associates, or deputies.\u201d\nIn support of his argument Willis relies on Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159, 801 S.W.2d 634 (1990), where we held that the Statute requires more than the mere signature of the person or chemist who performed the analysis.\nNard objected to the drug analysis report in his case when the prosecution sought to introduce it through the testimony of a chemist who had not personally performed the tests. The State\u2019s witness acknowledged the chemist\u2019s signature, which appeared at the bottom of the report and stated that the chemist who signed was a certified drug analyst who had worked in the laboratory for the past three years. Nard\u2019s objection cited \u00a7 12-12-313 and stated that the report had not been properly attested. We agreed because there were not sufficient \u201cindicia of truthfulness\u201d which we found could best be presented with an attestation by the chemist who performed the test.\nWillis\u2019s objection in this case also challenged the attestation, but unlike the report in the Nard case, the report contained an attestation by the chemist who purported to have performed the test:\nI, Keith Kerr, Chemist, do hereby certify and attest that I personally performed the laboratory tests and prepared the laboratory analysis report in Laboratory Case No. 90-02473.\nThis statement provides the indicia of truthfulness lacking in the Nard case and satisfies the requirements of the Statute. There is no notarization requirement.\n2'. The photograph\nThe problem with the photograph is that the sack used to depict the crime scene was a large one. The sack in which the drugs were found was a small one which was crumpled. In addition to his objection about the size of the sack, Willis contends the sack used in the photograph was not the \u201cbest evidence\u201d because the actual sack was not available for unknown reasons.\nThe Court admitted the photo with the caveat that the jury be informed of the discrepancies. The prosecutor said he would explain to the jury that the sack in question was much larger than the original sack and the circumstances were different to which the Court stated, \u201c[t]his would be important.\u201d\nBerry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986), is cited in support of Willis\u2019s argument and for the proposition that a court should carefully weigh the probative value of photographs against their prejudicial nature. Willis asserts that the photograph sheds no light on any issue, a challenge to its probative value, but makes no meritorious argument with respect to prejudice. It is true that the photo is merely cumulative of the testimony and, therefore, has only marginal probative value, but that does not make it inadmissible.\nThe testimony shows clearly that the person pictured was standing as co-defendant Bogard had stood, with the sack at his feet, on the day the arrest occurred. There was no possibility of confusion in the identification of the person found nearest to the drugs. The explanation was clear that the sack in the photo was larger. The only possibly prejudicial implication the size of the sack could convey was with respect to the quantity of drugs seized. The laboratory report makes the quantity of drugs seized very clear.\nWe reverse the Trial Court\u2019s admission of evidence only upon a showing of prejudice and a resulting abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524, 798 S.W.2d 94 (1990); Bennett v. State, 297 Ark. 115, 759 S.W.2d 799 (1988). Given the explanations presented to the jury, there was no prejudice in the admission of the photograph.\n3. Rule 11(f)\nThe record has been examined to determine whether there' are any errors, other than those argued, requiring reversal, and none have been found.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "David Newbern, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Clyde E. Lee, for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "George WILLIS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 91-106\n829 S.W.2d 417\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 11, 1992\nClyde E. Lee, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0328-01",
  "first_page_order": 352,
  "last_page_order": 355
}