{
  "id": 1898823,
  "name": "Hugh Allen SLATER v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Slater v. State",
  "decision_date": "1992-06-29",
  "docket_number": "CR 92-111",
  "first_page": "73",
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      "cite": "832 S.W.2d 846"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name": "Ark."
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
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      "year": 1986,
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-42-101",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1987,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:02:16.191716+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Hugh Allen SLATER v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nHugh Allen Slater, Jr., appellant, was convicted of two counts of rape and two counts of kidnapping involving two different victims. He argues that the trial court misconstrued the rape shield statute and erroneously refused to allow him to present evidence of both prosecutrixes\u2019 sexual consent on other occasions. The trial court correctly applied the statute, and we affirm the judgments of conviction.\nAt trial appellant asserted a consent defense, and filed a motion pursuant to the rape shield statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-42-101 (1987), asking that he be allowed to present evidence of both prosecutrixes\u2019 sexual conduct on other occasions. Appellant proffered the testimony of a witness concerning the sexual conduct of one prosecutrix before the rape, and concerning the conduct of both prosecutrixes after both rapes. The trial court excluded the proffered testimony.\nThe statute broadly excludes evidence of specific instances of the victim\u2019s prior sexual consent with the accused or any other person, for all purposes. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-42-101(b) (1987). It then provides that the evidence directly pertaining to the act upon which the prosecution is based, or evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual conduct with the defendant, or any other person, may be admitted if the trial court determines that the evidence is relevant and its probative value outweighs its inflammatory nature. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-42-101 (c) (1987).\nAppellant argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling was overly broad since the statute only excludes evidence of \u201cprior\u201d sexual conduct, and not evidence of sexual conduct subsequent to the crime. In making this argument he relies upon a court of appeals case, Flurry v. State, 18 Ark. App. 64, 711 S.W.2d 163 (1986), which held that the statute does not prohibit evidence of sexual conduct of the victim after the rape occurred. However, appellant\u2019s reliance is misplaced, for we overruled the court of appeals case in Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986), and said that \u201cprior\u201d sexual conduct includes all sexual behavior of the victim prior to the date of the trial. Accord 1A J.H. Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 62.1, at 1331 (P. Tillers ed. 1983). Thus, the trial court did not err in applying the statute to exclude evidence of sexual conduct of the victims that occurred after the rapes.\nFurthermore, the trial court ruled that sexual conduct after the crimes was not relevant and, in ruling whether evidence sought to be admitted under the statute is relevant, the trial court is vested with broad discretion, and we will not overturn its decision unless it was clearly erroneous. Manees v. State, 274 Ark. 69, 622 S.W.2d 166 (1981). The decision here was not clearly erroneous.\nThe other evidence of subsequent conduct was the witness\u2019 proffered testimony that he had seen both of the prosecutrixes two nights after the rapes and they were \u201cout partying regular\u201d and were \u201cstill drinking and flirting around . . .just like they had been before.\u201d Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that this evidence was irrelevant. See Houston v. State, 266 Ark. 257, 582 S.W.2d 958 (1979), in which we upheld the trial court\u2019s ruling that testimony that the prosecutrix \u201chung around clubs and bars\u201d was not relevant.\nMoreover, the statute provides for the admission of only certain kinds of evidence, one of which is evidence of the victim\u2019s \u201csexual conduct.\u201d The statute defines \u201csexual conduct\u201d as \u201cdeviate sexual activity, sexual contact, or sexual intercourse. . . .\u2019\u2019Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-42-101 (a) (1987). Partying, drinking, and flirting do not constitute sexual conduct under the statute. Therefore, evidence of such conduct is not admissible under it. See Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 289 S.W.2d 5 (1979), in which we said that, because the conduct did not come within the statutory definition of sexual conduct, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of it. Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this part of the proffered evidence.\nAfffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John R. Henry, for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Hugh Allen SLATER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 92-111\n832 S.W.2d 846\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 29, 1992\n[Rehearing denied September 14, 1992.]\nJohn R. Henry, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0073-01",
  "first_page_order": 101,
  "last_page_order": 103
}