{ "id": 1896930, "name": "HALL'S CLEANERS, et al. v. Gwendolyn WORTHAM", "name_abbreviation": "Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham", "decision_date": "1992-11-16", "docket_number": "92-559", "first_page": "103", "last_page": "108", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "311 Ark. 103" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "842 S.W.2d 7" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ark. App. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138021 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/10/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ark. App. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/7/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ark. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136285 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/14/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748136 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723029 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629-631" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-702", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "786 S.W.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1884268 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ark. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ark. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1636816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/250/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137613 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 490, "char_count": 8903, "ocr_confidence": 0.899, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6429254002859165e-07, "percentile": 0.8232929796293142 }, "sha256": "18bc827440496d7256abc3b166a7428586e72d88b55705604d6fd2a4c3f43b1c", "simhash": "1:1a65e9f513255fb8", "word_count": 1465 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:33.473421+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Holt, C.J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "HALL\u2019S CLEANERS, et al. v. Gwendolyn WORTHAM" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThe Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Worker\u2019s Compensation Commission\u2019s affirmance of the administrative law judge\u2019s ruling that appellee\u2019s claim for initial benefits was filed within the two year statute of limitations mandated by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1 l-9-702(a)(l) (1987). Hall\u2019s Cleaners v. Wortham, 38 Ark. App. 86, 829 S.W.2d 424 (1992). We agree that appellee\u2019s claim was timely, and affirm.\nThe statute of limitations issue was submitted to the Commission on the basis of a stipulated record, which essentially reflected that over a period of twelve years appellee developed a swan neck deformity in her left thumb. The deformity was caused by appellee\u2019s continuous operation of a pressing machine while employed by appellant, Hall\u2019s Cleaners. Some three years before she filed the claim at issue, appellee experienced pain and sought and paid for treatment from her family physician, Dr. Jim Citty. Dr. Citty informed appellee that appellee\u2019s thumb deformity was job-related and irreversible. Appellee reported Dr. Citty\u2019s opinion to appellant in September of 1987 and was thereafter removed from the position of press operator and reassigned to a less strenuous position at the front counter. The reassignment did not affect appellee\u2019s wages.\nAppellee\u2019s pain increased, yet Dr. Citty maintained his position that the condition could not be remedied. However, he did recommend that appellee seek a second opinion and directed her to a Dr. Green. Dr. Green, after investigation, told appellee the deformity could be repaired by fusing the joints back together. \u2022\nRelying on this information, appellee left her employ at Hall\u2019s Cleaners and consented to the surgery recommended by Dr. Green. The surgery took place on August 31,1989. Appellee returned to work a little over a month after the operation. Appellee then filed her claim for benefits on October 12, 1989.\nThe administrative law judge ruled the injury to be a \u201cgradual on-set injury\u201d which did not accrue until August 31, 1989, when appellee first lost time from work, thus, her claim, having been filed on October 12, 1989, was well within the two year statute of limitations. Appellee was awarded temporary total disability from August 31, 1989, through October 9, 1989. She also received a permanent impairment rating of 25 % to the left hand.\nThe Commission, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed, holding that, (1) appellee\u2019s injury was not a latent injury and (2) that the substantial character of her injury was known more than two years prior to the filing of her claim but that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because her injury did not cause an incapacity to earn wages until August 31,1989, and that the statute did not begin to run until that date. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and we granted review.\nThe issue presented to the Court of Appeals was whether there was substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision that appellee\u2019s claim for benefits was not barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision and its decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. St. Michael Hospital v. Wright, 250 Ark. 539, 465 S.W.2d 904 (1971). Thus, before the appellate court may reverse a decision by the Commission, it must be convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. International Paper Co. v. Tuberville, 301 Ark. 22, 786 S.W.2d 830 (1990).\nThe statute under consideration is Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-702(a)(1) (1987) which provides:\nTIME FOR FILING. (1) A claim for compensation for disability on account of injury, other than a occupational disability and occupational infection, shall be barred unless filed with the commission within two (2) years from the date of\u2019the injury.\nThe issue on appeal is when did appellee\u2019s condition first rise to the level of an \u201cinjury\u201d for purposes of commencing the statute of limitation. The decisions of this Court, and those of the Court of Appeals, consistently proclaim Arkansas to be an \u201cinjury state,\u201d that is, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the injury as opposed to the time of the accident. Donaldson v. Calvert-McBride Printing Co., 217 Ark. 625, 232 S.W.2d 651 (1950); Cornish Welding Shop v. Galbraith, 278 Ark. 185, 644 S.W.2d 926 (1983); Calion Lumber Co. v. Goff, 14 Ark. App. 18, 684 S.W.2d 272 (1985). However, review of the case law on this subject demonstrates that labelling Arkansas merely as an \u201cinjury state\u201d is somewhat misleading.\nIn Donaldson, this court held that, for purposes of commencing the statute of limitations under \u00a7 11-9-702(a)( 1), the word \u201cinjury\u201d is to be construed as \u201ccompensable injury,\u201d and that an injury does not become \u201ccompensable\u201d until (1) the injury develops or becomes apparent and (2) claimant suffers a loss in earnings on account of the injury. Donaldson, 217 Ark. at 629-631, 232 S.W.2d at 654. Thus, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until both elements of the rule are met. Therefore, Arkansas is technically a \u201ccompensable injury\u201d state. (For a review of cases in which our decision in Donaldson was applied see, Shepherd v. Easterling Const. Co., 7 Ark. App. 192, 195, 646 S.W.2d 37 (1983) and Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 98-99, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983)).\nThe following provision, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-501 (a) (1987) determines at what point an injured worker first becomes entitled to benefits:\nCompensation to the injured employee shall not be allowed for the first seven (7) days disability resulting from injury, excluding the day of injury. If a disability extends beyond that period, compensation shall commence with the ninth day of disability. If a disability extends for a period of two (2) weeks, compensation shall be allowed beginning the first day of disability, excluding the day of injury.\nAlthough appellee\u2019s injury had been apparent for some three years, it is undisputed that she was never absent from the job until she reported to the hospital for reconstructive surgery on August 31, 1989. Thus, it was not until that time, when she missed a month of work, that she became entitled to benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law. Therefore, we hold that it was not until she underwent surgery that the limitations period of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-702(a)(l) commenced to run. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the Commission\u2019s specific finding that appellee\u2019s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.\nOn appeal, appellants contend that appellee\u2019s claim is barred by the statute of limitations and premises this point upon our decision in Cornish Welding Shop v. Galbraith, 278 Ark. 185, 644 S.W.2d 926 (1983). They argue the statute commenced to run on the date Dr. Citty informed appellee that her deformity was both job related and irreversible. Appellant\u2019s reliance on Cornish Welding Shops is misplaced and the distinction between Cornish Welding Shops and the case at bar is rudimentary.\nIt is clear that the issue at bar today is, \u201cwhat is a compensable injury for purposes of commencing the statute of limitations contained within \u00a71 l-9-702(a)(l),\u201d which applies to a claimant\u2019s right to recover benefits for an initial \u201ccompensable injury.\u201d However, in Cornish Welding Shops, this court was confronted with the issue, \u201cwhen does the statute of limitations contained within \u00a7 1 l-9-702(b) commence to run?\u201d That provision, in pertinent part, reads as follows:\nTIME FOR FILING FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. In cases where compensation for disability has been paid on account of injury, a claim for additional compensation shall be barred unless filed with the commission within one year one (1) year from the date of the last payment of compensation, or two (2) years from the date of the injury, whichever is greater.\nTherefore, \u00a7 ll-9-702(b) and Cornish Welding Shops govern only the time in which a claimant, suffering a recurrence of an earlier fully compensated \u201ccompensable injury,\u201d must file a. claim for \u201cadditional compensation.\u201d It is clear from a reading of both Donaldson and Cornish Welding Shops that the former is a \u201ccompensable injury\u201d case under \u00a7 1 l-9-702(a)(l) and the latter a \u201crecurrent injury\u201d case under \u00a7 1 l-9-702(b). Likewise, the case at bar is a \u201ccompensable injury\u201d case and thus, the Commission and the Court of Appeals were correct in ruling that Donaldson is controlling.\nWe therefore affirm the Court of Appeals.\nHolt, C.J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey, Trimble, Capps, Lowe, Sellars & Thomas, by: Chester C. Lowe, for appellants.", "Lee A. Biggs, III, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HALL\u2019S CLEANERS, et al. v. Gwendolyn WORTHAM\n92-559\n842 S.W.2d 7\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 16, 1992\n[Rehearing denied December 14, 1992.]\nBailey, Trimble, Capps, Lowe, Sellars & Thomas, by: Chester C. Lowe, for appellants.\nLee A. Biggs, III, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0103-01", "first_page_order": 127, "last_page_order": 132 }