{ "id": 1896998, "name": "Tommy ICE v. Burl BRAMLETT", "name_abbreviation": "Ice v. Bramlett", "decision_date": "1992-11-23", "docket_number": "92-599", "first_page": "157", "last_page": "163", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "311 Ark. 157" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "842 S.W.2d 29" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "243 Ark. 854", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0854-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-50-804", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ark. 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1646657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/224/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ark. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1612051 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344-45" }, { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/218/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ark. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1869662 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" }, { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/293/0571-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 527, "char_count": 10157, "ocr_confidence": 0.895, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.3649944456221193 }, "sha256": "2e7a04c56e9189b542a4bd68743b8fde5768b5f99cb0b16d5628ab143c798802", "simhash": "1:1f8cc2a10f2a199a", "word_count": 1735 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:33.473421+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Tommy ICE v. Burl BRAMLETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice.\nThis appeal involves one of two cases consolidated for all purposes, including discovery and trial, pursuant to ARCP Rule 42(a). Both cases arose out of an automobile collision occurring shortly after noon on June 2,1990, at the intersection of Main and Roosevelt Streets in Little Rock, Arkansas. Appellant, Tommy Ice, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by James Lee Williams. In separate actions, both appellant and Williams sued the driver of the other car, appellee Burl Bramlett. Both cases were tried together before a jury which returned verdicts for the defendant in both cases. Only appellant Ice appeals the judgment entered in accordance with the verdicts. As his sole point for reversal, appellant contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence relating to a traffic citation issued to appellee for his actions in the accident in question. We find no merit to appellant\u2019s argument and affirm the judgment.\nThe trial court granted appellee\u2019s motion in limine to exclude any testimony concerning whether anyone had received a traffic citation in association with the accident in question and the outcome of any such citation. Appellant contends that appellee received a citation for running the red light at the scene of the accident, that appellee pled guilty to such citation, and was placed on probation. Appellant further,contends this alleged guilty plea is an admission against appellee\u2019s interest and therefore should have been admissible in the trial below. Appellant relies heavily on Dedman v. Porch, 293 Ark. 571, 575, 739 S.W.2d 685, 687 (1987), which holds that \u201cthe only proper evidence relating to a traffic violation conviction is a party\u2019s plea of guilty in open court.\u201d There was evidence from which the jury could have concluded, and apparently did so conclude, that appellee did not run a red light. Thus, argues appellant, the trial court\u2019s exclusion of appellee\u2019s alleged guilty plea was prejudicial to appellant and reversible error.\nTo support his claim that appellee pled guilty to the citation, appellant points to the testimony of Mr. David Ogden, Chief Probation Officer of Little Rock Municipal Court, Traffic Division. Mr. Ogden appeared in the trial court\u2019s chambers with a copy of a \u201cprobation contract\u201d bearing the signature of one \u201cBurl H. Bramlett.\u201d Mr. Ogden testified to the following concerning the probation procedure used in the municipal court:\nTHE WITNESS: Okay. A typical situation, they would come to the cashier\u2019s window to pay the ticket. The cashier will ask them, \u201cHow many tickets have you had? You might qualify for probation,\u201d to try and give them a break, instead of paying the ticket out right, to pay a probation fee and go on the probation contract for six months or a year, depending on \u2014\nTHE COURT: Is that in lieu of paying the ticket?\nTHE WITNESS: Yes sir. It\u2019s a $50.00 probation fee in lieu of paying the fine. We keep it held in our files during the time period, either six months or a year. It does not go on the state driving record during that time period unless he violates probation during the time period.\nI have the defendant read the contact [sic] and I explain it to him and at the same time say, \u201cYou are pleading guilty to whatever the charge is,\u201d whether it\u2019s speeding or [a] stop sign or whatever it is, and it is a plea of guilty to go on the program. They\u2019re either found guilty at trial in Judge Watt\u2019s court itself or \u2014\nTHE COURT: Let\u2019s say that wasn\u2019t done in this case. There was no \u2014 he never \u2014 he never saw Judge Watt. [Emphasis added.]\nTHE WITNESS: Well, I\u2019m saying it happens one of two ways.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Well, it didn\u2019t happen the second way, so let\u2019s talk about the first way. [Emphasis added.]\nTHE WITNESS: Okay. Well, the contact [sic] says plead guilty or upon a finding of guilt. That\u2019s what I was trying to say that the contract says.\nTHE COURT: Well, how does he plead guilty? How do you plead guilty in this thing?\nTHE WITNESS: Well, Judge Watt lets us take this as a guilty plea \u2014\nTHE COURT: What do you mean, Judge Watt lets you take a guilty plea? How does he let you take a guilty plea?\nTHE WITNESS: Well, if you walk up \u2014\nTHE COURT: What do you do to take a guilty plea?\nTHE WITNESS: If you just walk up to the cashier\u2019s window and pay it, that\u2019s an admission of guilt. I mean, you\u2019re paying the ticket out right without going to court or\nTHE COURT: So you treat this the same as paying a fine as far as pleading guilty?\nTHE WITNESS: Yes, sir, pleading guilty to go on probation.\nTHE COURT: The difference is, in your mind, between paying a fine and going on probation. Is that the only difference?\nTHE WITNESS: As far as the guilty plea, yes, sir. You plead guilty, you pay a $50.00 probation fee, you have a chance to keep it off your record after a six-month time period. In this case, it was a six-month time period.\nTHE COURT: How does the judge\u2019s signature end up on this [probation contract]?\nTHE WITNESS: He signs those at the beginning of the day so we can use these without disturbing him in court on each and every case. He set up this procedure \u2014\nTHE COURT: It\u2019s signed before this man even came in?\nTHE WITNESS: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m not going to allow it.\nTHE WITNESS: Okay.\nTHE COURT: If it\u2019s that easy to plead guilty and hold a man by his statement, I don\u2019t see any difference between that and paying a ticket, and I\u2019m not criticizing you.\nTHE WITNESS: I understand.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m just saying we\u2019re talking about a whole different issue of getting before a jury and saying, this man knowingly pled guilty in court, I don\u2019t think he did that.\nAppellee points out that the foregoing testimony was proffered in chambers by plaintiff Williams, not by appellant. Appellee claims that because appellant did not proffer Ogden\u2019s testimony, appellant cannot now claim it was error to exclude his testimony. The record reveals that while some witnesses were called on behalf of Williams alone and other witnesses were called on behalf of appellant alone, Mr. Ogden was called on behalf of \u201cthe plaintiffs\u201d in chambers and out of the hearing of the jury. However, whether it was Williams or appellant who actually proffered Mr. Ogden\u2019s testimony into evidence is of no consequence since \u201c[w]e have already seen that consolidated cases must be viewed as a whole, that each plaintiff may claim the benefit of testimony introduced by others.\u201d Derrick v. Rock, 218 Ark. 339, 344-45, 236 S.W.2d 726, 729 (1951), cited with approval in Southern Nat\u2019l Ins. Co. v. Williams, 224 Ark. 938, 277 S.W.2d 487 (1955).\nOn the merits of appellant\u2019s claim, appellee argues that the municipal court\u2019s probation procedure does not include a plea of guilty \u201cin open court,\u201d and therefore is not admissible in a civil trial. Appellee also relied on Dedman, 293 Ark. 571, 739 S.W.2d 685, as well as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-50-804 (1987). In the alternative, appellant argues that even if we find appellee did not make a guilty plea in open court, evidence of the citation and probation should be admissible simply as a statement against interest.\nSection 27-50-804 provides that \u201c[n]o record of the forfeiture of a bond or of the conviction of any person for any violation of this subtitle shall be admissible as evidence in any court in any civil action.\u201d We have stated that a plea of guilty is an admission against interest and is therefore admissible in a civil trial. Midwest Bus Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 243 Ark. 854, 422 S.W.2d 869 (1968). When interpreting the section 27-50-804\u2019s predecessor, we have held that \u201cthe only proper evidence relating to a traffic violation conviction is a party\u2019s plea of guilty in open court.\u201d Dedman, 293 Ark. 571, 739 S.W.2d 685.\nWe observe the absence of any evidence in the record indicating that appellee actually received a traffic citation or that it was his signature on the probation contract proffered into evidence. Mr. Ogden\u2019s testimony was proffered in chambers and the trial court then granted appellee\u2019s motion in limine; thus, even though appellee did testify at the close of the case, his testimony was necessarily silent regarding any traffic citation or probation. At the in-chambers discussion, there was some indication by counsel that appellee gave a deposition in which he stated that he pled guilty to a citation. However, no such deposition was proffered into evidence. There is also a lack of evidence indicating that appellee ever appeared before the municipal judge, or that he appeared in any hearing or formal activity in which the municipal court conducts business.\nThe record does contain the probation contract allegedly signed by appellee stating that \u201c [h] aving plead [sic] guilty or upon a finding of guilt ... I have been advised in open court . . . that I have been placed on unsupervised probation for a period of six months.\u201d The contract is ambiguous as to whether the person signing it pled guilty or was found guilty. This ambiguity, especially when considered with the lack of evidence indicating appellee had actually received a citation, signed the contract, and appeared before the municipal judge, renders the contract insufficient to support a finding that appellee entered a guilty plea in open court..\nTherefore, due to the lack of evidence connecting appellee with the citation and probation, we hold consistently with Dedman, 293 Ark. 571, 739 S.W.2d 685, and section 27-50-804, that any evidence of the citation allegedly issued to appellee and any evidence of his alleged probation in municipal court was not a guilty plea made in open court nor an admission against interest and was therefore properly excluded by the trial court.\nAs an aside, appellant claims the trial court erroneously judged the validity of the municipal court\u2019s probationary procedure. We disagree that the trial court\u2019s order had the claimed effect and state that our decision does not either.\nThe judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mays & Crutcher, P.A., by: Arkie Byrd, for appellant.", "Matthews, Sanders, Liles & Sayes, by: Marci Talbot Liles, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Tommy ICE v. Burl BRAMLETT\n92-599\n842 S.W.2d 29\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 23, 1992\nMays & Crutcher, P.A., by: Arkie Byrd, for appellant.\nMatthews, Sanders, Liles & Sayes, by: Marci Talbot Liles, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0157-01", "first_page_order": 181, "last_page_order": 187 }