{
  "id": 1896949,
  "name": "C. E. WOOD v. Floy WHITE",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wood v. White",
  "decision_date": "1992-11-23",
  "docket_number": "92-681",
  "first_page": "168",
  "last_page": "171",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "311 Ark. 168"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "842 S.W.2d 24"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "297 Ark. 160",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1891463
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/297/0160-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:33.473421+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "C. E. WOOD v. Floy WHITE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice.\nAppellant, C.E. Wood, appeals a judgment of the Cleburne Circuit Court awarding appellee, Floy White, $15,000.00 compensatory damages and $15,000.00 punitive damages on her claim for assault, battery, and trespass. For reversal of the judgment entered pursuant to a unanimous jury verdict, appellant asserts four points of error in the trial, three of which have no merit. However, we find merit in appellant\u2019s first argument and therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. At least one of appellant\u2019s arguments involves a question in the law of torts; thus, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 29(l)(o).\nAppellant and appellee own adjoining tracts of land in Greers Ferry, Arkansas. In a separate lawsuit, appellant sued appellee to determine ownership of a particular strip of land. Appellee testified in the present suit that while the dispute on the ownership of the strip was pending, she did not even cross the strip. Once the trial court determining the dispute over the strip rendered its order stating appellee was the rightful owner of the land in question, she attempted to resume caring for the strip of property by cleaning it of debris and trash. Appellee testified to three specific altercations between her and appellant that occurred on March 11,1989, when she attempted to haul trash from the strip down toward the lake in order to burn the trash. She stated that on those three occasions, appellant cussed her while yelling that she was on his property and he meant for her to stay off of it; appellant also came onto the strip, pried appellee\u2019s hands off of her wheelbarrow full of debris, shoved her backward, pushed her wheelbarrow over to her patio and turned it over, spilling the debris on her patio. Appellee testified that she had no way of describing her feelings on those three occasions, but that she was scared of appellant and that she was \u201cdevastated of him.\u201d She also stated that she was still scared of appellant, that she could not and did not go onto the strip of property when she knew appellant was home, and that she did not have the expectation of being able to move about freely on her property.\nThe present suit consists of only four witnesses, two for each side. There is the appellee and her only corroborating witness, neighbor Ruth Gadberry, against appellant and his wife. Not surprisingly, appellant and his wife have a completely different recollection of the events of March 11,1989, than do appellee and Mrs. Gadberry. Thus, this case is an example of the proverbial \u201cswearing match.\u201d\nAppellant\u2019s first assignment of error is in the trial court\u2019s ruling excluding evidence of possible bias on the part of appellee\u2019s witness and neighbor, Ruth Gadberry. While cross-examining Mrs. Gadberry, appellant inquired whether any annoying telephone calls were made from her phone to appellant\u2019s phone. Mrs. Gadberry responded in the negative. Appellee objected to any further cross-examination concerning phone calls on the grounds that such calls were \u201cextraneous matters.\u201d Despite appellant\u2019s response that the rule excluding extrinsic evidence of misconduct did not apply to an attempt at showing bias or prejudice, the trial court sustained appellee\u2019s objection.\nAppellant was allowed to proffer the testimonies of six witnesses who were either Southwestern Bell employees or local law enforcement officers and who investigated appellant\u2019s report of an annoying phone call. The proffered evidence reveals that appellant was receiving annoying phone calls and reported this to the telephone company; that he had the phone company place a \u201ctrap\u201d on his phone line; that on April 13, 1989, appellant received one of the annoying calls that activated the trap; that the phone company determined the trap to have \u201clocked\u201d Mrs. Gadberry\u2019s phone onto appellant\u2019s phone on April 13,1989; that Mrs. Gadberry\u2019s phone did not have any devices such as a \u201cstacked drop\u201d or \u201ccable pair\u201d that would have allowed some other phone to cause hers to lock onto appellant\u2019s phone; that both Mr. and Mrs. Gadberry were home all day on April 13,1989, but their phone was not locked onto appellant\u2019s phone when law enforcement officials investigated the complaint late in the day on April 13, 1989.\nJust as he argued below, appellant argues on appeal that the foregoing evidence shows Mrs. Gadberry was biased against appellant. Mrs. Gadberry\u2019s alleged bias is particularly relevant, argues appellant, because her testimony was the only evidence appellee offered to corroborate her own testimony.\nOur law is well settled that evidence of a witness\u2019 bias or prejudice is not a collateral matter, and if a witness denies or does not fully admit the facts claimed to show bias, the attacker has a right to prove those facts by extrinsic evidence. Bowden v. State, 297 Ark. 160, 761 S.W.2d 148 (1988). This rule of law is applied to both criminal and civil cases alike. See Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, \u00a7 40 (3d ed. 1984).\nHostility of a witness toward a party is evidence of bias and may be shown by the fact that the witness has had a fight or quarrel with the party. Id. Certainly, the testimonies proffered by appellant show that someone at the Gadberry household made an annoying .phone call to appellant\u2019s home. It goes without saying that annoying phone calls are usually made as a result of some animosity or hostility toward the recipient of the call. At the very least, hostility toward appellant is something the jury could reasonably infer on the part of Mrs. Gadberry or someone in her household.\nThe proffered testimonies were evidence of Mrs. Gadberry\u2019s possible bias or prejudice against appellant and it was error for the trial court to prevent appellant from presenting such information to the jury. Furthermore, given the fact that Mrs. Gadberry\u2019s testimony was appellee\u2019s only corroborating evidence of her claim, appellant was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s error. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Odell Pollard, P.A., by: Margaret Meads, for appellant.",
      "Harkey, Walmsley & Blankenship, by: Leroy Blankenship, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "C. E. WOOD v. Floy WHITE\n92-681\n842 S.W.2d 24\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 23, 1992\nOdell Pollard, P.A., by: Margaret Meads, for appellant.\nHarkey, Walmsley & Blankenship, by: Leroy Blankenship, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0168-01",
  "first_page_order": 192,
  "last_page_order": 195
}