{
  "id": 1935031,
  "name": "Terry NUTT and Jerry Nutt v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Nutt v. State",
  "decision_date": "1993-03-08",
  "docket_number": "CR 92-1095",
  "first_page": "247",
  "last_page": "249",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "312 Ark. 247"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "848 S.W.2d 427"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "277 Ark. 271",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "275-76"
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        {
          "page": "12"
        }
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "278 Ark. 420",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1748257
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/278/0420-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:48:25.249850+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Terry NUTT and Jerry Nutt v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nAppellants were jointly tried and convicted of second degree murder. On appeal, they contend that the trial court improperly interfered with their voir dire examination. The appeal is without merit, and we affirm the judgments of conviction.\nDuring voir dire appellants\u2019 counsel began to recite the facts he thought would be proved during the trial. Perhaps before appellants\u2019 counsel had finished his recitation of facts, and clearly before any of the jurors had a chance to respond, the deputy prosecutor asked if counsel could approach the bench and, out of the hearing of the jury, objected to the factual recitation. The trial court ruled by advising appellants\u2019 counsel that at the time they were conducting voir dire examination, and not giving opening statements. Appellants\u2019 counsel responded that, after stating the facts, he intended to ask the jurors if they would accept his theory of the case and accept his defense. The trial judge advised appellants\u2019 attorney that he could not recite a set of facts and then seek to commit the prospective jurors to a decision in advance on those facts. Appellants\u2019 counsel asked a number of questions without objection and then asked the trial court for a clarification of its earlier ruling. Out of the hearing of the jury, the trial court responded that counsel might ask \u201cabout specific subjects, about the prospective juror\u2019s views on particular defenses, such as insanity defenses; however, you may not question them in regard to the facts expected to be proved at the trial and thus commit the jury to a decision in advance.\u201d\nAppellants contend the trial court\u2019s ruling erroneously prevented them from inquiring into prospective jurors\u2019 views regarding their theory of defense. The ruling of the trial court was eminently correct. The purposes of voir dire examination are to discover if there is any basis for challenges for cause and to gain knowledge for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 32.2; Sanders v. State, 278 Ark. 420, 646 S.W.2d 14 (1983). Those purposes do not include an attempt to commit the jurors to a decision in advance. In Hobbs v. State, 277 Ark. 271, 275-76, 641 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1982), we wrote, \u201c[Prospective jurors may not be questioned with respect to a hypothetical set of facts expected to be proved at trial and thus commit the jury to a decision in advance, but. . . they may be questioned . . . about their mental attitude toward certain types of evidence, such as circumstantial evidence.\u201d\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gregory E. Bryant, for appellants.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Terry NUTT and Jerry Nutt v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 92-1095\n848 S.W.2d 427\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 8, 1993\nGregory E. Bryant, for appellants.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0247-01",
  "first_page_order": 273,
  "last_page_order": 275
}